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Abstract: According to a "selective" (as opposed to "instructive") model of human language capacity, people come to know more than
they experience. The discrepancy between experience and eventual capacity (the "poverty of the stimulus") is bridged by genetically
provided information. Hence any hypothesis about the linguistic genotype (or "Universal Grammar," UC) has consequences for what
experience is needed and what form people's mature capacities (or "grammars") will take. This BBS target article discusses the
"trigger experience," that is, the experience that actually affects a child's linguistic development. It is argued that this must be a
subset of a child's total linguistic experience and hence that much of what a child hears has no consequence for the form of the eventual
grammar. UG filters experience and provides an upper bound on what constitutes the triggering experience. This filtering effect can
often be seen in the way linguistic capacity can change between generations. Children only need access to robust structures of
minimal ("degree-0") complexity. Everything can be learned from simple, unembedded "domains" (a grammatical concept involved
in defining an expression's logical form). Children do not need access to more complex structures.
Keywords: cognition, critical periods, development, early experience, evolution, grammar, innate structures, language, learn-
ability, learning, maturation, psycholinguistics
1. Introduction: A selective theory of language
acquisition
Linguists have traditionally maintained that language is
not acquired by children only on the basis of experience;
rather, children must themselves contribute something,
if only an appropriate "disposition to learn." As careful
studies were conducted, so "discovery procedures" and
"analogical principles" of increasing complexity were
postulated as part of the child's contribution to the pro-
cess of acquiring a language.
In the last thirty years, generative grammarians have
been developing a selective theory of language acquisi-
tion. We have sought to ascertain what information must
be available to children independently of any experience
with language, in order for the eventual mature linguistic
capacities to emerge on exposure to some typical "trig-
gering experience. " Cutting some corners, we have as-
sumed that this unlearned information is genetically
encoded in some fashion and we have adopted (1) as our
explanatory model:
(1) a. trigger (genotype —» phenotype)
b. primary linguistic data (Universal Grammar-* grammar)
The goal is to specify relevant aspects of a child's genotype
so that a particular mature state will emerge when a child
is exposed to a certain triggering experience, depending
on whether the child is raised in, say, a Japanese or
Navaho linguistic environment, (l.b) reflects the usual
terminology, where "Universal Grammar" (UG) contains
those aspects of the genotype directly relevant for lan-
guage growth, and a "grammar" is taken to be that part of
a person's mental make-up which characterizes mature
linguistic capacity.
The theory is "selective" in the same sense that current
theories of immunology and vision are selective and not
"instructive." Under an instructive theory, an outside
signal imparts its character to the system that receives it,
instructing what is essentially a plastic and modifiable
nervous system; under a selective theory, a stimulus may
change a system which is already highly structured by
identifying and amplifying some component of already
available circuitry. Put differently, a selective theory
holds that an organism experiences the surrounding en-
vironment (and selects relevant stimuli) according to
criteria which are already present internally. Jerne (1967)
depicts antibody formation as a selective process whereby
the antigen selects and amplifies specific antibodies
which already exist. Similarly, Hubel and Wiesel (1962)
showed that particular neurons were preset to react only
to a specific visual stimulus, such as a horizontal line;
exposure to a horizontal line entails a radical increase in
the number of horizontal line receptors, and a horizontal
line can be said to elicit and select specific responses
within the organism. Changeux (1980; 1983) argues along
similar lines for a theory of "selective stabilization of
synapses" whereby "the genetic program directs the
proper interaction between main categories of neu-
rons. . . . However, during development within a given
category, several contacts with the same specificity may
form" and other elements, which are not selected, may
atrophy (1980, p. 193). Thus to learn is to amplify certain
connections and to eliminate other possibilities (see also
Mehler 1974). Jerne (1967) argues that "looking back into
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Lightfoot: Language learnability
the history of biology, it appears that wherever a phe-
nomenon resembles learning, an instructive theory was
first proposed to account for the underlying mechanisms.
In every case, this was later replaced by a selective
theory." For more discussion, see Piattelli-Palmarini
(1986) and Jerne's Nobel Prize address (1985). [See also
Ebbesson: "Evolution and Ontogeny of Neural Circuits"
BBS 7(3) 1984.]
Under current formulations of linguistic theory (e.g.
Chomsky 1981), the linguistic genotype, UG, consists of
principles and parameters that are set by some linguistic
environment, just as certain receptors are "set" on ex-
posure to a horizontal line. So the environment may be
said to "select" particular values for the parameters of
UG. UG must be able to support the acquisition of any
human grammar, given the appropriate triggering expe-
rience. Of course, UG need not be seen as homogeneous,
and may emerge piecemeal, parts of it being available
maturationally only at certain stages of a child's develop-
ment. Grammars must not only be attainable under
normal childhood conditions; they must also be usable for
such purposes as speech production and comprehension,
they must be vulnerable to the kinds of aphasias that one
finds, and they should provide part of the basis for
understanding the developmental stages that children go
through. There is no shortage of empirical constraints on
hypotheses about (1).
2. Arguments from the poverty of the stimulus
The "logical problem of language acquisition" has pro-
vided much of the empirical refinement of (1). Apparent
"poverty of the stimulus" problems have led gram-
marians to postulate particular principles and parameters
at the level of UG: The stimulus or trigger experience that
children have appears to be too poor to determine all
aspects of the mature capacities that they typically attain.
It is too poor in three distinct ways: (a) The child's
experience is finite but the capacity eventually attained
ranges over an infinite domain and must therefore incor-
porate some recursive property not demanded by experi-
ence; (b) the experience consists partly of degenerate data
which have no effect on the emerging capacity (see
section 4); and, most important, (c) it fails to provide the
data needed to induce many principles and generaliza-
tions which hold true of the mature capacity. Of these
three, (a) and (b) have been discussed much more fre-
quently than (c), although (c) is by far the most significant
factor and provides a means for elaborating theories of
UG, as I shall now illustrate. For discussion, see
Chomsky (1965, ch.l), Hornstein and Lightfoot (1981,
pp. 9-31), and Lightfoot (1982, ch.2). [See also Chomsky
"Rules and representations" BBS 3(1) 1980].
Any argument from the poverty of the stimulus makes
crucial assumptions about the nature of the triggering
experience. To illustrate, I shall briefly summarize an
argument originally presented by Baker (1978), which has
been restated in terms of standard X-bar theory by
Hornstein and Lightfoot (1981) and by Lightfoot (1982). It
has generally been agreed for a long time that linguistic
expressions are made up of subunits and have an internal
hierarchical structure. It is also generally agreed that a
grammar (in the sense defined) is not just a list of ex-
pressions but is a finite algebraic system which can
"generate" an infinite range of expressions. One might
imagine, in that case, that English noun phrases have the
structure of either (2.a) or (2.b).
(2) a. NP
N'
Specifier N' b. NP




If the phrase structure rules generating a noun phrase
(NP) are those of (2. a), a phrase like an old man from the
city will have the internal structure of (3. a); if the rules are
those of (2.b), the structure will be (3.b). In (3.a) an old
man, for example, does not form a single phrasal unit, but
in (3.b) it does. The crucial difference is that the rules of
(2.a) refer to N', an element intermediate between the
head noun (N) and the maximal phrasal projection (NP) of
that noun.
(3) a. NP NP
man from the city an old man from the city
Now, it can be shown that any noun phrase that occurs
in English, and thus any noun phrase that an English-
speaking child will hear, can be generated by both sets of
rules. However, linguists believe that something along
the lines of (2. a) must be correct, or at least preferred to
(2.b), because (2.b) is consistent with certain phenomena
which do not occur in English (in contrast to (2.a)) and
because (2.b) has no N' node, and therefore provides no
straightforward way to distinguish between (4.a&b), and
no ready means to capture the ambiguity of (5.a), which
may have the meaning of (5.b) or (5.c). The details of the
analysis need not concern us here.1
(4) a. *the student of physics is older than the one of chemistry
b. the student from New York is older than the one from
Los Angeles
(5) a. he wants an old suit but he already has the only one I
own
b. he wants an old suit but he already has the only suit I
own
c. he wants an old suit but he already has the only old suit I
own
What is relevant here is the following problem: Chil-
dren might be exposed to any noun phrase that could
occur in English, but they are not systematically in-
formed that sentences like (4. a) are not uttered by most
speakers and that (5.a) has two possible meanings. In fact,
perception of ambiguity is a sophisticated skill which
develops late and not uniformly; most ambiguities pass
unnoticed and people take the most appropriate of the
available meanings. Children do come to know these
things, and this knowledge is indeed part of the output of
the language acquisition process, but it is not part of the
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input, not part of the "evidence" for the emerging sys-
tem, and thus not part of the triggering experience.
Consequently, although linguists are able to choose hy-
pothesis (2. a) over (2.b) on the basis of phenomena like (4)
and (5), children have no analogous basis for such a choice
if such data are not available to them. It is in this sense
that the stimulus is too impoverished to fully determine
the emergent analysis.
Hence children must arrive at (2.a) on some other,
presumably nonexperiential basis. As an account of this
basis, linguists have postulated genotypical information
that phrasal categories have the structure of (6).
(6) a. XP -» Specifier, X'
b. X' -» fX'l.(YP)
According to (6.a), any noun phrase (NP) consists of a
Specifier (e.g. an article) and a subphrase N' in some
order to be determined by the child's particular linguistic
experience, the "trigger" of (l.a); similarly, a verb phrase
(VP) consists of a Specifier and a V in some order, and
likewise the other phrasal categories. By (6.b), the N'
consists of a head (N or N') and perhaps some comple-
ment phrase in some order (the comma indicates an
unordered set and YP covers any phrasal category or a
clause).
Under (6), the linear order of constituents constitutes a
parameter that is set on exposure to some trigger, for
example (7).
(7). a. the house
b. students of linguistics, belief that Susan left
The English-speaking child hears phrases like (7.a) and,
after some development, analyzes them as consisting of
two words, one of a closed class (the) and the other of an
open class (house); in the light of this and in the light of the
parameter in (6.a), the child adopts the first rule of (2.a).
Likewise, exposure to phrases like (7.b) suffices to set the
parameter in (6.b), so that the second rule of (2.a) is
adopted.2 Given the parameters in (6), rules like those of
(2.b) are never available to children and therefore do not
have to be "unlearned" in any sense. Although no "evi-
dence" for the existence of a phrasal category N' seems to
be available in a child's experience, it is provided by the
genotype and therefore occurs in mature grammars (I
shall consider an alternative account later).
There is much more to be said about this argument and
about its consequences. I have sketched it briefly here in
order to demonstrate that a poverty-of-stimulus argu-
ment is based on assumptions about the triggering experi-
ence. The assumption so far has been that the nonoccur-
rence for many people of (4. a) and the ambiguity of (5. a)
are not part of the trigger, but that garden variety NPs
like (7) are. It should be clear that there is a close
relationship between the three entities of (1), and a claim
made about any one of them usually has consequences for
hypotheses about the other two.
This is by now reasonably well-established for UG and
particular grammars, but there has been a curious silence
about the triggering experience. Generativists nowadays
describe "parametric differences " between the grammars
of, say, Japanese and Navaho, but they rarely mention
how the parameters would be set for the particular
grammars of these languages: what the triggering experi-
ence would need to be for the Japanese and Navaho child.
Worse, if one tries to tease out the implicit assumptions
about the trigger, they sometimes include exotic or nega-
tive data (see below). Despite this incomprehensible
omission, which potentially undermines the claims being
made, there is an intrinsic relationship between the items
in (1). If the trigger or the "primary linguistic data" (PLD)
were rich and well-organized, correspondingly less infor-
mation would be needed in UG, and vice versa. These are
not aesthetic swings and roundabouts; there are clear
facts which limit viable hypotheses. My goal here is to
focus attention on the triggering experience.
I shall argue that the trigger consists of a haphazard set
of utterances made in an appropriate context, utterances
of a type that any child hears frequently. In other words,
it consists of robust data and includes no "negative data"-
no information that certain expressions do not occur.
First I will contrast this idea with some other ideas in the
literature. Then in section 5 I will flesh it out, making it
more precise and arguing that the trigger consists only of
simple, unembedded material and that everything can be
learned from structures of "degree-0" complexity, where
structural complexity is defined in terms of logical forms.
3. Negative data
It is clear that the PLD which trigger the growth of a
child's grammar do not include much of what linguists use
to choose between hypotheses. To this extent, the chil-
dren are not "little linguists," constructing their gram-
mars in the way that linguists construct their hypotheses.
For example, the PLD do not include well-organized
paradigms or comparable data from other languages. Nor
do the PLD include rich information about what does not
occur, that is, negative data.3 It is true that some zealous
parents correct certain aspects of their child's speech and
so provide negative data, but this is not the general basis
for language development. First, such correction is not
provided to all children and there is no reason to suppose
that it is an indispensable ingredient for language growth
to take place. Second, even when it is provided, it is
typically resisted, as many parents will readily attest.
McNeill (1966, p.69) recorded a celebrated illustration of
this resistance.
Child: Nobody don't like me.
Mother: No, say "nobody likes me."
Child: Nobody don't like me.
(eight repetitions of this dialogue)
Mother: No, now listen carefully; say "nobody likes me."
Child: Oh, nobody don't likes me.
Third, correction is provided only for a narrow range of
errors, usually relating to morphological forms. So, the
occasional taked, goed, the man what we saw, etc, might
be corrected; on the eighth try McNeill's child perceived
only a morphological correction, changing like to likes.
However, not even the most conscientious parents cor-
rect deviant uses of the contracted form of verbs like is
and will (8) - in this case because they do not occur in
children's speech.
(8) a. *Jay's taller than Kay's (cf. . . . than Kay is)
b. *Jay'H be happier than Kay'11 (cf. . . . than Kay will)
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Parents also do not correct errors in which anaphors such
as each other are misused. Matthei (1981) reports that
children sometimes interpret sentences like the pigs said
the chickens tickled each other with each other referring
to the pigs. This misinterpretation, discovered under
experimental conditions, is unlikely to be perceived by
many adults in everyday circumstances. Similarly with
many other features of children's language; for good
discussion, see Baker (1979).
It is sometimes argued that although children are not
supplied with negative data directly, they may have
access to them indirectly. So Chomsky speculates along
these lines:
If certain structures or rules fail to be exemplified in
relatively simple expressions, where they would be
expected to be found [my emphasis], then a (possibly
marked) option is selected excluding them in the gram-
mar, so that a kind of "negative evidence" can be
available even without corrections, adverse reactions,
etc. (1981, p.9)
This is illustrated by the so-called null-subject parameter,
whereby finite declarative sentences like (9) occur with a
phonetically null subject in Italian, Spanish, and many
other languages, but the corresponding expressions do
not occur in English, French, and so on.
(9) a. ho trovato il libro
b. chi credi che partiri?
c. *found the book
d. *who do you think that will leave?
Whatever the form of the parameter permitting this kind
of variation, Chomsky, following Rizzi (1982b), suggests
that if the English-speaking child picks the wrong setting,
then failure to hear sentences like (9.c) might be taken as
indirect evidence that such sentences are ungrammatical
and thus do not occur for some principled reason. Conse-
quently the child will pick the setting which bars (9.c,d).
Two remarks on this': First, if children do have indirect
access to negative data, it will have to be specified under
what circumstances this occurs. That is, in Chomsky's
formulation above, the phrase "in relatively simple ex-
pressions, where they would be expected to be found"
will need to be elaborated in such a way that it dis-
tinguishes cases like (9) from those like (4) and (8). One
can argue that children may have indirect access to data
like (9.c), but it is hardly plausible to say that they have
indirect access to (8). For this distinction to be made, UG
would have to be enriched to include analogical notions
which have not yet been hinted at.
Second, so far as there are no strong arguments for
indirect access to negative data. There are certainly
plausible alternative explanations for the null-subject
phenomenon. One possibility is to claim that the English
setting for the relevant parameter is unmarked, that is,
the default case. Thus Italian and Spanish children need
specific evidence to adopt the other setting, and (9. a) is
the required evidence.4 The fact that the Italian setting
for the parameter seems to be much more common across
languages than the English setting does not entail that it is
less marked, since markedness values do not reflect
statistical frequency. In fact, Berwick's Subset Principle
(1985) predicts that the Italian setting should be marked.
The Subset Principle requires children to "pick the
narrowest possible language consistent with evidence
seen so far" (p.237). The Italian setting of the parameter
entails a language which is broader than one with the
English setting (because in Italian subjects may or may
not be phonetically expressed), and therefore the English
setting needs to be unmarked (p.290).
Another possibility is to make the variation in null
subjects depend on some other property. It has often
been suggested that null subjects occur only in grammars
with rich verbal inflection. However, rich inflection is not
a sufficient condition for null subjects: German does not
have null subjects, although its verbal inflection involves
number, person, and gender like that of Spanish, which
does allow null subjects. Consequently, the learning
problem remains constant and is unaffected by the
richness of inflections. As an alternative account, Hyams
(1983) related the impossibility of null subjects to the
occurrence of expletive pronouns (it's cold, there's no
more), which occur in English, French, and German but
not in Italian or Spanish; she marshalled some interesting
evidence in favor of something along these lines by
considering the developmental stages that children go
through.
Indirect access to negative data may prove to be neces-
sary for a full explanation of language acquisition but so far
no very plausible case has been made.5 The notion raises
nontrivial problems in defining the contexts in which
indirect access is available. Meanwhile, plausible solu-
tions for problems which seem to call for indirect access to
negative data may be suggested by viewing the phe-
nomena in relation to other properties and not in isola-
tion. I have mentioned two such possibilities here, but
there are other suggestions in the literature.
4. Not all experience is a trigger
Putting aside further discussion of the possibility of indi-
rect access to certain negative data, one can plausibly
argue that the triggering experience is less than what a
"little linguist" might encounter and that it does not
include information about ungrammatical sentences or
the many other properties that are analyzed in a typical
issue of Linguistic Inquiry. Such information is simply
not part of any child's linguistic experience. Conse-
quently, we may persist with the idea that the trigger
consists of nothing more than a haphazard set of utter-
ances in an appropriate context. In fact, we can restrict
things further: The trigger is something less than the total
linguistic experience. Neither the occasional degenerate
data that a child hears nor idiosyncratic forms necessarily
trigger some device in the emergent grammar which has
the effect of generating those forms. So, for example, a
form like (10. a) might occur in a child's experience with-
out triggering the formation of a rule that generates this
unusual form of subject-verb agreement. Similarly, a
child growing up in New York might hear (10. b) without
adopting y'all as a word in his grammar.
(10) a. the person who runs the stores never treat people well
b. y'all have a good time in South Carolina
A child might even be exposed to significant quantities of
linguistic material that does not act as a trigger. So, if a
house-guest speaks an unusual form of English, perhaps
with different regional forms or the forms of somebody
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who has learned English imperfectly as a second lan-
guage, this normally has no noticeable effect on a child's
linguistic development. Even children of immigrant par-
ents with heavy accents perpetuate few nonstandard
aspects of their parents' speech.
This is fairly obvious intuitively and shows that there is
little to be learned about the trigger experience from
simply tape-recording everything uttered within a child's
hearing (cf. Wells 1981). More can be learned from the
historical changes that languages undergo. It is well
known that certain kinds of syntactic patterns become
obsolete in certain speech communities at certain times.
This means that children sometimes hear a form which
does not trigger some grammatical device for incorporat-
ing this form in their grammar. Thus, even though they
have been exposed to the form, it does not occur in their
mature speech. The conditions under which this happens
cast some light on the nature of the trigger.
Consider an example discussed in some detail in Light-
foot (1979; 1982). In earlier forms of English, sentences
such as the king likes the queen used to occur with the
same general meaning that they have today but with
the king being analyzed as the object of the verb like and
the queen as the subject. So a Middle English speaker
might also have heard (11), where the postverbal noun
phrase is clearly the subject (having an appropriate case in
(11.a) and agreeing with the verb in number in (11.b)). It
is plausible to assign such forms structure (12), where the
postverbal subject is linked to the canonical subject
position, which is empty (and perhaps the residue of a
movement transformation). Like must have meant "cause
pleasure for," unlike in Modern English, where it always
means "derive pleasure from." There were some forty or
fifty verbs which could occur in such a syntactic context:
Other examples were repent, rue, ail, and so forth.
(11) a. him likes the queen
b. the king like the pears
(12)
 NP[ej] v p [ v.[him likes] NP[the queen,]]
Forms like (11) died out during the Middle English
period; that is, some speakers must have heard them but
did not reproduce them. For those speakers such forms
were part of their linguistic environment but were not
part of the trigger experience; they did not trigger a
grammatical device which permitted their generation,
and we know why. Notice that structure (12) contains a V
with object-verb order. This order was characteristic of
early English, just as it is characteristic of modern Dutch
and German. Given the phrase structure convention of
(6.b), speakers of early English had the head of V in final
position, whereas later English speakers fixed the order
differently. For a discussion of how that change took
place, see Canale (1978) and Lightfoot (1979; 1982). My
point here is that as the order of elements within the V
changed, so forms like (11) were no longer part of the
trigger, although they were heard by children. When the
order of constituents in V was fixed differently, a form
like (11.a) would have a structure like (13).
(13)
 NP[e|] VP[v.[likes him] NP[the queenj]
The problem is that there is no ready way for him to move
to a preverbal position without violating a principle of
grammar. There is only one available NP position for him
to move to, since there is no evidence that Middle
Lightfoot: Language learnability
English allowed a preverbal clitic NP. If him moved to the
empty subject position, the indexed empty element
would no longer exist, and there would be no way of
interpreting the queen as the subject with which the verb
must agree in number and person. The derivation would
violate Chomsky's (1981) "theta criterion", because there
would be no one-to-one relationship between noun
phrases and "theta positions," that is, "logical" positions
in which an NP may be understood as filling a semantic
function (him would be associated with two positions and
the queen with none). Consequently, a form like (11.a)
could not be derived from a structure like (13).
Nonetheless, children at the relevant stage presum-
ably heard sentences like the king likes the queen uttered
in a context in which it was clear that the king was happy
and that the queen was the reason for his happiness. Since
an analysis like (13) was not available, a ready alternative
was adopted where no NP was moved and the preverbal
NP was interpreted as the subject (14). Forms like (11)
were heard but not reproduced; they were replaced by
(14.b,c).
(14) a.
 NP[the king] vp[ v,[likes NP[the queen]]]
b.
 NP[he] vp[ v.[likes NP[the queen]]]
c-
 NP[he] vp[ v,[likes NP[the pears]]]
Under this syntactic analysis, which was forced for the
reasons given, and given the perceived meaning of the
sentence, like could only be interpreted with a different
meaning, the modern "derive pleasure from." Conse-
quently, the old meaning of like and forms like (11) were
not part of the trigger experience and died out of the
language; the reason was that they could not be in-
terpreted consistently with the context in which they
were uttered and consistently with a V containing a head
preceding a complement . . . assuming that other as-
pects of the grammar were triggered as in the immediate-
ly preceding generation of speakers.6
The point of this discussion has been to reinforce the
claim that the trigger experience may be less than the
total linguistic experience of a child, and to show that
considering the conditions under which structures be-
come obsolete in a language tells us something about the
limits to trigger experiences. Indeed, from the point of
view of the research program under discussion here, this
seems to be a major interest of historical change: Properly
interpreted, it can reveal something about the limits to
trigger experiences if one studies the conditions under
which structures drop out of the language and thus fail to
be triggered at a certain stage of the history of a language.
The trigger experience is hence some subset of a child's
total linguistic experience. But where exactly are the
limits? This is often a crucial question in grammatical
analyses, but it is rare to see alternatives discussed.
Consider again the example of the structure of noun
phrases. I argued above that any noun phrase that an
English-speaking child could hear would be consistent
with the rules of both (2. a) and (2.b). I also claimed that
the data which lead grammarians to prefer (2.a) to (2.b)
are generally not available to children and that the infor-
mation which eliminates (2.b) must therefore come from
some other, presumably genetic source. One could look
at things somewhat differently, however. The real dif-
ference between (2.a) and (2.b) is the existence of a N'
node in the rules of (2.a). The existence of this node is
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required by the UG rule schema in (6) and, on that
account, does not have to be derived from relevant
experience. In that case, we might ask whether there is
anything in a child's experience which would require
postulating an N' node; one can indeed imagine evidence
that would force the child to establish such a node.
English speakers use the indefinite pronoun one to
refer back to an N' (see note 1); the fact that it refers to an
N', something intermediate between the head N and its
maximal projection (NP), might in fact be learnable. A
sentence like (15. a) would not be a sufficient basis for
learning this because, regardless of whether Heidi actu-
ally has a big or small cup, the sentence could always be
interpreted as specifying only that Heidi had some cup
regardless of size (with one referring only to the N cup).
Sentence (15.b), however, would suffice if uttered in a
situation where Heidi has a cup that is some color other
than blue; only the interpretation with one representing
blue cup would be consistent with the facts. In that case, a
child might learn correctly that one stands for a phrasal
projection of N, namely an N' .7
(15) a. Kirsten has a big cup, and Heidi has one too
b. Kirsten has a blue cup, but Heidi doesn't have one
We now have two alternative accounts: The existence
of N' might be derived from a property of UG or it might
be triggered by the scenario just sketched. My hunch was
and remains that this scenario is too exotic and contrived
to be part of every child's experience, and therefore that
postulating (6) at the level of UG is more plausible. But
this hunch may be wrong. It is certainly falsifiable. If a
rule schema like (6) exists in UG, then strong claims are
made about the possible degree of variability in the
structure of NPs that will be found in the languages of the
world: In languages where this kind of structural configu-
ration is relevant (which may or may not be all languages),
there will be essentially four NP types as in (16).
(16) a.
 NP[Spec N. [head complement]]
b.
 NP[Spec N.[complement head]]
c.
 NP[ N,[head complement] Spec]
d.
 NP[ N. [complement head] Spec]
Type (16.a) is represented by English, French, and so on,
and type (16. b) seems to be manifested in Basque, Bur-
mese, Burushaski, Chibcha, Japanese, Kannada, and
Turkish (see Greenberg 1966, n. 20). Types (16.c,d) are
more problematic because I know of no carefully studied
grammar which manifests them. Greenberg (1966) and
Hawkins (1979) discuss several languages in which de-
monstratives follow the head noun and which therefore
might be of type (16. c or d), but they do not distinguish
between demonstratives which have the syntax of adjec-
tives (as in Latin) and those which manifest Spec (as in
English). If it should turn out that types (16.c,d) do not
occur, then the rule schema of (6. a) will be tightened to
allow only the Spec-N' order.
Also, the rule schema (6) suggests that one will find
developmental stages corresponding to the fixing of the
two parameters by a child. Lightfoot (1982, p.l79f),
building on work by Klima and Bellugi (1966) and Roeper
(1979), argues that this is indeed the case. Children seem
to acquire noun phrase structures in four identifiable
stages. Examples (17.a,b) list some noun phrases occur-
ring in the first two stages.
(17) a. car b. a coat that Adam
baby a celery more coffee
wa-wa (water) a Becky two socks
mama a hands big foot
hands my mommy
All children go through the four stages at some point,
although the ages may vary. Most children utter the
stage 2 forms between one and two years. At stage 3
there is more sophistication.
(18) mama my doll a blue flower
cracker your cracker a nice cap
doll a your horse
spoon that a horse
that a blue horse
your blue cap
At stage 4 the mature system emerges, which normally
remains more or less constant for the rest of the child's
lifetime. But consider (19), some forms that never occur
in children's speech.














Recall the parameters for noun phrases developed
earlier. These were hypotheses about how NP structure
could vary from grammar to grammar. At stage 1 these
parameters are irrelevant, because the child has only one-
word structures. Other cognitive capacities are relevant,
such as the conceptual system that involves properties
and conditions of reference, knowledge and belief about
the world, conditions of appropriate use, and so on. These
play a role in explaining why mama and cup are more
likely than photosynthesis, quark, or grammar to be
among the earliest words in a child's speech.
At stage 2 the child seems to have fixed the linear order
parameter of rule schema (6. a) and determined that the
order is Spec N': All specifiers appear at the front of the
noun phrase. The occurrence of phrases like a Becky or a
hands suggests that at this stage children cannot dis-
tinguish definite and indefinite articles, and that they do
not know that a is singular. There is no evidence that the
child can distinguish subtypes of specifiers (articles, pos-
sessives, numerals, demonstratives), but they all occur
one at a time in front of a noun.
By stage 3, children discriminate some kinds of spec-
ifiers and establish some more of the relative orders. In
fact, the child knows that all specifiers precede adjec-
tives, which in turn precede nouns, and that specifiers are
optional, whereas the noun is obligatory. The stage 3
grammar differs from the mature system in that the child
does not yet know that an article may not co-occur with a
demonstrative or with a possessive like your. This sug-
gests that the child now has the rules NP—» Spec N', N'
—* (Adj) N, but that it takes a little longer to determine the
status of a demonstrative and whether a form like your is a
specifier or an adjective. After all, in other languages
demonstratives and possessives are often adjectives in-
stead of specifiers.
Consequently, there is reason to believe that postulat-
ing the rule schema in (6) at the level of UG is more
plausible than claiming that the existence of N' is learned
on the basis of exposure to sentences like (15. b) uttered in
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the relevant context. But the important point is that
alternatives like this need to be sketched and evaluated,
and that grammarians should be paying more attention to
their assumptions about the nature of the triggering
experience required to set the parameters of UG that
they hypothesize.
So I persist with the idea that the trigger is a subset of a
child's experience, and that it probably does not include
exotic events like the one sketched above in the context of
(15. b). The trigger consists only of robust data which can
be analyzed consistently with genotypical principles.
There remains the question of how small the subset is.
There is a theory, advanced recently by Snow (1977)
and earlier by Jespersen (1922, p. 142; as pointed out to
me by Jim McCawley), that the crucial input for language
growth to take place is very small: a specially structured
form of speech transmitted through mothers and care-
takers. This "motherese " is supposed to provide a set of
patterns which are generalized by children on an induc-
tive basis. This view was held fairly widely for a while.
There are at least four reasons why this kind of pattern
generalization is not the answer to how children acquire
speech. First, although children no doubt register only
part of their linguistic environment, there is nc way of
knowing quite what any individual child registers. Hence
factual basis is lacking for the claim that children register
only what is filtered for them through parents' deliber-
ately simplified speech. Children have access to more
than this, including defective utterances.
Second, even supposing that children register only
perfectly well-formed expressions, this would not be
enough to show that the child has a sufficient inductive
base for language acquisition. Recall that the child's
stimulus is "deficient" in three distinct ways (sect. 2
above); the motherese hypothesis would circumvent only
the degeneracy problem (b) but leaves untouched the
infinity problem (a) and the far more important problem
(c): the absence of evidence in PLD (primary linguistic
data) for certain partial generalizations. The poverty of
stimulus problems still hold and the child would need to
know that the contractability of the first is in (8) could not
be extended to the second is. One wants to know why
quite ordinary inductive generalizations like this are not
in fact made; the so-called motherese does not show
where inductive generalizations must stop.
Third, if the child registered only the simplified and
well-formed sentences of motherese, the problem of
language learning would be more difficult because the
child's information would be more limited.
Fourth, careful studies of parents' speech to children
(e.g. Newport et al. 1977) show that an unusually high
proportion consists of questions and imperatives; simple
declarative sentences are much rarer than in ordinary
speech. This suggests that there is very little correlation
between the way the child's language emerges and what
parents do in their speech directed at children. Thus, the
existence of motherese in no way eliminates the need for
postulating a genetic basis to explain language acquisi-
tion. The child is primarily responsible for the acquisition
process, not parents or older playmates. (For a good
discussion of this topic, see Wexler and Culicover 1980,
pp. 66-78.)
Furthermore, though it is by no means clear exactly
what this motherese consists of, the general phenomenon
is not uniform and does not occur in all households or
cultures. Even where motherese is not practiced, chil-
dren nonetheless attain a normal linguistic capacity. This
suggests that the child's trigger experience does not need
to be limited artificially along the lines of motherese.
5. Degree-0 learnability
Wexler and Culicover (1980) argued for limits to a child's
trigger with their notion of degree-2 learnability. They
offered the first "learnability proof," showing that, given
certain constraints on grammatical processes, a child
might be confronted with (b, s) pairs (where b is a base
structure, in which transformational and phonological
rules have not applied, and s a surface string) and would
identify the relevant grammar in finite time when ex-
posed only to sentences with two levels of embedding;
this is "degree-2 learnability." The first learnability proof
was bound to be important and many interesting assump-
tions were made about language learners, not all of them
very plausible (see Baker 1982; Morgan 1986). In particu-
lar, the notion that children must have access to very
complex sentences seems worth examining.8
Since Wexler and Culicover there have been real
advances in grammatical theory, notably the develop-
ment of the parameter-setting model of UG, replacing
the earlier selectional model of Chomsky (1965), whereby
a child was said to "select" the appropriate grammar
through the aid of an evaluation metric. Also, for the last
fifteen years grammarians have been trying to develop
locality restrictions in such a way that grammatical pro-
cesses affect only elements which are not too far apart.
This work suggests that, in general, grammatical pro-
cesses have effects only on items which are clause-mates
(members of the same clause) or where an item in a lower
clause is, loosely, at the front of that clause. Locality
restrictions are formulated somewhat differently at differ-
ent stages of the development of UG and by different
authors. The details of various locality restrictions need
not concern us immediately, but they do raise the follow-
ing question: If grammatical processes are generally lim-
ited to clause-mates or at most to items of which one is at
the front of an embedded clause, why should children
need to hear more than a single clause (plus the front of a
lower clause) in order to hear the effects of all possible
grammatical processes in their language? In other words,
can everything be learned from main clauses (degree-0
learnability) plus a little bit?
This work may suggest a tight restriction on the trigger
experience, but there is no demonstration effect (al-
though this has sometimes been assumed, e.g. Culicover
& Wilkins 1984; see Lightfoot 1986 for discussion). This
will be illustrated as we consider some apparent coun-
terexamples to degree-0 and even degree-l learnability,
which are consistent with the usual locality conditions
and with degree-2 learnability. I shall argue that these
cases are in fact compatible with a degree-0 learnability
account.
5.1. Bounding nodes. Chomsky (1973) proposed a Subja-
cency condition, which requires syntactic movement to
be local, crossing no more than one "bounding" node.
Wh-phrases move to a complementizer position
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("Comp") at the front of a clause; hence a clause, S',
consists of Comp and S, and S in turn consists of a subject
NP, an inflection element INFL (including tense and an
agreement marker), and a VP. Consequently, a wh-
phrase must move step-wise from within an embedded
clause to the front of a main clause, leaving a "trace" at
each stage; so who did Jay say Kay met? would be derived
as in (20), and each movement crosses only one bounding
node, S.
Rizzi (1982a, p.73 n.25) and Sportiche (1981) have
argued for a parametric difference between English on
the one hand and French and Italian on the other, so that
English speakers have S as a bounding node whereas
French and Italian speakers have S'. Rizzi points to (21.a)
and Sportiche to (21.b,c), which have a long-distance
movement as in (22) (which is Sportiche's analysis for
21.c).
(21) a. tuo fratello, a cui mi domando che storie abbiano
raccontato, era molto preoccupato
"your brother, to whom I wonder which stories they
told, was very troubled"
b. e'est a mon cousin que je sais lequel ofirir
"it's to my cousin that I know which one to offer"
c. voila une liste des gens a qui on n'a pas encore trouve
quoi envoyer
"here's a list of the people to whom we've not yet found
what to send"
(22) [a qui] Jon n'a pas encore trouv6
 s.[[quoi] s[envoyer e,
e,]]]
In (22) a qui moves over two S nodes but only one S' node.
Consequently, if the Subjacency condition proscribes
movement over more than one bounding node, (21)
suggests that in French and Italian S' and not S must be
the bounding node. If we assume that the English equiv-
alents of (21) are ungrammatical (see Rizzi 1982a and
Sportiche 1981), then English grammars have S as a
bounding node and a movement like that of (22) would
violate Subjacency. Rizzi (1982a) is one of the rare in-
stances of a grammarian discussing the needed trigger
experience; he argues that if the Subjacency condition is
parameterized so that either S or S' or both may be a
bounding node, then S must be a less marked value than
S'. The reason is that if S' is unmarked, then it is hard to
see how the English-speaking child could learn the S
value without having access to negative data, namely,
that the English analogues to (21) do not occur. On the
other hand, the Italian and French child could learn the
S' value by hearing sentences like (21). Hence a trigger is
provided, but the trigger is a complex structure with two
levels of embedding, which is consistent with degree-2
learnability but not with degree-0.9
Continuing to assume Rizzi and Sportiche's analysis
and its factual basis, one may ask whether there is an
alternative way to learn what is needed: that S' and not S
is a bounding node in French and Italian. A simple
sentence like (23. a) might appear to provide the relevant
trigger if it is analyzed along the lines of (23. b). In (23. b)
there is movement over NP and S, suggesting that both
cannot be bounding nodes. However, there is an alter-
native analysis in which movement takes place from
outside the NP, as in (23. c), as Hornstein and Weinberg
(1981) showed was needed for English (23. d). If (23. c) is a
possible analysis, then (23. a) would not provide crucial
evidence (i.e., a trigger) for the choice of S' as a bounding
node as opposed to S.
(23) a. de qui as-tu vu un photo?
b. de quij
 s[as-tu vu Np[un photo ej]
c. de quij
 s[as-tu vu NP[un photo] e,]
d. who;
 s[did you see NP[a photo] of e j
However, there are simple main clause data which re-
quire that S not be a bounding node; (24.a) needs to be
analyzed as (24.b), as argued by Kayne (1981) and others.
This movement of combien from within an object NP,
across both NP and S, dictates that S cannot be a bound-
ing node in addition to NP.10
(24) a. combien as-tu vu de personnes?
"how many people have you seen?"
b. combienf s[as-tu vu NP[ef N.[de personnes]]
I have argued here that at least for French (I shall
return to Italian in section 5.4 below) the relevant param-
etric value can be triggered by unembedded data like
(24), and therefore that Rizzi and Sportiche's analysis of
(21) does not motivate degree-2 or degree-1 learnability.
However, it is important to note that whether or not there
was a degree-0 trigger for the bounding node parameter is
quite unrelated to the existence of locality conditions,
which do not ipso facto require degree-0 learnability.
I shall consider two further examples of analyses which
seem to require a more complex trigger than would be
permitted under degree-0 learnability, but I shall argue
that the relevant parameters may be set on the basis of
unembedded material. These examples require a discus-
sion of some theoretical machinery.
For both cases I shall adopt the usual model of grammar
(25) and the specific UG proposals of Weinberg et al.
(1987). Under (25), a D-structure (which represents the
underlying grammatical relationships) is mapped onto an
S-structure through successive movement operations. S-
structure, in turn, is mapped onto both a phonological
form (PF), which is the basis for a phonetic representa-
tion, and a logical form (LF), which represents a signifi-
cant part of the meaning of an expression, indicating the
scope relations of quantifiers, anaphoric relations among
NPs, and so forth.
328 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1989) 12:2
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00049086









Weinberg et al. propose two locality conditions. They
argue that an anaphor must be bound (i.e. coindexed with
some higher element) within its Domain at logical form
(26. a), and that this is part of a more general binding
theory along the lines of Chomsky (1981).
(26) Binding theory
a. an anaphor is bound in its Domain
b. a pronoun is not bound in its Domain
c. a referential expression is not bound by an argument
(for our purposes, a NP inside S)
They also require an empty element in PF to occur only
where it is governed by a coindexed element. A govern-
ment relation holds if two elements share all maximal
projections; more technically, (27).
(27) a (X° or head in our earlier terminology) governs P
i. if all maximal projections dominating a also dominate B
and ii. a is dominated either by
a. all maximal projections dominating B
or b. by all maximal projections dominating the maximal
projection of B.
Consider how (27) applies with respect to a more






NP and PP are maximal phrasal projections of the heads N
and P respectively. In (3'), the relationship between the
N man and Spec an, Adj, and PP satisfies the conditions of
(27i and ii.a). Thus the N man governs these elements. It
also governs the P/rom via (27i and ii.b) since its maximal
phrasal projection PP is dominated by all the maximal
phrasal projections dominating the N man. However the
N man does not govern the N city because its maximal
phrasal projection NP is dominated by another maximal
phrasal projection PP which does not dominate the N
man, in violation of (27ii.b).
5.2. Dutch government. This formulation of UG permits a
degree-0 account of some phenomena which have been
widely discussed for the last ten years. As often noted,
English speakers do not move subjects from a position
immediately to the right of an overt complementizer.
Structures like (28. b) violate the UG condition that empty
elements at PF must be governed by a coindexed ele-
ment. Hence, corresponding sentences like *who did Jay
say that saw Kay? do not occur in English (by contrast,
sentences corresponding to (28. a) and (28. c) do occur:
who did Jay say that Kay saw? and who did Jay say saw
Kay?).
(28) a.
 s.[who, did + ACR, Jayj say s.[ Comp[e, that] Kayv ACRk saw e, ]]
b. *s.[who, did+AGRj Ja^ say s.[ ComP[ei 'hat] e, AGR, saw Kay ]]
c.
 s.[who, did+AGR, Ja^ say s.[ Comp[e, ] e, AGR, saw Kay]]
Dutch speakers, however, use sentences equivalent to
(28.b): wie denkje dat het boek gelezen had "who do you
think that had read the book." Such sentences have a
structure like (29.a): The Subjacency condition forces wie
to move first to its local Comp leaving a trace there which
makes the empty subject governed via a Comp indexing
procedure.n Similarly, in structures like (29. b) the inde-
xed Comp properly governs an empty subject despite the
presence of the complementizer.
(29) a. wie, denk je
 s . [ ^ J e , dat], s[e, het boek gelezen had] ]
who think you that the book read had
b. ik vraag me af
 s . [Comp[w'ei ofdat], s[e| het boek gelezen had] ]
I wonder who whether the book read had
"I wonder who read the book"
Koopman (1983) discussed these phenomena and
raised the question of what the relevant parameter was
that distinguished Dutch and English grammars; she
further asked how that parameter could be set, arguing
that it could be set on the basis of main clause data. The
essential idea is that a Dutch speaker has to learn that an
item in Comp may percolate its index to Comp and make
an empty subject governed despite intervening material,
unlike in English, where percolation is blocked by the
presence of other material in Comp; so in (28.b) the trace
in Comp may not percolate its index and hence the
subject trace is not properly governed. Koopman argued
that this distinction can be learned from main clause data
like (30). Dutch has an underlying object-verb order and
heeft must therefore move toward the front of the sen-
tence, as indicated. The empty subject must be governed
by the Comp despite the presence of heeft, just as the
empty subjects in (29) are governed by the coindexed
Comp despite the dat and ofdat.
(3°) comply heeftjlj
 s[e, het boek gelezen e,]
who has the book read
"who has read the book?"
English, however, does not have structures like (30), and
thus no main clause evidence that an item in Comp may
effectively govern across intervening material (via the
Comp indexing procedure). So sentences like who has
read the book have a structure like (31. a), where has does
not move from its S-internal position.
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(31) a- Comp[wh°i]i (ei h a S r e a d t h e
b
- c o m p [w h o i d i d j l , tei ej r e a d t h e
C
- Comp[what, didjJ [Jay ej r e a d e J
Since English does not have underlying object-verb
order, there is no reason to require has to move. In fact,
the nonoccurrence of *who did read the book (where did
is not stressed) suggests that an auxiliary verb may not
move toward the front in such structures; the structure
would have to be (31.b), because the unstressed do only
occurs nonadjacent to the main verb. The nonoccurrence
of (31. b) can be attributed to the fact that the empty
subject fails to be governed by a coindexed Comp because
of the presence of did. Although (31. c) does occur, here
the trace of what is governed by the verb read and is
coindexed with it (see note II) .1 2 So, on hearing simple
sentences like wie heeft het boek gelezen? and analyzing
them as (30), the Dutch child relaxes the restriction on
government, such that the empty subject is properly
governed. This entails the well-formedness of complex
sentences like (29). The English-speaking child hears no
equivalent main clauses which motivate such a relaxation
and therefore does not use structures like (28.b). Conse-
quently, given a UG condition that empty items at PF
must be properly governed, a degree-0 learnability ac-
count can be provided for the striking differences be-
tween Dutch and English embedded clauses.
This last case demonstrates that some properties of
Comp which crucially affect the well-formedness of em-
bedded clauses can be derived from main clause proper-
ties, given certain formulations of UG. However, this is
not to say that all properties of Comp can be so derived.
So, for example, English, unlike Dutch, French, Ger-
man, Italian, Spanish, and many other languages, allows
an element in Comp to be deleted, subject to certain
conditions (primarily the UG condition already men-
tioned, namely, that empty elements at PF, including
tempty items and deletion sites in Comp, must be prop-
erly governed; see Weinberg et al. 1987): (32).
(32) a. Jay said (that) Kay left
b. Jan zei *(dat) Marie vertrokken was
c. Jean a dit *(que) Marie est partie
Similarly, French has a process whereby the complemen-
tizer que takes on the form qui if it governs an empty
subject in an embedded clause (33).
(33) a. quij crois-tu s-[con,P[qui/*que]sk est parti] ]
who do you think that has left
b. quij crois-tu
 s-tcon,P[que/*qui]s[Marie a v u e J 1
who do you think that Marie saw
I cannot see how main clause data could motivate these
processes, nor the marked device in English whereby the
embedded subject of a nonfinite verb may be governed
and assigned case by the higher verb: / expect [her to
win]. A higher verb does not govern a lower subject
unless the maximal projection (S') dominating the lower
clause is removed, on the assumption that a governs b
only if they share all maximal projections (Chomsky 1981
and (27) above). The removal of this projection (often
referred to as S' deletion) is a marked process found in
certain grammars and triggered by sentences like / expect
Jay to be happy, Jay was expected to be happy.
Such phenomena require that children have access to
at least the front of an embedded clause in order to set
some parameters. This would suggest that the notion of
degree-0 needs to be amended to O-plus-a-little, as noted
earlier. However, this messiness can be avoided if we
think not in terms of clauses but rather of binding Do-
mains (see 26). A binding Domain is defined in terms of a
SUBJECT. The Domain for an element x is the first
clause or NP which contains an accessible SUBJECT. A
SUBJECT is a higher NP or AGR, and a SUBJECT is
accessible to x if assigning the SUBJECT'S index to x
violates neither the "i-within-i" condition (not relevant
here) nor condition (26.c). (This will be illustrated in
section 5.3.) The fixing of some grammatical parameters
depends on access to a lower Comp and the subject of an
infinitival, as noted. For each of these elements, the
Domain in which there is a higher SUBJECT can only be
the next higher clause and not the local clause, assuming
as usual that an infinitival clause lacks the agreement
marker. So in a structure like (34), if the lower clause lacks
AGR, the only higher SUBJECT for the embedded sub-
ject is an element in the matrix clause. Similarly for
Comp, regardless of whether there is AGR in the lower
clause, because a lower AGR would not be higher than
the Comp.
(34)
 s,[ . . . NP AGR . . . s.[Comp S[NP . . .]]]]
If this is correct, it seems plausible to argue that some
current formulations of UG allow us to maintain a strict
version of degree-0 learnability. The child's triggering
experience seems to consist only of robust positive data
which may be analyzed within the framework of UG,
given already established parameters of the particular
grammar. Furthermore it is restricted to data occurring
in an unembedded binding Domain, and we may claim
that there is nothing new to be learned from embedded
Domains. This permits a degree-0 account of a parametric
difference between English and Chinese.
5.3. Chinese AGR. Aoun (1986), reanalyzing work by
Huang (1982), argues that Chinese (whose verbs do not
vary morphologically depending on the choice of subject)
lacks AGR in INFL on the basis of sentences like (35):
(35) zhangsan, shuo
 s-[ziji, hui lai]
Zhangsan say self can come
"Zhangsan said that himself will come"
Such sentences indicate that the binding Domain for the
anaphor ziji is the matrix clause; this in turn entails that
there is no accessible SUBJECT, that is, no AGR in the
embedded clause containing ziji. In the English analogue
to (35) (see the gloss) AGR would occur in the embedded
clause and would act as an accessible SUBJECT for
himself; consequently, the embedded clause would be
the binding Domain for himselfbut would fail to be bound
in that Domain, hence violating (26.a).
Datum (35) does not seem to be particularly exotic. It is
also consistent with degree-0 learnability, if we define
degree-0 in terms of binding Domain at LF: The Domain
for ziji is not an embedded one and therefore ziji is
available to a language learner having access only to
unembedded material.
Defining the parametric difference between Chinese
and English so that Chinese lacks AGR accounts for
several superficial differences, notably differences in sub-
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ject-object asymmetries and in the interpretability of the
adjunct "why." Let us see how this works. All subject NPs
are coindexed with their AGR, under the usual subject-
verb agreement. Consequently, in (28.a) the lowest e has
no accessible SUBJECT. The local candidates are Kay
and AGR, but in each case assigning the index k to the e
would entail that e would be coindexed with an argument
position, that of Kay, this would violate (26.c). The same
holds for the higher AGR and Jay. Therefore, in (28. a), e
has no accessible SUBJECT, hence no Domain, and so
the binding theory does not hold for this element and it
has no locality restriction. Consequently, direct objects
may move long distances generally. But now consider an
empty element in subject position (28.b). Here e does
have an accessible SUBJECT; assigning it the index of the
local AGR does not entail a coindexing with some other
argument position; AGR is therefore "accessible." As a
result, e must be coindexed with a higher element in its
local clause in order to satisfy (26.a). Since it has no local
antecedent, the structure violates the binding theory (in
addition to the PF condition of proper government, see
section 5.2). Now compare this with (28. c), which lacks an
overt complementizer at the front of the embedded
clause. Again the empty subject in the embedded clause
has an accessible SUBJECT for the same reason as in
(28. b), but here there is a local antecedent, namely the
indexed Comp, and condition (26.a) is satisfied.13 This
analysis provides a way of accounting for this kind of
subject-object asymmetry, whereby extraction of a wh-
word from object position (whether taking place in the
syntax or in logical form) is quite free, but extraction from
subject position is sensitive to the presence of a
complementizer.
Although such asymmetries are widespread in the
languages of the world, they do not occur in Chinese, as
pointed out by Huang (1982). Saying that Chinese lacks
AGR provides an explanation. In general, Chinese has its
interrogative words occurring not at the front of the
sentence but in the position in which they must be
understood, that is, "in situ." Most languages allow this
possibility (cf. English / wonder who bought what, where
what remains in situ) but Chinese has no general alter-
native of syntactic movement. For such constructions the
relevant scope relations are usually expressed through a
process of "movement" in logical form (LF), the level of
representation where quantifier-variable binding is ex-
pressed. A sentence like (36) is ambiguous and may have
the LF representations of (37.a) or (37.b).
(36) ni xiang-zhidaos.[shei mai-le sheme]
you wonder who buy-ASP what
a. "what is the x such that you wonder who bought x?"
b. "who is the x such that you wonder what x bought?"
(37) a.
 s.[shemej s[ni xiang-zhidao s[shei, s[e, mai-le ej ] ] ]
what you wonder who buy-ASP
b.
 s.[shei, s[ni xiang-zhidao s.[shemej s[e, mai-le ej ] ] ]
who you wonder what buy-ASP
Because Chinese lacks AGR, neither shei nor sheme has a
binding Domain and therefore both may move long
distance in LF. In (37.a,b) ex has no accessible SUBJECT;
there is no AGR and ni is not accessible. Also, the object e^
has no accessible SUBJECT for the same reason as the
object in (28.a). So, lack of AGR in Chinese entails no
subject-object asymmetries analogous to those of (28).
However, (38) is not ambiguous in the same way as (36).
"What" may have wide scope over the matrix clause, with
"why" having narrow scope over the embedded clause
under "wonder," but not vice versa.
(38) ni xiang-zhidaos. [Lisi weisheme mai-le sheme]
you wonder Lisi why buy-ASP what
"what is the x such that you wonder why Lisi bought x?"
Here sheme has no accessible SUBJECT and thus no
binding Domain, for the same reason that who had no
Domain in (28.a): The candidate SUBJECTS are Lisi and
ni, but coindexing with these elements would lead to a
violation of condition (26. c), that a referential expression
be argument free. Hence the binding theory is irrelevant
for sheme and there is no locality restriction. Weisheme,
however, is not a referential expression and therefore is
not subject to condition (26.c); Lisi is accordingly accessi-
ble to the trace of "why" and the embedded clause is its
binding Domain. Hence (39.a) is a possible LF for (38),
but not (39. b).
(39) a.
 s,[shemes[ni xiang-zhidao s.[weishemeiS[Lisiej mai-le
ej]]]]
b.
 s.[weisheme; s[ni xiang-zhidao s. [sheme- s[Lisi e- mai-
le ej]]]]
It is a general property of "why" and "how" that they are
not referential expressions, and thus not subject to (26.c).
Hence the contrast in English between (4O.a,b); similarly




a. Jay wondered who lives where
b. *Jay wondered who left why
a. who lives where?
b. *who is leaving why?
a.
 s,[whoJ, s[ej AGR, is leaving why]
b.
 s,[whOj whyjj s[e, AGR, is leaving
The structure of (41.b) is (42.a) and the LF is (42.b). When
why moves to Comp at LF, its trace, e^ has an accessible
SUBJECT and thus a binding Domain, but fails to have
an antecedent high enough in that Domain. The Comp
must bear the index of the subject et because otherwise
the empty subject, for which AGR is an accessible SUB-
JECT, would fail to be bound in its Domain. The identical
structure with where instead of why is well-formed be-
cause where is a referential expression and therefore has
no Domain and is not subject to the demands of the
binding theory (26). Consequently, saying that Chinese
lacks AGR accounts for many puzzling differences be-
tween English and Chinese.
Now, although (41. b) does not occur in English the
corresponding sentence is well-formed in Chinese.
(43) a. shei weisheme mai-le shu
who why buy-ASP books
"who buys books why?"
b.
 s.[ [sheij weishemej], s[e, e, mai-le shu] ]
The LF of (43.a) is (43.b). Note that ei has an accessible
SUBJECT, namely es, and must therefore be bound in
its Domain, as it is. On the other hand, e, has no Domain,
there being no AGR in Chinese; it therefore needs no
local binder. Hence the distinction between (41. b),
which is ungrammatical in English, and (43.a), which has
the well-formed LF (43.b) in Chinese, lies in the fact that
Chinese lacks AGR. Consequently, (43.a), involving only
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material in an unembedded binding Domain, may also
(like 35) act as a trigger for the correct parametric value:
that Chinese lacks AGR.
This case has involved some theory-internal claims, as
one should expect by now. My point throughout this
target article has been that one's assumptions about the
nature of the trigger will affect the details of one's tech-
nical analyses, including claims about both UG and par-
ticular grammars. In this example, the UG locality condi-
tions formulated by Weinberg et al. (1987) enable us to
establish a single parameter-the presence/absence of
AGR-which accounts for many superficial differences
between English and Chinese and which can be set on the
basis of unembedded data, contrary to initial ap-
pearances. But, again, there is no logical relationship
between the existence of locality restrictions and degree-
0 learnability; the Chinese processes just discussed were
quite local but it remained an empirical question whether
there were parameters to be fixed which required access
to complex sentences.
5.4. Italian again. If one thinks in terms of unembedded
binding Domains rather than unembedded clauses as the
basis for language acquisition, then a solution to the
Italian problem (above) becomes available, as Guglielmo
Cinque has pointed out (personal communication). Recall
that Rizzi and Sportiche argued that S' but not S is a
bounding node in Italian and French. We showed how
the French child could derive this conclusion from simple
data like (24). However, it is not clear that comparable
data are available to the Italian child. Analyses vary and
(44.a) might be treated as (44.b,c, or d); it is not obvious
that quante is extracted from a NP.
(44) a. quante ne hai viste?
"how many have (you) seen of them?"
b.
 NP[quante e j k ne( hai viste NP[ek]
c. pP[quante]k nef hai viste NP[ek ej
d. QP[quante]k ne; hai viste [ej [ej
However, if (45. a, b) are well-formed structures for the
corresponding sentences, then movement has taken
place across a NP and S, showing that S cannot be a
bounding node. For arguments that such "small clauses"
are dominated by S and not by S', see Hornstein and
Lightfoot (1987). In such a structure, the NP indicated,
being a subject, cannot be reanalyzed. Furthermore, its
binding Domain is the matrix clause since the lower S
contains no SUBJECT (AGR).
(45) a. ne( ho visti s[NP[molti ej corrergli incontro]
"of them (I) saw many run toward him"
b. ne; ho visto
 s[NP[il volto ej sbiancarsi]
"of him (I) saw the face become white"
c. ne; ho visti s[NP[moIti e j affaticati]
"of them (I) saw many tired "
Hence simple, degree-0 data are available to make S into
a nonbounding node in the grammars of Italian speakers.
Although simple, the data are nonetheless slightly exotic
and probably not of frequent occurrence in any child's
experience. It is consequently not surprising that there is
variability among Italian speakers in the setting of this
parameter.
6. Conclusion
The viability of this hypothesis, that primary linguistic
data are restricted to data occurring in an unembedded
binding Domain, will depend on further case studies of
the type considered here. I have examined some crucial
cases which would seem to have motivated richer and
more extensive triggers, and I have shown that, given
certain formulations of UG, the relevant parameters can
be fixed on the basis of data in nonembedded Domains.
Further cases may be less tractable, of course, and this
deliberately strong hypothesis may have to be revised
and relaxed. The strong hypothesis directs attention
toward discrepancies between phenomena occurring in
embedded and unembedded Domains, but such discre-
pancies raise no particular learnability questions if em-
bedded Domains may be part of the trigger experience.14
If something along these lines proves to be correct, it
will explain the old observation that "what happens
downstairs also happens upstairs, but not vice versa" (cf.
Ross 1973). It will also have many consequences for the
study of language acquisition under various conditions.
To take one example, it will explain the rapidity of the
creolization process. If most aspects of a person's gram-
mar are triggered by simple data, the creole-speaking
child who has an impoverished input is under no great
disadvantage in developing a normal mature capacity. As
a result, there is no need to postulate that creole gram-
mars manifest the linguistic genotype in some more or
less privileged way (Bickerton 1984), and thus one can
avoid the unacceptable consequences of that claim
(Lightfoot 1988).
However, there is a more fundamental point: An in-
trinsic relationship exists between claims made about the
three entities of (1); and any claim made about, say, UG
entails certain assumptions about the trigger. Those as-
sumptions should be spelled out because they may vary in
their plausibility, with consequences for the claim about
UG and the particular grammars under investigation.
Given the richness of current theories and the productivi-
ty of comparative work on parametric variation, claims
about the trigger can be used as one basis for evaluating
hypotheses. In fact, ignoring the trigger at this stage runs
the risk that ones hypothesis may be off the mark. I have
tackled the matter of the trigger experience here very
much from a linguist's perspective, being concerned with
consequences for claims about UG. However, the matter
relates to many aspects of the acquisition process not
touched in this article, and I hope that other perspectives
may be able to tell us more about the true nature of the
trigger.15
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NOTES
1. (2.b) provides only one possible structure for a noun
phrase consisting of a head noun followed by a prepositional
phrase, whereas (2. a) provides more than one structure: Student
from New York can (and must) have the structure
 N.[N.[N[stu-
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dent]] pp[from New York]], whereas student of physics is
N.[N[student] PP[of physics]]. The pronoun one refers to a
preceding N'. Student is a N' in (4.b), hence a referent for one,
but not in (4.a). In (5.a) both suit and old suit are instances of N'
and thus possible referents for one, hence the ambiguity. For
details and the reasons why student from New York and student
of physics must have different structures, see Lightfoot (1982).
2. The rules of (2.a) allow an adjective to occur before a N or
N', but convention (6) says nothing about possible adjective
positions. This is appropriate because convention (6) stipulates
the basic geometry of categorial structures; this basic geometry
may be supplemented in response to experience. The position
of adjectives is fully determined by a normal child's experience;
exposure to phrases like the tall student will suffice to show that
an English N' may have an adjective at its front. There is no
poverty-of-stimulus problem for such adjectives which would
require a richer convention in UG, as far as I can see.
3. Young children are known to have great difficulty in
detecting for themselves the absence of forms, even when
confronted with carefully prepared paradigmatic sets of patterns
(Sainsbury 1971; 1973).
4. The notion of "markedness" has led to much confused
discussion. UG includes a theory of markedness which leads one
parameter setting to be preferred over another and permits
"core grammar" to be extended to a marked periphery
(Chomsky 1981, p.8). So the unmarked parameter setting is
adopted in the absence of contrary evidence, but specific evi-
dence will be required for a marked setting.
5. Baker (1979) discusses a transformational movement rule
relating John gave the book to Alice and John gave Alice the
book, which does not generalize to report and say. The fact that
the rule is not entirely general suggests that negative data are
needed to establish the limits to the generalization. He went on
to show that a lexical relationship is preferable to a movement
analysis and circumvents the apparent leamability problem if
children are conservative in establishing the lexical properties of
verbs, generalizing only within narrowly prescribed limits.
However, children are not entirely conservative in this regard
and they do, in fact, overgeneralize double objects to certain
verbs. For further discussion, see Mazurkewich and White
(1984) and Randall (1985).
6. For example, I assume that the morphological case system
had already become dysfunctional. It is quite possible that a
different reanalysis would have taken place if the case system
had been rich enough and robust enough to force children to
interpret the preverbal NP as a direct object.
This change in the use of like, etc., has given rise to much
recent discussion: see Allen (1986), Anderson (1986), Elmer
(1981), Fischer and van der Leek (1983), Warner (1983). Alter-
native analyses are possible (see Lightfoot, forthcoming).
7. Sentences like Kirsten has
 NP [a blue cup] and Heidi has a
red one show that one must also refer to something smaller than
a NP.
8. Wexler and Culicover (1980) use a particular kind of error
detection procedure which effectively adds an extra level of
sentence embedding to whatever triggering experience is
needed. They argue that the relevant information is contained
in structures with one level of embedding, but their error
detection procedure then requires another level of embedding
to reveal possible errors. This is discussed interestingly by
Morgan (1986), who adopts a different error detection pro-
cedure and offers a degree-1 learnability proof (based on the
assumption that children receive as input not only Wexler and
Culicover's [b,s] pairs but also a surface string with constituent
structure assigned).
However, the error detection procedure reflects a more
fundamental difference in orientation. Wexler and Culicover
were not much concerned with variation in grammars and used a
selection model of acquisition wherein the child tests various
hypotheses in accordance with a specific evaluation metric. I
have adopted the recent parameter-setting model, however, in
which UG contains rich information about, say, possible phrase
structure rules and specifies certain option-points which are set
on exposure to particular data-sets. The issues I raise in the
following three case studies would also be important for a
selection model of acquisition not making rich assumptions
about parameters in UG. A comparison of the two models,
however, would be extremely complex and will not be under-
taken here, since selection models have not addressed the kind
of language variation discussed.
9. If there are grammars which generally prevent extraction
from an embedded clause (as claimed for Russian), then there is
a setting for this parameter which is less marked than the
English value: Both S and S' are bounding nodes. This would
block the second movement in (i), from the embedded Comp
into the higher Comp.
(i) who;
 s[did Jay say s'ta [Kay saw e ]^
The English-speaking child is confronted with specific evidence
that the default value does not hold, i.e., sentences correspond-
ing to (i). The Italian child is driven to a still more marked value
when confronted by (21. a).
Since direct questions like quel livre Jean sait a qui qffrir?
("which book does John know to whom to offer?") occur in
French (but not in Italian), a trigger with one level of embedding
can be specified.
For more discussion of the Italian case and alternative analy-
ses, see Adams (1984) and Grimshaw (1986).
10. Since (24) requires that S not be a bounding node in
French, structures like (23.b) will also be well-formed. Conse-
quently, there is no positive motivation in the PLD for an
English-style reanalysis rule yielding (23. c). This is the right
result because French shows none of the English-type phe-
nomena that Hornstein and Weinberg used to motivate the
reanalysis rule.
This kind of extraction is not possible from a subject NP (*de
quit est [[le frere ej peintre]?) for reasons other than the
Subjacency condition.
11. The Comp indexing convention permits Comp to take on
the index of an element that it contains. An indexed Comp (but
no* an element inside Comp) is "high" enough to act as a proper
governor at PF and as an antecedent for an anaphor at LF. See
Weinberg et al. (1987) for details.
Rouveret and Vergnaud (1980) propose a coindexing relation
between a NP and the item from which it receives a theta-role,
and so a verb is coindexed with and thus properly governs its
direct object. In exactly the same sense a Comp properly
governs a coindexed subject in (28.c), (29), (30), etc.
12. In (31) I have shown the auxiliary verb moving to Comp.
This may not be correct; it may move to some other pre-S
position, perhaps adjoined to S, as in Lasnik (1981). Nothing
hinges on this for present purposes. Similarly for the Dutch case
(30).
13. This analysis assumes that a wh word moves first to its
local Comp (28. c). This is required by the Subjacency condition
if S is a bounding node in English (see above in the main text). So
movement from the lower subject position to the higher Comp
in (28. b) would cross two bounding nodes, in addition to violat-
ing the binding theory (26. a) and the PF condition that empty
items be properly governed (see below).
14. For example, standard analyses claim that Dutch and
German are basically subject-object-verb and that the verb
moves into the position of a complementizer in main clauses but
not in embedded clauses. A child can presumably learn from
primary data that verbs occur in complementizer positions and
are therefore moved there from another base-generated posi-
tion. Then two questions arise: (a) How do simple, unembedded
data show from where the verb has moved, and (b) how do
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children know that verbs may not occur in complementizer
positions in embedded clauses? For discussion bearing on the
first of these questions, see Travis (1987). Lightfoot (forthcom-
ing) discusses the acquisition of object-verb order in such "verb-
second" languages.
15. This target article represents a chapter of a larger work in
progress; there I consider historical change in language and the
way in which new parameter settings are adopted by children at
certain stages in the history of a language (Lightfoot,
forthcoming).
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Some observations on degree of learnability
C. L. Baker
Department of Linguistics, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712
Electronic mall: Iiar454@iv1.cc.utexas.edu
Lightfoot argues with great clarity and persuasiveness that the
choice among grammatical theories depends not only on as-
sumptions about the systems that are attained, but also on
assumptions about the nature of the linguistic data available to
language learners. A particularly important point is made in
section 2, where he notes "a curious silence about the triggering
experience" in discussions of linguistic theory in which one
would expect to find potential triggering experiences discussed.
Lightfoot goes on to say that anyone who seriously proposes a
language-particular rule, lexical entry, or parameter setting
should be able in principle to suggest a plausible kind of
triggering experience which would suffice for its selection.
Going beyond these general methodological remarks, Light-
foot advances an extremely restrictive view of the "degree" of
the data that is relevant for a child's acquisition of a native
language. Specifically, he proposes that the boundary between
degree-0 and degree-l data represents an important dividing
line between plausible and implausible linguistic triggering
experience. My primary purpose in this commentary will be to
argue against this thesis. I want to suggest instead that it would
be wrong to exclude all positive degree-l data, and also that it
would be wrong not to exclude certain positive degree-0 data.
As a final incidental point, I will use Lightfoot's logic to call into
question the analysis of Chinese he proposes near the end of his
article.
An obvious preliminary point to be made concerning de-
gree-l data is that there is no scarcity of it in the child's linguistic
environment. In this respect, then, we do not have the same
kind of argument for excluding degree-l data as input to a theory
that we have for excluding negative data. Thus, the actual
situation in which a first language is learned does not in and of
itself provide any compelling reason to avoid using data of
degree greater than zero.
Granting that data of degree greater than zero are available in
ample quantities, we might still ask whether they make a truly
essential contribution to language learning. On this question,
Lightfoot offers a number of detailed case studies in which he
suggests potential degree-0 triggering data in situations that
might have appeared to require data of higher degree. How-
ever, at the end of section 5.2, he goes on to discuss some cases
that seem to warrant the relaxation of the degree-0 requirement
to "degree-O-plus-a-little."
Several constructions not discussed in the target article sug-
gest that even this more permissive thesis is too restrictive. For
example, a language learner apparently needs to find out
whether relative clauses in the language that he is learning call
for gaps or whether they call for resumptive pronouns. Learners
face similar problems with constructions like the following
English result clause:
(1) John, is too tired [to invite .
dinner].
to your house for
In particular, the learner needs to get far enough into the
embedded infinitival to determine that it can contain a nonsub-
ject gap. Some languages do not permit such a construction for
the case in which the matrix subject is coreferential with a
nonsubject in the infinitival, allowing instead only a structure
like that in (2):
(2) Johnj is too tired [to invite hinij to your house for dinner].
Turning to the other side of the degre-l/degree-0 boundary, I
would like to argue that not all degree-0 examples have equal
plausibility as potential triggering experiences. Near the con-
clusion of his discussion of Aoun's account of Chinese, Lightfoot
gives the following as a simple sentence that would suffice to
show (under Aoun's assumptions) that Chinese lacks ACR:
(3) (Lightfoot's (43)) shei weisheme mai-le shu
who why buy-ASP books
"who buys books why?"
Even though this is a degree-0 sentence, its potential usefulness
as a triggering datum for a "no-AGR" parameter setting seems
quite doubtful to me. I base this skepticism on the hunch that
questions of this type are not significantly more common in
causal Chinese conversation than they are in casual English
conversation. There is a more general point to be made here.
Whereas it is now widely recognized that most negative data
about a language are best viewed as "nonprimary' in nature, it is
less often appreciated that at least some positive data need to be
accorded the same status. That is, certain types of acceptable
sentences occur so rarely if at all in normal language use that
their acceptability is more properly viewed as a result of lan-
guage acquisition than as an input to it. (Many of the standard
pictures of each other examples from English almost certainly
have the same status.)
Regarding the proposed analysis of Chinese, recent work by
Susan Wilcoxon (1988) casts serious doubt on the validity of the
conclusions that Huang and Aoun have drawn from the exis-
tence of sentences like Lightfoot's (35), in which ziji appears at
first glance to be the subject of the subordinate clause:
(4) (Lightfoot's (35)) zhangsan, shuo
 s.[ziji, hui lai]
Zhaiigsan say self can come
"Zhangsan said that himself will come"
Wilcoxon shows that as well as serving as a reflexive pronoun
ziji has an added use as an optional intensive adverb that can be
linked to subjects of all kinds. When ziji is used with a subject
that happens to be empty, the following result is predicted:
(5) zhangsan, shuo
 s[NP[e,] Adv[ziji,] hui lai]
Zhangsan say he, self can come
"Zhangsan said that he himself will come"
The reactions of Wilcoxon's informants suggest that the inten-
sive interpretation is the only one the sentence in question
allows. Besides removing one piece of evidence for postulating
this parametric difference between English and Chinese,
Wilcoxon's reanalysis makes such sentences ineffective as "de-
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gree-O-plus-a-little" triggering data for the parametric setting in
question.
If we now take seriously the methodological remarks in
section 2, we are forced to question the validity of the proposed
parametric analysis of Chinese. Two possible triggering data
were offered for the postulated parametric setting. The "de-
gree-O-plus-a-little" datum was shown to be deficient by virtue
of its failure to force this parameter setting unambiguously,
whereas the degree-0 datum was argued to be deficient by
virtue of the extremely small chance that Chinese language
learners would have of actually hearing it uttered. Unless
triggering data can be found that do not suffer from either of
these deficiencies, we have grounds for doubting that English
and Chinese really differ in the way proposed.
On triggers
Hugh W. Buckingham
Program in Linguistics, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803
In this commentary I would like to explore some thoughts that
came to mind in reading Lightfoot's target article. The first has
to do with the very impressionistic notion of "exotic" sentences
or situations in which sentences arise. Granted that if children
must await degree-2 sentence types or if they must hold off
setting a parameter for n-bar until they find themselves in a
situation concerning "old suits" or the like, then their syntactic
development will be delayed, but we still do not have anything
like a technical definition of the "exotic" sentence or situation.
Eventually, some sort of metric for this will have to be devel-
oped, but at present I am not sure what it would be.
Second, it has often been remarked that children have little if
any notion of grammaticality. Consequently, it is still unclear to
me just how a child will reap the benefits from this or that crucial
trigger structure. It would seem to me that if a trigger is to have
any sort of effect whatsoever, then the child will somehow have
to know that the trigger is grammatical. How could the fact that a
trigger is acted upon to set a parameter ever be empirically
demonstrated? How would, or could, a test be formulated to
demonstrate the utility of a trigger?
My third point hinges on the fact that parameter settings have
a sort of typological ripple effect. Setting the parameter, for
instance, for [+pro-drop] (pronoun dropping), will have a cas-
cading effect-switching levers that will allow the possibility of
postverbal subjects, the possibility of object-verb structures,
and the like (e.g. Phinney 1987; Torrego 1984; White 1987). The
question then becomes that of establishing the necessary type of
trigger. Would the trigger need to be some sentence without an
overt subject, or would a verb-subject (VS) or object-verb (OV)
structure work equally well? Even if the initial setting (the
unmarked case) would be (due to the "subset" principle) at
[—pro-drop], how would we establish which trigger type would
be more crucial for a pro-drop language? A trigger structure
with null subject? A VS structure? An OV structure? Or any one
of them? The answer is not clear to me, but the typological
nature of the theory of parameter settings makes this question
an important one to consider.
The fourth issue I would raise is that before any notion of
proper and/or necessary triggers can be put forth clearly, we
will have to have a hold on just what the proper parameters are
for a specific language. Most studies with which I am familiar
specify that, for English, NP and S are the bounding nodes; but
recently Grimshaw (1986) has made a case for considering S-bar
the bounding node, not S. She makes an important distinction
between initial movement of alpha and subsequent movements
of alpha. For her arguments to go through, we must agree upon
the "essential" (Grimshaw 1986, p. 366) grammaticality of sen-
tences such as:
(a) [[ Which book, ] [s did the students forget [jfwhoj [s tj
wrote t,]]]]
(b) [[ Which book, ][5 did the T.A.s tell the students [s[that]
[sthey shouldn't forget [s[whoj] [s tj wrote tj]]]]]]
One Comp can be skipped on the initial movement on
Grimshaw's view, but note that two S nodes are crossed in both
(a) and (b). If S is a bounding node in English, this situation
should produce ungrammatical sentences. Again, the argument
only goes through if we agree on the grammatical status of (a) and
(b). As Grimshaw points out, however, (a) and (b) are certainly
better than sentences such as:
(c) [[ Which book, ][„ did the students forget [s[who,] [s tj told
them [5[that] [s Noam Chomsky wrote t,]]]]]]
The initial movement poses no problem in (c), but as Grimshaw
suggests, subsequent movements may not skip a Comp, which
is exactly what must happen in (c). In this case, the moved item
crosses two Ss and two S-bars. Since the "essential" gram-
maticality of sentences (a) and (b) presumably demonstrates that
S is not a bounding node, the ungrammaticality of (c) would
force the analysis that S-bar is indeed the bounding node for
English. Grammaticality judgments aside, several problems
arise for the theory of triggers here. First, the sentences that
crucially bear on these issues are at least of degree-2 complexity.
Linguistic theory, however, must be carried on at this level. The
theory of triggers would be in deep trouble if it turned out that
degree-0 structures would lead the English-speaking child to set
the bounding parameter at S, but that later complex sentences
of degree-2 or more would force a resetting to the S-bar. In
general, though, my point is that issues such as the ones
Grimshaw raises must be settled before any sense can be made
of the nature of bounding node triggers-degree-2 or degree-0.
Although I previously mentioned the difficulty of demonstrat-
ing that the child would have an easy time of it appreciating the
actual utility of positive trigger structures, Lightfoot and all
language learning theorists are certainly right in emphasizing
the uselessness of negative data, that is, "String not in language,
Johnny." Even in the days of the evaluation metric view of
acquisition, negative data (ungrammatical sentences) were for-
mally proven to be inconsequential for developing grammatical
knowledge. The formal existence of weakly equivalent gram-
mars demonstrated clearly that deciding between grammars
could not involve negative data. The problem there, of course,
was that positive data could be of no help either, since the two
grammars generated the same set of strings. Theories of simple
phrase structure grammars told us as much. For this reason, the
onus was placed on some sort of "metric" to help decide
between two grammars. Considering strings (grammatical or
ungrammatical) alone was no help at all. As Lightfoot points out,
however, the parameter-setting model has replaced the selec-
tional model that required the aid of an evaluation metric. The
latter model, which grew out of early Chomskyan thinking,
simply did not produce results. Williams (1987, p. vii) puts it
this way, "The parametrized model of grammar grew out of the
failure, on the part of grammarians, to make any progress in
understanding grammar selection with this evaluation
metric."
Negative evidence is out on both views, but now, with the
model of parametrized grammar, positive evidence is utilizable
in the form of triggers. The question then becomes one of
deciding just how a child will appreciate the positive evidence as
positive evidence and of deciding the degree of complexity of
the positive evidence as well as the exact structures of the
positive evidence. Lightfoot appears to be on the right track
here in seeking the maximum information in degree-0 struc-
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tures. Finally, linguistic theory will have the responsibility of
driving the whole enterprise, since without knowing the princi-
ples and parameters for Universal Grammar and how the param-
eters are set for specific languages in question, we cannot know
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Much as in equations with two constants and one "unknown,"
whenever we have a reasonable understanding of the gram-
matical knowledge attained and of the triggering experi-
ence, we can infer something about the contribution of UG.
"Poverty-of-stimulus" arguments, such as the one about one-
pronominalization discussed by Lightfoot, typically have this
character.
But there is a class of cases in which we can gain indepen-
dent access to properties of UG; that is, when we compare
different grammars (the recognition that languages differ in
either allowing or not allowing null subjects, for example,
requires UG to have a specific two-valued parameter to that
effect). In these particular cases, then, by treating UG and
attained knowledge as known, we can treat the triggering
experience as the "unknown," trying to determine with better
accuracy what the general character of the trigger must be like
for the child to arrive at the correct value of the parameter
which yields the grammar.
The main goal of Lightfoot's target article is to determine in'
this way the character of the triggering experience beyond the
little that is generally assumed: the unavailability of explicit
instruction and direct negative evidence.
I think Lightfoot succeeds in defending the desirability and
correctness of "degree-0" learnability in many controversial
cases which would seem to require a more complex trigger.
This is a result, which, in my opinion, one should be willing to
abandon only if forced to do so.
I would like to raise a related point, one that is somewhat in
the background in Lightfoot's discussion, but which may de-
serve some clarification. The problem of parameter setting is
usually posed in the context of the simplifying assumption that
acquisition is instantaneous (cf. Chomsky 1975, pp. 119-22).
My point is that such an assumption may not be just a conve-
nient (and innocuous) idealization. It may well prove to be the
only pertinent way to approach the question. Considerations of
the actual stages of acquisition (though interesting in their own
right) run the risk of distorting matters. Let me consider the
pro-drop (pronoun-dropping) parameter as a case in point.
Rizzi (1982) suggested, on the assumption that negative
evidence is not available to the child, that the English value of
the parameter should be the least marked value. This is be-
cause, starting from the wrong setting, the Italian value can be
learned from extremely simple positive data contradicting the
other setting, whereas the English value cannot.
Note that, even though the two values do not give rise to
languages that stand in a proper subset relation to each other,
as noted by Hyams (1986), the kind of data that could act as a
trigger to reset the parameter from the Italian to the English
value (e.g., the existence of lexical expletives) is radically
limited.
There is a complication, however. Hyams (1986) noted that
even earlier stages of non-pro-drop languages are pro-drop, so
that the Italian value must apparently be taken as the "initial"
setting of the parameter (whether or not it is also the least
marked; cf. Rizzi 1986, fn.27). This disrupts the rather straight-
forward picture seen above, raising the problem of what the
evidence is that forces the English child to reset the parameter
from the larger to the smaller language.
Hyams (1986) suggests, as noted, that the existence of lexical
expletives and pragmatically neutral lexical pronouns (not
found in pro-drop languages) provides the required positive
evidence to reset the parameter to the English value. But some
questions remain: Why should the Italian value be the initial
setting? Why should the resetting occur at the particular time
of development that it occurs? Hyams's answers, based on her
isomorphic principle, though interesting, are not entirely con-
vincing. In particular, one might expect that different children
reset the parameter at (widely) different times (depending on
such variables as exposure to relevant data, intelligence, etc.).
Similar questions arise within the solutions to this problem
suggested by Weinberg (1987) and by Lebeaux (1987).
Recent work on early child grammar by Andrew Radford
opens the way to a more radical alternative, one that eliminates
the need to consider the Italian value as the "initial" setting
and renders real-time acquisition indistinguishable from in-
stantaneous acquisition for the problem at hand. Radford
(1988) suggests that several apparently unrelated properties
that distinguish the grammar of English children up to the
mean age of 22 months from the grammars of later stages
should be seen as different manifestations of a single, more
abstract, property of the early grammar: the fact that the child's
phrase structure has not yet developed the "nonlexical" projec-
tions of I(nflection) (IP = the traditional S) and (C)omplemen-
tizer (CP = the traditional S').
Radford observes that if these two projections are missing
(with their respective heads, I and C, and specifiers), then all
phenomena which involve such positions should also be miss-
ing. In this way, he is able to relate several properties noted in
the literature as typical of the child's grammar of this period,
namely, that complementizers and "inverted" auxiliaries (both
of which involve C) are missing; that no preposed wh-phrases
(which move to the specifier of CP) are possible; that clauses
lack modal auxiliaries and infinitival to (which occupy I); that
verbs are not marked to Tense or Agreement (also found in I).
(See Radford 1988 for a more careful discussion of these and
further properties.)
According to this account, it is also to be expected that all
such properties will emerge in strict succession, as indeed
appears to be the case, and not at random intervals in time.
Note that among the missing positions is the structural sub-
ject of the clause (the specifier of IP). Now, this is the crucial
fact for our pro-drop problem. Subjects, whether lexical or
empty (when permitted by the pro-drop parameter), must be
present in clauses, by the E(xtended) P(rojection) P(rinciple).
Subjects of phrases other than clauses, on the other hand, need
not be present (cf. the destruction of the city). But the EPP
cannot be active until the structural subject position develops.
So before that there is no requirement that a subject be pre-
sent (when lexically present, it may either be a topic - cf.
Gruber (1967) - or a "small clause" subject - cf. Radford 1988).
All this implies that the setting of the pro-drop parameter does
not even arise at this stage.
If so, in the pro-drop case (and perhaps in general) there is
no resetting of the parameter, but rather delayed setting. Only
when the required conditions mature does the setting occur;
and at that point, it may apply as it does under the in-
stantaneous acquisition model, with the English value as the
least marked one, thus avoiding the problems of the alternative
choice.
In this view, the instantaneous model represents abstractly
how the parameter must be set at the relevant point of real-
time acquisition. It is perhaps the only model giving the cor-
rect results, as seen, provided that we do not expect it to
explain the actual course of acquisition, which may be affected
by maturational factors (cf. Borer & Wexler 1987; Felix 1987).
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The discovery of the correct adult grammar seems quite tracta-
ble in a parameter-setting model. A parameter may be thought
of as a linguistic property; for example, a property might be
whether the object precedes or follows the verb in the target
language. The learner would need only monitor the input data
searching for examples that can be used to determine the correct
parameter setting. If Universal Grammar specifies only a finite
set of linguistic properties (parameters), then only a finite
number of examples should be required for the learner to arrive
at the correct target grammar. The goal of arriving at the correct
knowledge state on the basis of finite input would then be
achieved.
Lightfoot correctly observes that the nature of the input data
must be carefully considered in developing a parametrized
theory of Universal Grammar. Studies of "Motherese," for
example, indicate that the primary linguistic data (PLD) consist
largely of simple grammatical sentences. • If the data required to
set a parameter are of such complexity that they are unlikely to
occur in the PLD, then the probability that the learner will be
able to converge on the adult grammar will decrease according-
ly. A linguistic theory which purports to account for learnability
using such a parameter would then be cast into doubt. A
parameter which could only be set given a clause with three or
four embedded clauses in it is unlikely ever to be set if only that
the necessary input is so rare.
For the above reasons, Lightfoot's attempt to develop a
"degree-0" model of parameter setting is on the right track. A
"degree-0" theory would provide a plausible model of the
linguistic environment that the learner must work in. I would
argue, however, that the computational properties of the learn-
er must be included in the theory along with Universal Gram-
mar and the role of the PLD. In particular, a parameterized
(selective) theory may still face some problems similar to those
faced by inductive theories. Put briefly, given a piece of input
data, how does the learner know which parameter to set? The
learner must have some idea how the datum is relevant to the
problem of arriving at the correct adult state.
To illustrate the type of problem faced by a parametrized
learner, let us suppose that the learner is provided with a set of
parameters by Universal Grammar. For each new input sen-
tence, the learner attempts to assign that sentence a well-
formed representation. If the learner succeeds, it does nothing
to the current parameter setting and proceeds to the next input
datum. If the learner fails, then it selects a parameter and resets
it. The question is how the learner selects a parameter.
Consider, for example, "Exceptional Case Marking" (ECM)
structures, as in (1):
(1) They believe [clause each other to be ill]
The property of (1) that is of interest for present purposes is that
the matrix verb, believe, stands in the structural relationship of
government to the subject of the embedded infinitival clause,
each other. Because of this structural relationship, the verb is
able to assign abstract case to the subject of the infinitival. As a
result, the subject of the infinitival is permitted to have pho-
nological content (see Chomsky 1981a).
Not all languages have ECM structures, so their presence in a
language must be the result of setting a parameter. Some
languages allow for Case assignment to the subject of infinitivals
without government by a verb like believe; modern Irish and
Latin (Chung & McCloskey 1987) are examples of this kind of
language. The latter type of language will have sentences very
similar to the sentence in (1); the Irish example in (2) shows this:
CommentarylLightfoot: Language learnability
(2) Is cuimhneach leo (clause 'ac' a bheith ar seachran]
[Copula] mindful with-them they to-be lost
"They remember being lost."
Despite the apparent similarity between (1) and (2) with
respect to the phonologically overt subject of the infinitival
clause, the two structures differ in ways that have interesting
consequences for the resulting language. Because of the gov-
ernment relation, English allows anaphoric noun phrases (like
each other) to occur in the subject position of the infinitival,
whereas Irish does not because it lacks the appropriate govern-
ment relation:
(3) *Shil siad [clause a cheile a bheith breoite]
thought they each-other to-be ill
They thought each other to be ill."
Clearly, setting the relevant parameters correctly is important
to explaining the resultant grammaticality judgments.
Upon encountering examples like (1), how does a child in an
English-speaking environment know that the language has
ECM rather than a Case-marking system like Irish? One might
imagine that the child would compare the predictions made by
the two different parameter settings to decide which fits the
facts better. Thus, the child could note that examples like (1)
allow for an anaphoric noun phrase in the subject position of the
infinitival clause and could then (correctly) select the setting
that allows ECM. But the child could also incorrectly conclude
that the language was like Irish in having special Case marking
for infinitival subjects, and like CJiinese (see the target article for
discussion) in allowing for "long distance" anaphors. Such a
language would permit examples like (1) without ECM. In fact,
the language might well be a superset language of English; it
would contain all the grammatical sentences as well an infinite
number of ungrammatical strings. Assuming that the child
encounters only simple, grammatical utterances (the underly-
ing assumption of the "degree-0" framework), no data available
to the child would overrule the bad hypothesis.2 The learner
must connect the distribution of anaphors with the ECM param-
eter and not assume that the two phenomena are unrelated.
The problem is that each parameter setting makes a wide
variety of predictions about the form of the resulting language,
and many of these predictions are made given that other param-
eters are set in a particular way. Parameter settings are not
discrete but interact with other parameter settings to generate
the adult language. The learner's problem in setting a parameter
appears to be analogous to the "frame problem" familiar from
artificial intelligence (McCarthy & Hayes 1969); how does one
go about changing a knowledge state automatically in the face of
a dynamic world? In the present context, how would the learner
know when to stop generating and testing predictions made by
possible parameter settings and combinations of parameter
settings? It seems unlikely that an effective procedure can be
given that will tell the learner that it can stop testing predictions
and set a parameter. If no such procedure can be given, then the
learner might never actually set a parameter.
Children are nevertheless quite successful at acquiring lan-
guage quickly and efficiently. This suggests that the learner is so
structured that the relevant parameter can be set given particu-
lar input data. Discovering how the learner has this built-in
capacity will play a fundamental role in cracking the logical
problem of language acquisition. Lightfoot is right in emphasiz-
ing the role of the input in language learnability; but the
relationship between the input data and Universal Grammar is
crucially mediated by a learner. The problem will not be solved
until we can achieve an understanding of how the input data,
Universal Grammar, and the form of the learner interact to
arrive at the adult state of knowledge of language.
NOTES
1. On studies of Motherese, see Newport et al. (1977) and the
references cited there. Wexler and Culicover (1980) provide an exten-
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sive discussion and criticism of the assumptions underlying many
studies of Motherese.
2. This situation violates the "Subset Principle." See Berwick (1985),
Manzini and Wexler (1987), Wexler and Manzini (1987) for discussion.
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The acquisition of a language involves two components: the
contribution of the individual and the contribution of the lin-
guistic environment. What cannot be attributed to the linguistic
environment must be attributed to the individual. Within the
framework of generative grammar, the contribution of the
individual is represented as a system of rules1 and a related
system of principles which determine the form or application of
the rules, or the representations the rules generate. These two
systems constitute Universal Grammar (UG), an explicit theory
of the biological endowment of our species (universal across the
species) which allows a human being to acquire a language. It is
further assumed that these systems (actually, subsystems of UG)
may be realized differently for specific languages within certain
limits. For language acquisition to occur, an individual must be
exposed to (primary) linguistic data which allow him to acquire
the grammar of a particular language. Lightfoot's target article
focuses on the nature of the evidence required so that the child
endowed with UG can develop the grammar of a specific
language.
In line with recent advances in generative grammar, Light-
foot adopts the view that specific grammar develops from the
fixing of certain open values (parameters) in the subsystems of
UG. In this view the acquisition of language is largely a result of
parameter setting on the basis of the linguistic evidence avail-
able to the child. Lightfoot's main new claim is that the evidence
required for parameter setting may basically be limited to
properties of main clauses (without reference to embedded
clauses - what he calls degree-0 learnability). In this way,
Lightfoot's target article constitutes a serious effort to clarify the
relationship between the contribution of the individual's UG
and of the linguistic environment. Although we find ourselves
largely in agreement with Lightfoot's general approach, there
are questions of detail that require further clarification and
revision.
The term "parameter" in the literature of generative gram-
mar (including Lightfoot's article) covers several distinct no-
tions. Because this has a direct bearing on the issue of language
acquisition in the parameter-setting model, it is necessary to
distinguish between the different notions. Once the distinctions
are made, it becomes clear that the child's triggering experience
(i.e., the linguistic evidence the child uses in constructing a
grammar) bears on one particular notion and not the others. We
will argue that the evidence for UG based on the poverty of the
stimulus is also evidence that certain parameters of UG are
preset innately (i.e., in the absence of any triggering experi-
ence). This suggests that a certain sharpening of the parameter-
setting model that Lightfoot's article explores is in order.
1. On the notion "parameter of UG." Given a model of UG
consisting of a subsystem of rules and a subsystem of principles,
we can identify parts of the subsystems which are subject to
variation across languages. The range of values involved in this
variation constitute the "parameters" of UG. Thus we have two
types of parameters: those associated with the subsystem of
principles (p-parameters) and those associated with the sub-
system of rules (r-parameters). For example, the values associ-
ated with the Subjacency principle (i. e., the choice of S or S' as a
bounding node, discussed in Lightfoot's section 5.1) would be
instances of p-parameters. With respect to rules, the concrete
values that are assigned to category variables in rule schema
(e.g., Lightfoot's section 6) would constitute r-parameters. In
Lightfoot's discussion (sect. 2, para. 6) the linear order of
constituents also constitutes a parameter - and hence an r-
parameter in our terms. One further set of r-parameters would
be the possible category values assigned to a in the rule schema
"move a " which represents the two distinct elementary trans-
formational operations of substitution and adjunction.2
According to the parameter-setting model of language ac-
quisition there is a crucial difference between p-parametcrs and
r-parameters with respect to the role of linguistic experience. In
the case of r-parameters, it is reasonable to assume that lin-
guistic data are necessary and sufficient to fix values. Thus word
order and the categories affected by movement rules will be
determined primarily by data - the triggering experience.
However, the setting of p-parameters cannot be explained in
this way.
2. P-parameters and the poverty of the stimulus. Principles of
grammar such as Subjacency are motivated in part by empirical
evidence concerning the ill-formedness of certain syntactic
structures. For example, Subjacency in English (where the
bounding nodes are taken to be S and NP) accounts for the
following contrast.
(1) a. i. Who do you believe that Mary likes?
ii. [s. whoJs do you believe [s. e, that [s Mary likes e, ] ] ] ]
b. i. *Who do you believe the claim that Mary likes?
ii. [s. whOj[s do you believe [NP the claim [s. e, that [s Mary
likes e, ] ] ] ] ]
(In (lb.ii) and elsewhere the arrow indicates the connection
which violates Subjacency.) Given standard assumptions, the
wh-phrase in (la) moves in a stepwise fashion through each
intervening Comp position (the position between the S' and S
brackets in the structures above) and leaves a trace (ej) in each
position it moves from. In this analysis, (la) does not violate
Subjacency. In contrast, (lb) violates Subjacency because the
movement of the wh-phrase to the front of the main clause
crosses two bounding nodes (NP and S).
Since (lb) does not occur as part of the child's triggering
experience, Subjacency must be assumed to develop in the
absence of the relevant linguistic experience - what we shall call
"zero-stimulation." Where it can be demonstrated that zero-
stimulation holds with respect to a principle of grammar, that
principle must be innate. This is a standard poverty-of-the-
stimulus argument for establishing principles of UG.
If Subjacency has p-parameters (cf. Rizzi 1982, fn. 25;
Chomsky 1981, p.52 ff), then the argument from the poverty of
the stimulus applies not only to the existence of the principle in
UG, but also to the original setting of its parameters. The
parameters for Subjacency must be preset in UG at the most
restrictive settings. If not, then the language learner would
require negative evidence (e.g. (lb)) to fix the p-parameters
correctly.
This can be further illustrated by considering the case of wh-
movement in Russian, which is more constrained than English
(and Italian). In Russian, an interrogative pronoun (or wh-
phrase) can be moved to the front of the its clause as in (2).
(2) a. Kavo ljubit Marija
who-ACC loves Mary-NOM
"who does Mary love?"
b. Ja znaju, kavo Marija ljubit
I know who-ACC Mary-NOM loves
"I know who(m) Mary loves."
(2b) illustrates that wh-movement applies inside an embedded
clause just as it applies in a simple sentence like (2a). However,
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a wh-phrase cannot be moved from an embedded clause to a
matrix clause. Thus the Russian example corresponding to (la)
is ill-formed. Compare (la) and (3).
(3) u. *Kavo govorit Ivan, cto Marija ljubit?
who-ACC says Ivan that Mary-NOM loves
"who does Ivan say that Mary loves?"
b. [s. Kavo, [s. govorit Kvan, [s. e, cto [s Marija ljubit e, ] ] ] ]
These facts can plausibly be explained by the Subjacency princi-
ple under the assumption that both S and S' are bounding nodes
in Russian. Since negative evidence such as (3) is not available to
the language learner, we have another case of zero-stimulation.
We are therefore led to assume that the p-parameters for
Subjacency must be preset at S and S' (and also NP, for reasons
we won't discuss here).
If a child acquires a grammar of Russian, the p-parameters for
Subjacency remain as preset in UG. But if the child is exposed to
a language like English, positive evidence like (la) will trigger a
resetting of the p-parameters to allow the movement of a wh-
phrase out of its clause. This is achieved by excluding either S or
S' as a bounding node for Subjacency. Again, negative evidence
indicates that the correct choice for English is to exclude S'. The
relevant example is given in (4).
(4) a. * Which books did John wonder whom Bill gave to?
b. [s. Which books, [s did John wonder [s. whonij [s Bill gave e,
to ej ] ] ]
If S is a bounding node for English, then Subjacency correctly
rules out (4a). If instead S' is taken to be a bounding node, then
(4a) is no longer excluded by Subjacency. The choice of S over S'
for English, which also depends on negative evidence, is yet
another instance of zero-stimulation. By the logic of the argu-
ment concerning the initial setting of p-parameters, the reset-
ting of p-parameters for Subjacency from {NP,S',S} to {NP,S}
must be innately specified as part of UG. Positive evidence like
(la) merely indicates that the p-parameters must be reset, but is
not sufficient to determine the actual values.
A third situation arises in Italian and French, where examples
analogous to (4a) are grammatical. (The following Italian exam-
ples are from Rizzi 1982, 18a-b, and the French examples are
from Sportiche 1981, 45a-b.)
(5) a. Italian
i. II mio primo libro, che credo che tu sappia a chi ho
dedicate me e sempre stato molto caro.
"My first book, which I believe that you know to
whom I dedicated, has always been very dear to me"
ii. II mio primo libro,[s'che( [scredo[s'e|che[s tu
sappia[s' a chi, [g ho dedicato e, ej]]]]] me e sempre
stato molto caro.
b. French
i. Voila quelqu un a qui je crois que je sais lequel
j'offrirais.
"Here is someone to whom I think that I know which
one I will offer."
ii. Voila quelqu'un[s' a quij[sje crois[s'ejque[sje sais
[s'lequel,[s j'offrirais e, ej]]]]]]
If S were a bounding node in Italian then the connection
between the traces of the wh-phrase chet in (5a. ii) would be
incorrectly excluded by Subjacency because it crosses two S
nodes. If, however, S' rather than S is a bounding node for
Italian, as argued by Rizzi, then the connection between these
traces crosses only one S' and (5a. ii) is permitted (since no
Subjacency violation occurs). An analogous argument has been
made by Sportiche for the French example (5b). In contrast to
(5), the examples in (6) show that Subjacency does hold for
Italian and French when two S' nodes are crossed.
(6) a. Italian
i. *I1 mio primo libro, che so a chi credi che abbia
dedicato, me e sempre stato molto caro.
"My first book, which I know to whom you believe that I
dedicated, has always been very dear to me"
ii. II mio primo libro,
[s. che, [s so [s. a chij [s credi [s. e, che [s abbia
dedicato e, ej ] ] ] ] ]
me e sempre stato molto caro.
b. French
i. *Voila quelqu'un a qui je sais lequel je crois que
j'offrirais.
"Here is someone to whom I know which one I think that
I will offer."
ii. Voila quelqu'un
[s- a quij [s je sais [s. lequel, [s je crois [s. 6, que [s
j'offrirais e, e,] ] ] ] ] ]
In (6a. ii) for example, while the connection between the wh-
phrase a chij and its trace crosses only one S', the connection
between chei and its closest trace crosses two S' nodes in
violation of Subjacency. This holds true for the French example.
By the logic of the general argument, the resetting of the p-
parameters for Subjacency in Italian and French (i.e. from
{NP,S',S} to {NP,S'} requires positive evidence - either exam-
ples like those in (5) above or simplex structures of the sort
discussed by Lightfoot (see his examples 24 and 44).
What we have attempted to show here is that p-parameters in
UG must be preset because there is no relevant triggering
experience of any sort (including degree-0 data). By the logic of
the argument from the poverty of the stimulus, the original
setting is a case of zero-stimulation. The trigger experience is
relevant only to the resetting of the p-parameters. And even for
resetting, the change values in some cases (e.g. Subjacency for
English) must be innately prespecified. If this is correct, then
the trigger experience, which is important for the setting of r-
parameters, does not determine the setting of the p-parameters
ofUG.
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NOTES
1. We assume that the rule system of UG consists of abstract mecha-
nisms (rule schema) which may be instantiated as language particular
rules in specific grammars. On this view, such mechanisms would
include the elementary transformational operations
i. adjoin ot to B
ii. substitute o for B
iii. delete o
where a and B are syntactic category variables. This subsystem of UG
does not include language particular phrase structure rules or
transformations.
2. There is a third use of the term "parameter" in the study of
crosslinguistic variation where it has yet to be established that any p- or
r-parameter is involved. The most often cited case is the so-called null-
subject parameter whereby some languages allow null subjects in finite
clauses and others do not. The notions "null subject" versus "non-null
subject" are not values of any subsystem of UG. This difference in
phenomena across languages may arise as a result of parameter setting
for other principles - e.g., the Empty Category Principle vis-a-vis the
values for proper governors (see Chomsky 1981a) or for the direction of
government (see Adams 1987).
Infinitely nested Chinese "black boxes":
Linguists and the search for Universal
(innate) Grammar
Allen D. Grimshaw
Department of Sociology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47401
1. Introduction. As an outsider I have always admired and
even envied linguists; at the same time I have sometimes found
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myself sympathizing with them over the apparent intractability
of some of the intellectual puzzles with which they must deal.
Finally, I have been puzzled by at least some linguists' notions of
what constitutes evidence for often intriguing theoretical
claims. I admire linguists because they have taken on the
challenging task of explaining language and because in doing
this they have avoided a separation between "theory" and
"research" which has inhibited the development of strong
theory(ies) in my own discipline of sociology. I sympathize with
linguists because they must confront difficult and heavily
freighted and possibly unanswerable questions of semantics. I
envy linguists because some of their data (phonological) are so
easy to obtain and their measurement so crisp - and because
working with those materials has permitted linguists to develop
much more elegant "discovery procedures " than generally ob-
tain in my own field. These positive reactions make it hard for
me to understand why some of the most productive, thoughtful,
and innovative linguists continue to rely primarily on their own
"intuitions" (or those of others) and on constructed examples
rather than on naturally occurring discourse (whether spoken or
written) as evidence for their theoretical claims.
Lightfoot addresses an interesting question with implications
for the understanding of language acquisition and of claims
about Universal Grammar (and innateness). I am ultimately
unpersuaded.
2. "Whafs In the LAD? - "Another black box. "Linguists gener-
ally subscribe to some version of a view which says: (1) Infants
immersed in talk themselves generally acquire language; (2)
they do this by processing what they hear through a "language
acquisition device" (sometimes disdainfully referred to as "the
black box"). Specification of the contents of the black box or
LAO is a goal of all linguists of "innatist" persuasions (most
contemporary linguists); they seem to agree that they'll find
some sort of genetically programmed "software" which permits
learners to construct theories of whatever language they hear. It
seems to me that Lightfoot is further saying that (3) to the extent
that linguists subscribe to such a position and to the extent that
they agree with the "poverty-of-stimulus" codicil to the theory,
they must assign greater magnitude to the genetic contribution
to language acquisition. Whether researchers have started from
"selectionalist" or "binding" perspectives, moreover, it seems
to me that the argument just reviewed has led to the postulation
of more and more features which the UG "must" have - in boxes
further and further "down" (or "in"?) - and thereby to attempts
(1) to specify what data could "trigger" incorporation of those
UG features into individuals' competences and (2) to demon-
strate that things done in rather different ways in quite disparate
languages are actually, for purposes of triggering, the same. The
data used in attempts to specify and demonstrate have ordinarily
been constructed utterances (or fortuitously overheard ones).
To my knowledge the idea that features of UG might result from
such extralinguistic attributes of good theories as parsimony or
efficiency is not entertained by linguists.
3. SWIM differences In the semantic domain of "obvious."
Space limitations for BBS commentaries do not permit me to
detail the reasons for my discomfort about observations/claims
that Lightfoot adduces, usually uncritically, in the course of his
argument. I'll simply list some of them and provide brief
reactions. Lightfoot either explicitly states, or implies, the
following:
(1) Constructed examples, based on linguists' "intuitions,"
constitute adequate bases for the investigation both of features
of formal grammar and of processes of language acquisition
(passim). In my view it has been demonstrated that this is a most
dubious assumption (e.g., Bowerman 1985; Brown 1973; 1977;
Ervin-Tripp & Mitchell-Keman 1977a; 1977b; Fillmore 1979;
Ochs 1986; Schieffelin & Ochs 1986; Slobin 1985a; 1985b; Snow
1977; Snow & Ferguson 1977).
(2) "Most ambiguities pass unnoticed and people take the
most appropriate of the available meanings" (sect.2, para.4).
This is an undocumented and probably undemonstrable claim
(Grimshaw 1987; Levine 1985).
(3) "Motherese" is the primary data for children's language
learning. Snow (1977) herself makes no such claim (see also case
studies as disparate in their authors' orienting perspectives as
Bloom 1970 and Halliday 1975). Lightfoot's characterization of
Snow more generally seems misleading. Snow emphasized that
learning is an interactive process in which mothers (or other
caretakers) and infants mutually accommodate.
(4) Some children are given no explicit instruction; others are
corrected by "zealous" parents, and when corrected resist
(sect.3). Children are corrected by a range of interlocutors; they
do resist; they also accept - and sometimes adapt or explain
(Gumperz & Hernandez-Ch. 1971).
(5) Not only are children not instructed, and when corrected
resist, but they also disattend (i.e., don't experience as "trig-
gers") what they hear that is not part of the socially most valued
local varieties. This remains undemonstrated.
(6) Lightfoot asks why some speakers hear linguistic forms
but do not reproduce them; his answer is that syntactic shifts
occur in such a way that utterances previously analyzed in a
particular way no longer constitute triggers. Although his claim
is not that a change occurs in the UG/genetic program (as seems
mind-bogglingly to be the case on a first reading), Lightfoot
writes as if the richly documented studies of social constraints on
language change (e.g., Labov 1972b; 1980; 1986; Weinreich et
al. 1968) had never been done. It may well be that triggering
phenomena have nothing at all to do with change (although at
some point Lightfoot and his colleagues will have to address the
question of whether changes in the UG have accompanied other
changes in human genetic make-up over the millenia). For
reasons similar to my questioning of his explanation for language
change, I find Lightfoot's proposals concerning creolization less
persuasive than the more socially oriented views (e.g., Sankoff
1980).
At one point in his argument Lightfoot reports a hunch that an
explanatory scenario is "too exotic" and that an interpretation
based on UG is more persuasive (sect.4, para.9). At a later point,
where he reports differences in production among Italian speak-
ers (a fact which counters a strong UG position), he remarks that
the data are "slightly exotic" and that variation is hence not
surprising (sect.5.4, para. 1). It seems to me that this amounts to
saying that when data support the UG thesis, that's fine, but
when they don't, the problem is with the data rather than a
challenge to the UG perspective. This sounds like wanting
things both ways.
4. In spite of my complaints ... Although I have complained
about issues of documentation/demonstration, and particularly
about Lightfoot's apparent unwillingness to take any account of
social variables, I nonetheless found this an intriguing and
suggestive paper. I like both the mode of argument and the
systematic marshaling of data from within the paradigm. I wish
there could be some rapprochement between formal linguists at
the "autonomous core" and those sensitive to social contexts. At
the same time, the facts of language are so impressive that it is
not surprising that linguists continue to attempt to open up the
black boxes they keep finding inside those already opened.
Those same facts also make the argument that there is some
genetic programming plausible - even if undemonstrated.
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Positive and negative evidence in language
acquisition
Jane Grimshaw8 and Steven Pinker*5
'Department of Psychology, Linguistics & Cognitive Science Program,
Brandeis University, Waltham, MA 02254 and "Department of Brain and
Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
MA 02139
Electronic mall: mgrimshaw@brandeis.bitnet and bSteve@psyche.mit.edu
Lightfoot's interesting target article is part of a growing body of
work that has transformed the study of language acquisition
during the last decade. Rather than studying children's speech
as an end in itself, this research has proposed explicit learning
mechanisms by which the child could acquire grammatical
structures upon exposure to input data. Any such model of
language acquisition has to take into account the nature of the
input data: whether children have access to information about
what is a sentence in the language (positive evidence), informa-
tion about which strings of words are not sentences (negative
evidence), or both.
Though no one questions that children hear and learn from
positive evidence (parents' speech), the question of negative
evidence is more complex. Children end up knowing that
certain sentences are ungrammatical, yet many theorists, in-
cluding Lightfoot, take the position that this information is not
present in the linguistic world of children. Somehow, children
must generalize beyond what they hear, but not so much that
they permanently generate ungrammatical sentences by mak-
ing generalizations that the world can never disconfirm. A major
goal of Lightfoot's proposals, and those of other language ac-
quisition theorists (see Baker & McCarthy 1981; Grimshaw
1981; Pinker 1984; 1989; Wexler & Culicover 1980), is to solve
those problems. If negative evidence is available, however,
these specific proposals would lose much of their motivation.
The key questions are: Does negative evidence exist? Is it there
in a usable form? Do language learners use it? Do language
learners need it?
Brown and Hanlon (1970) examined parents' feedback to their
children's questions and negatives, a collection chosen because
these constructions are frequently ill-formed in child language.
Brown and Hanlon divided adult responses by appropriateness
into "sequiturs' and "nonsequiturs' on the assumption that
children might take comprehension failure as evidence that
their utterance was ungrammatical. Brown and Hanlon found
no correlation between the grammaticality of the child sen-
tences and appropriate interpretations by adults. They also
studied "contingent approval" to see whether parents tended to
respond with disapproval to ungrammatical sentences. Again,
they found no relation.
These results are the empirical foundation for the assumption
that children do not receive negative evidence. But the conclu-
sion has not sat well with developmental psychologists. Re-
cently, four studies have reopened the question. Hirsch-Pasek
et al. (1984) studied approval and its relationship to well-
formedness. Here their results accorded with those of Brown
and Hanlon. However, they also tallied repetitions (both ver-
batim and with modifications), and found that adults are more
likely to repeat ungrammatical than grammatical sentences.
Specifically, they found a statistical relation between maternal
repetition and ungrammaticality for their 2-year-olds and none
for older children (3-5 years): 20.8% of the ill-formed sentences
of 2-year-olds were repeated whereas only 12.0% of the gram-
matical ones were. Demetras et al. (1986) found that most
measures of parental behavior were independent of the gram-
maticality of the 2-year-old children's sentence, but some were
not: Verbatim repetitions and continuations of the conversation
followed grammatical sentences slightly more often than un-
grammatical ones, but clarification questions followed ungram-
matical sentences slightly more often.
Similar results have been documented by Bohannon and
Stanowicz (1988) for 2-year-olds, and by Penner (1987) for 2-
year-olds, and, greatly attenuated, for 3-year-olds. None of the
studies found any form of feedback that followed only gram-
matical or only ungrammatical sentences; it was only relative
frequencies that differed, and usually by only a few percentage
points. The conclusion drawn by some of these researchers is
that feedback giving information about ungrammaticality is
available to learners and that the claims of theorists like Light-
foot are unmotivated.
One thing is certain: Children do not receive negative evi-
dence in the technical sense. Negative evidence (see Gold 1967;
Pinker 1979) is information about the ungrammaticality of every
ungrammatical string composed of the language's vocabulary
items. None of these studies have shown that all of children's
ungrammatical sentences elicit differences in parental behavior,
only that some do. Furthermore, feedback could only serve as
true negative evidence if children could utter any string of
words whatsoever and expect appropriate feedback. Note that
most of the ungrammatical strings that linguists try to account
for are not uttered by children in the 2-3 year age range for
which feedback has been documented; there is little reason to
believe that children could count on feedback if they uttered
them.
An equally important question is whether all parents provide
these kinds of feedback. A number of the researchers use
statistics to show that the sample data come from maternal
populations in which the mean number of responses to gram-
matical sentences and ungrammatical sentences differ. But
these statistics are beside the point: The population means may
differ while some of the individual mothers may make the
responses equiprobably (or with a difference in the opposite
direction). Yet their children, presumably, learn to talk. Unless
all mothers of children who acquire language provide feedback,
we cannot attribute an important role to it. Not only are
individual data not reported in most of the studies, and standard
deviations quite large, but caretakers from the socioeconomic
classes or cultures that may be less apt to lavish moment-by-
moment attention on their children have not been studied at all.
Even for those children whose parents provide feedback, and
for those sentences that elicit it, direct information about un-
grammaticality is not available. The learner cannot just con-
clude that a sentence which gets repeated is ungrammatical, or
that a sentence which is not repeated is grammatical; the
feedback is a small statistical tendency, and not an absolute
relationship. For example, any children in the Hirsh-Pasek et
al. sample who changed their grammar so as to rule out a
repeated utterance would be making their grammar better a
fifth of the time but making it worse an eighth of the time,
oscillating between incorrect and correct hypotheses.
It might seem that the problem does not arise if we study, for
example, corrections, instead of repetitions. After all, unlike
repetition, correction presumably occurs only with ungram-
matical sentences, so the child could safely assume that if a
sentence is corrected it's ungrammatical. There is a problem
with this reasoning, however: How does the child know what to
count as a correction? Unless corrections are uniquely marked
off somehow, the child cannot know whether or not a response
constitutes a correction. A correction, if you don't know that it's
a correction, is just a partial repetition. Since other partial
repetitions occur, children cannot know which are in fact correc-
tions without knowing whether what they said was ungram-
matical. But this is the very information that the correction must
supply, if it is to provide negative evidence. For example:
ungrammatical: Daddy put the book.
correction: Daddy put the book on the table.
grammatical: Daddy threw the book.
partial repetition: Daddy threw the book on the table.
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Calling something a correction in the first place reflects a
prior classification of the child's previous utterance as ungram-
matical. It's a coding of the data that is available to the experi-
menter but not to the child. So unless it's possible to show that
corrections can be reliably distinguished by children from par-
tial repetitions, the supposed negative evidence would not exist
in any form accessible to the learner, since the learner does not
in fact know that something is being corrected, and cannot
therefore use the information that a correction has occurred.
Perhaps, one might argue, over time children could aggre-
gate information from the statistical tendencies uncovered in
the cited work, rejecting a sentence if it had been followed by a
given type of feedback so often that the hypothesis that it was
ungrammatical was very much more probable. But how this
would work is quite unclear, to say the least. Children certainly
cannot aggregate information about feedback to tokens of partic-
ular sentences; no sentence is used by a child often enough. So if
they use feedback at all, they must lump "equivalent" kinds of
sentences together for the tallies. How they hypothesize the
right equivalence classes and assign sentences correctly to them
simply reraises all the questions about generalization that
nativist theories seek to answer.
The usefulness of the information that a kind of sentence is
ungrammatical is highly questionable too. Sentences are gener-
ated by large numbers of rules and principles that vary
crosslinguistically, not just by one rule, so even a child able to
make a binary good/bad decision faces a formidable example of
the "blame-assignment" problem in singling out which rule to
change or discard. In fact, the feedback documented by some of
the studies does not even distinguish "errors" that are due to
syntax from those due to bad pronunciation (e.g. bawoon for
balloon), so the child cannot even directly relate an error signal
to a deficiency in grammar.
The next question about negative evidence, if it exists in
usable form, is whether children use it. Lightfoot reports a
typical anecdote showing that overt corrections are fruitless,
and no evidence better than such anecdotes exists. Though it is
possible that corrections or that other forms of enriched interac-
tion with children may lead to changes in their speech, such
evidence would have to be interpreted cautiously. Any correc-
tion by its very nature also offers positive evidence, and positive
evidence of a peculiarly relevant kind. So any study which
purports to show that corrections are actually used by children
can be given the more parsimonious explanation that this is
another case where relevant positive evidence is used. To make
any kind of case for the role of corrections as negative evidence,
it is necessary to distinguish the statistical correlation of partial
repetitions with ungrammatical utterances from the content of
partial repetitions themselves - a form of positive evidence.
Finally, even if children do use feedback, the most germane
question is whether they have to. Consider the strings that
adults come to recognize as ungrammatical (any of the asterisked
example in Lightfoot's paper, for example). Have all speakers of
English uttered such strings in their lives and accumulated
negative feedback showing that they are ungrammatical? Would
an adult who had never uttered the sentence type, or who had
not been in the company of people who had noticed and reacted
to it, find it grammatical? The relative uniformity of people's
judgments of grammaticality for unusual sentence types makes
this highly unlikely.
The conclusion, then, is that the newer studies do not provide
the slightest reason to question the research program Lightfoot
advocates and illustrates, with its assumption of no negative
evidence. But it is important to consider how central the
absence of negative evidence is to the current research program
in learnability. Although individual arguments may rest on the
assumption that negative evidence is unavailable, the research
program as a whole certainly does not. After all, linguists have
access to all the negative evidence there is, but they are still
remarkably less good at grammar discovery than children are.
The real question concerns the difference between a child and a
linguist. Why is the child so much more successful? The answer
is surely the one that nativist theories of language acquisition
provide - the child has Universal Grammar to use, whereas the
linguist is trying simultaneously to construct grammars and to
discover the properties of Universal Grammar.
The language learner: A trigger-happy kid?
Yosef Grodzinsky
Department of Psychology, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel;
Aphasia Research Center, Boston University School of Medicine, Boston
Veterans Administration Medical Center, Boston, MA 02130
Electronic mail: kid@taunds.bitnet
A principles-and-parameters theory of grammar calls for a trig-
gering theory of language acquisition of the general kind Light-
foot describes. A full triggering theory has to specify not only
what the trigger is - to demonstrate that the child can identify
his grammar on simple data - but it must also provide the
selection device by which the child attends to the relevant data
and sifts away the unimportant and ungrammatical. We need, in
short, not just convenient conditions for pulling the trigger, a
hard enough problem to solve, but also directions for when to
withhold. To construct such a theory is extremely difficult.
Lightfoot adduces evidence' from historical change to show
that some of the child's linguistic experience is not used. This
claim is quite plausible, and, as Lightfoot points out, other
evidence (for example, the fact that kids ignore ungrammatical
strings that appear in the text they are exposed to) points in the
same direction. This raises two important questions. First,
which portion of the text is sufficient for language learning?
Second, given that it constitutes only a subset of the linguistic
material the learner hears, how does he identify it and avoid the
rest? Lightfoot has an interesting proposal regarding the first
question, but not the second. We do not know what prevents
the child from assigning a grammatical analysis to "noise,"
which may lead to wrong conclusions about the grammar of his
ambient language. So, whereas the target article attempts to
identify the simplest triggering data that would suffice, the issue
is not just what the trigger is, but also what isn't the trigger, and
how the child knows it. This is a serious problem, given that the
text contains ungrammatical utterances, hesitations, and false
starts galore, which the child presumably knows he should not
misanalyze, but simply ignore. Lightfoot seems to recognize the
fact that a trigger-happy language learner would end up excom-
municado - with the wrong grammar. Miracles aside, we would
like to know how this is avoided.
A concrete example will make my point clear. Consider the
well-known give/donate contrast that has occupied students of
language acquisition for a long time:
(1) a. John gave a book to Bill
b. John gave Bill a book
(2) a. John donated a book to Bill
b. *John donated Bill a book
The problem here concerns how the child knows the relation
between (la) and (lb), but blocks (2b) without negative evi-
dence. Several solutions have been proposed in the literature.
Of these, Randall's (1985) "retreat route" idea is an appropriate
one in the present context. She accounts for the child's "retreat"
from overgeneralization in this case by assuming an "Order
Principle" that disallows optional complements to intervene
between a head and obligatory complements. This principle
thus relates the facts in (1) and (2) to the contrast in (3):
(3) a. "John gave a book
b. John donated a book
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Since the NP with the Beneficiary 0-role of the verb donate is
optional (as (3b) shows), the Order Principle blocks (2b). This is
not the case forgive, however, which obligatorily takes two NPs.
Thus the appearance of sentences like (3b) in the child's enviion-
ment should suffice for him to know that (2b) is blocked, and no
negative evidence is necessary.
The descriptive generalization captured by the Order Princi-
ple may follow from something else. In fact, it can be seen as a
consequence of Larson's (1988) recent analysis of double-
objects. This analysis assumes verb-Raising in predicates like
give (4b), with an underlying structure as in (4a), and a thematic
structure as in (5):
(4) a. John [a book [gave to Mary]]
b. John gave [a book [t to Mary]]
(5) give—Beneficiary
Coal of motion along some path
The relevant part of this analysis for us is the claim that the
preposition to also assigns the 6-role of "goal of motion along
some patH," and that in give, this role is subsumed by the
predicate, whereas in donate it is not. This is the difference
between give and donate according to Larson. Because of this
difference, dative shift in the latter is impossible (2b) because it
"violates (the equivalent of) 'recoverability of deletion'" with
respect to 6-roles. This claim also explains the contrast in (3),
because if the second object of donate, unlike that of give,
depends on the preposition thematically, then its oblique object
is always optional, whereas give must have an oblique object to
discharge all of its 6-roles. Thus (3a) violates the 6-criterion,
whereas (3b) does not. On this view, the Order Principle now
reduces to differences in 0-grid between the two verbs, and it is
this difference that the child has to identify. This identification
would presumably come - as Randall proposes - from starting
with the assumption that all dative verbs are double objects (like
give), and then being exposed to examples like (3b), which lead
to a revision of the lexical entry.
Yet it is not unreasonable to assume that the child hears
ungrammatical expressions like (3a) quite often. If not in isolated
form, then certainly in discourse, the rules of which he surely
doesn't know yet. Worse yet, he might be exposed to sentences
like (6), where there is nothing - no semantic, intonational, or
any other cues - to tell him whether (6a) or (6b) is the right
analysis:
(6) a. Mommy gave [the baby] [food]
b. Mommy gave [the babyfood]
Why, then, do children not take such misleading utterances into
consideration? If Randall is right, and if data such as (3a) do
appear in the text, then the child, unaware of the ungram-
maticality of (3a), should misanalyze give as having an optional
complement. This mistake would lead him to treat give as if it
were donate - taking one obligatory complement NP. How-
ever, upon facing examples like (lb) in the text, he would be led
to the opposite conclusion, namely, that both complements of
give are obligatory. His lexicon at this point should contain a
contradiction. With the absence of additional evidence, he
would therefore be forced to reject either (lb) or (3a). Yet there
is nothing in the input that would tell the child where to go,
which should lead him to an arbitrary choice - concluding, at
random, that one of these two sentences is ungrammatical. This
does not happen, obviously - English-speaking kids do not
converge on different grammars in this respect. They are much
more cautious, pulling the trigger on data of the right kind only.
Why, then, do all kids behave the same way and choose (lb)?
It must be emphasized that the foregoing is an instance of a
much broader problem. Similar considerations hold, for exam-
ple, of Pinker's (1988) recent proposal that the child has a
"learning sequence" that records argument structures of verbs
in parental speech, counts them, and creates rules on this
evidential basis. In this case the problem of selecting the right
data base arises just as forcefully. Whereas the cases discussed
deal with lexical entries, one can easily imagine how the same
issues arise with respect to parameter fixing. It is quite clear,
then, that a solution - a selection device - is necessary for a
learning theory to get off the ground.
A good answer is not in sight, of course. One can list the
logical possibilities, however. Two kinds of solutions are con-
ceivable for the problem of input selection: "Internal" ones
(assuming that the child has an ability [criteria] to select the
good portion of the text) and "external" ones (assuming that the
bad portion of the text comes somehow marked, in a way the
child is capable of identifying).
The external account has three versions, none of which seems
particularly promising. The first is based on the claim that the
input is presented to the child in an ordered fashion, simple
constructions first, complex ones later; the second is based on
the effects of the frequency of occurrence of a given expression
in the text the child is exposed to; the third is based on the
hypothesis that the input comes marked - the child notes
ungrammatically by deviant intonational contours and the like.
Arguments of the type Lightfoot gives against the "motherese"
hypothesis seem generally valid here too, decreasing the like-
lihood that the "external" account will bear much fruit.
The "internal" account requires a mechanism by which the
child highlights good data and throws away the bad without
analyzing it. It is, in fact, a complicated form of "bootstrapping":
The child has to decide what the right data are for a grammar he
does not know yet. Whereas such a solution is imaginable, we
are clearly still far from it at this stage.
The problem is hard, yet a solution must be found, lest we
back ourselves into the corner where everything is innate, being
forced to a position that even Fodor would not endorse: that not
only are concepts like "syllabify" innate, but also their lexical
entries - which is, really, a bit too much.
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Language acquisition: What triggers what?
Hubert Haider
Department of Linguistics, University of Stuttgart, D-7000 Stuttgart, Federal
Republic of Germany
1. Impressed by David Lightfoot's elegant presentation of
the current conception of UG (Universal Grammar) I feel
tempted to ask, as an advocatus diaboli, whether it is true that
the difference between English and the flu is just the length of
the incubation period. By analogy with antibody formation,
grammar formation is depicted as the result of a selective
process. "The environment may be said to 'select' particular
values for the parameters of UG." This analogy fades out the role
of cognition, however. UG is a specific system of constraints for
symbol manipulation. As a module, it is connected with, and
mediated by, less task specific mechanisms of the general
cognitive system. UG does not have direct access to the primary
trigger experience. Chomsky (1981a, p. 10) accordingly stresses
the "epistemological priority" of parameter values. These must
be identifiable from a nonlinguistic categorization of patterns.
A plausible alternative hypothesis would be this: UG is an
innate piece of software (an inborn program) for building up a
cognitive structure called grammar. This cognitive structure
determines the verbal behavior. The analogies used by Light-
foot suggest a view of UG as a hardwired system, parts of which
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will be activated upon exposure to a specific input whereas
others may atrophy. [See Ebbesson: "Evolution and Ontogeny
of Neural Circuits" BBS 7(3) 1984.] If this is so, language
acquisition should be a continuous and irreversible process that
stops when the last parameter is fixed. What we observe,
however, is step-by-step development, with frequent re-
organizations (cf. Pinker 1984), suggesting that parameters may
be fixed with improper values and then reset in subsequent
stages. This would fit with a concept of UG as an innate program
for grammar formation. UG could be said to guide the child
toward projecting specific structures on selected data: the trig-
ger experience. In the course of language acquisition, UG
focuses attention on specific data structures. This would account
for both the stage specific frequency of patterns and the child's
resistance to untimely correction (sect. 3). One can sum up this
proposal in the form of a brief answer to the initial question: UG
triggers the child to scan the environment for what is called the
trigger experience.
2. How complex are the data that are to be scanned for
adjustingthe parameters? Lightfoot's position, well substanti-
ated by a series of case studies, is the strongest possible one: No
complex data are needed. Any linguist will try hard to concoct
some counterarguments to undermine a bold hypothesis. Here
are some: Let us start with some general considerations. In any
natural language, the subset of sentential structures charac-
terized by degree-0 complexity is finite. It can easily be enumer-
ated because there is no recursion. It is highly plausible that
embedded clauses are determined by the same kinds of princi-
ples that apply in nonembedded clauses (cf. the principle of
cognitive harmony) except for one property, the nonclause
bound relations. These can arise only in recursive structures.
One might therefore expect that the trigger experience must be
^"sought at least in a subset of degree-1 complexity. Lightfoot
suggests an interesting characterization of a degree-0 domain
that consists of the main clause plus a bit of the embedded
clause. This is the local domain of binding. But even if the strong
position cannot not be maintained, Lightfoot's way of defining a
local domain is well chosen. It turns Wexler and Culicover's
(1980) degree-2-domain immediately into a degree-1-domain,
which is a most welcome result. If degree-2 were necessary, one
might ask why not any other degree, since the choice of numeral
2 seems arbitrary. Degree-1 simply means a domain with
embedding in contrast to a nonembedding domain.
Scandinavian languages seem to abound with nonlocal phe-
nomena. I will briefly illustrate two phenomena whose param-
etrization seems to violate the degree-0 restriction, namely,
long distance reflexives and intersecting extractions. The follow-
ing examples are taken from Icelandic.
(1) a. J6n, segir ao Maria elski sig,
John says that Mary loves himself (Anderson 1986, p. 66)
b. Hann, skipaSi Haraldi, aS raka sig,j
He, ordered Harold, to shave himself,, (Maling 1986, p. 61)
In both cases the most local subject accessible for the reflexive is
not the matrix subject and hence there is an embedded binding
domain. The reflexive may nevertheless be bound, as indicated
in (1), by the matrix subject. In order to set the parameter that
distinguishes English from Icelandic, it seems that a degree-1
domain must be taken into consideration.
The example in (2), taken from Norwegian (Koch Kristensen
1982), illustrates intersecting extractions. English allows only
nested extractions (cf. Pesetzky 1982), and only with nohfinite
complements (cf. 3a vs. 3c). In a nested extraction (3a) the path
between the highest extraction position and its extraction site
includes the other path. In an intersecting extraction (3b) the
paths do not overlap completely.
(2) Hvilke malerier, har ikke Petter noen vegg, a henge opp e, pa e,
which paintings has not Peter any wall to hang up on
(3) a. Han hade insett pa ett tidigt stadium att han maste forstora banden.
He had realized at an early stage that he must destroy tapes,
b. Nixon sade att han redan pa ett tidigt stadium (hade)
Nixon said that he already at an early stage (had)
insett att han maste forstora banden.
realized that he must destory tapes.
The Norwegian example indicates that the original ban against
intersecting extractions (cf. Pesetzky's path containment condi-
tion) must allow for parametrization. In order to fix this param-
eter for Norwegian, it is an embedded binding domain that is
again crucial. It seems that the proper relation between the
extracted phrases and their respective extraction sites can be
determined only if a degree-1 domain is accessible.
Even if it should turn out that these cases resist a degree-0
treatment, Lightfoot's proposal of the relevant locality domain
together with a degree-1 domain for the trigger experience is a
reasonable result. I wonder how a degree-2 phenomenon might
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Inviting a sceptic to comment on the internal niceties of gener-
ativist language-acquisition theory is rather like asking an athe-
ist to discuss rival theologians' various interpretations of the
doctrine of transubstantiation. If no such process ever takes
place, then all accounts of exactly how it takes place must be
mistaken. Conceivably, certain orthodox accounts are more
mistaken than other orthodox accounts; but the interest in
degrees of compound error is marginal. From a radical un-
believer's point of view, the only interesting question is why
anyone should believe the orthodox doctrine in the first place.
The answer is not far to seek in the present instance. As
Lightfoot's introduction amply demonstrates, some linguists
have fallen for - and deliberately revamped - a metaphor
familiar to biologists. Anyone acquainted with the history of
nineteenth- and twentieth-century linguistics will understand
why. It is part and parcel of the long drawn-out academic battle
to obtain for linguistics recognition as one of the natural sci-
ences. The strategy is to show that the methods and assumptions
of linguistics parallel those of the established scientific
disciplines.
The key phrase "triggering experience" arguably makes some
sense if we are discussing how fledgling birds learn the birdsong
patterns of their species [see Johnson: "Developmental Expla-
nation and the Ontogeny of Birdsong" BBS 11(4) 1988.]; but it
makes no prima facie sense at all in the case of a human child
learning the syntactic details of English, French, Cantonese,
and so forth. For one thing, these languages are not species-
specific. For another, every parent knows that a child's first
steps across its family's linguistic threshold are taken when the
child's voluntary (but encouraged) attempts to imitate certain
single arbitrary vocables become acceptably successful. If
Nature had really been generous enough to provide Homo
sapiens with built-in aids to language acquisition, it is here that
one would expect to find clear evidence for them; whereas
knowing how to construct subordinate clauses (which is Light-
foot's main concern) is about as likely to be genetically built-in as
knowing how to tie a reef-knot.
Lightfoot clearly has not taken on board any of the basic
criticisms which can be - and have been — made of his chosen
approach to language acquisition. (Romaine 1985 provides a
lucid summary.) For Lightfoot nothing essential seems to have
changed since the publication of Homstein and Lightfoot
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(1981). However, the "problem" of language acquisition, as
posed within this theoretical framework, has increasingly come
to be seen as irrelevant to any enterprise except the obsessive
self-justification of generativist linguistics.
Although Lightfoot refers to the child as a "little linguist" in
scare quotes, presumably in order to distance himself from the
original Chomskyan thesis about language acquisition, it is clear
that only "little linguists" can benefit from the putative "trigger-
ing experiences" which Lightfoot postulates. For those experi-
ences, if they are to be crucial, have to be subject to an analysis
which parallels suspiciously closely the overt arguments which
linguists like Lightfoot come up with. The difference between a
child "inferring" the rules and having them genetically "trig-
gered" thus turns out to be merely terminological.
In any case, the "triggering experience" hypothesis is explan-
atorily vacuous in the case of subordinate clauses. For implicitly
presupposed are the following assumptions: (i) that any incipient
grammar is already "a finite algebraic system," (ii) that what the
child hears are utterances with a determinate semantic struc-
ture, and (iii) that the child has prior access to a cognitive system
of remarkable complexity, which enables unknown factors in the
situational context to "force" a preferred interpretation of the
structural semantics. But if Santa Claus already brings this much
for free, he does not need to include in the genetic Christmas
stocking a gift package to help all God's children with the
acquisition of subordinate syntax. Or if he did, he might need
Occam's cordless shaver as a useful Christmas present himself.
The trouble with the entire generativist scenario of language
acquisition is twofold, and the twin faults are perspicuously
exemplified in Lightfoot's account of generativist reasoning, (i)
The evidence adduced is a priori, even when claiming to be
empirical; and the a priori material on inspection reveals closet
prescriptivism. For example, Lightfoot finds no fault with the
Chomskyite claim (Rizzi 1982b) that one difference between
acquiring English syntax and acquiring Italian syntax might be
explicable by the fact that Italian children hear sentence-types
such as ho trovato il libro, whereas English children do not hear
*found the book. The choice of this particular construction is
revealing. According to prescriptive grammarians ho trovato d
libro is "good" Italian, but *found the book is not "good"
English: i.e. it is "ungrammatical" in English to omit the subject
pronoun. (How many non-English-speaking linguists have been
taken in by this notorious example it would be difficult to
estimate.) The fact is that found the book (with no subject
pronoun) exemplifies a combinatorial pattern frequently en-
countered in colloquial English (and hence, presumably, heard
by English-learning children), particularly in response to ques-
tions. Why any reputable theorist should asterisk such ex-
pressions is a prescriptivist mystery. But such idealizations are
apparently essential to explain generativist "parameter setting."
(ii) The rationale on offer is boot-strappingly tautological. For
instance, discussing the blackboard example an old man from
the city (Scott Fitzgerald or the Financial Times?), Lightfoot
apparently endorses the claim that it can be "generated" by
either of two "sets of rules." He writes: "It can be shown that any
noun phrase that occurs in English, and thus any noun phrase
that an English-speaking child will hear, can be generated by
both sets of rules." The give-away word here is thus. In short,
children who acquire English noun phrases are deemed to have
been (relevantly) exposed to (not all but) only English noun
phrases as possible "triggering experiences." Anything else the
child hears, it will already recognize, evidently, as not an
English noun phrase. Mutatis mutandis the same presumably
goes for any piece of English syntax. Given this assumption, one
may reasonably ask whether children need Santa Claus's
subordinate-clause "degree-0" gift kit at all. Like most un-
wanted Christmas presents, it is likely to remain neglected in a
corner until someone has the sense to throw it out, along with
other degree-0 explanations in linguistics.
Commentary/Lightfoot: Language learnability
A possible mathematical specification of
"degree-0" or "degree-0 plus a little"
learnability
Aravind K. Joshi
Department of Computer and Information Science, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104
Electronic mail: joshi@linc.cis.upenn.edu
The basic idea discussed in the target article is that all informa-
tion needed to acquire a grammar can be obtained by the learner
from single unembedded structures. Information obtained from
these simple structures, together with some general principles
that are part of a Universal Grammar (UG), is all that is needed
for grammar acquisition. Let us try to see what kind of formal
system(s) can support such a learning paradigm.
Let us consider a formal system (formal grammar) which
consists of a finite set of (elementary) structures and a single
operation of composition of these elementary structures and
structures derived from them. If this single operation of com-
position is considered as belonging to Universal Grammar then
the finite set of elementary structures completely specifies the
grammar. What is needed to specify these elementary struc-
tures? First, of course, we need information about the shapes of
the possible elementary structures and constraints that must
hold among the nodes of a given structure. We may also need to
specify for each node of each structure which other elementary
structures are combinable at that node (if there are constraints
on combinability). Given such a system (of course, assuming
that it is linguistically adequate), it is of interest to see what kind
of mathematical system would serve as a specification for the
model proposed by Lightfoot.
One such formal system is tree adjoining grammar (tag),
which has been investigated in detail in recent years; see, for
example, Joshi (1985; 1987), Joshi etal. (in press), Kroch (1987),
and Kroch & Joshi (in press), among others. A tag, G, consists of
a finite set of initial structures (trees), I, and a finite set of
auxiliary trees, A. The initial trees roughly correspond to mini-
mal sentences and the auxiliary trees roughly correspond to
minimal recursive structures. An initial tree is rooted in S or S
and the frontier is all terminals. An auxiliary tree is rooted in
some nonterminal and the frontier is all terminals, except one
symbol, which is a nonterminal and the same as the one labeling
the root of the auxiliary tree. The trees in I and A together
constitute the finite set of elementary trees. There is a single
operation of composition, called "adjoining," which adjoins an
auxiliary tree to a node in an elementary tree or a tree derived
from it. Adjoining inserts the auxiliary tree at a node (with the
same label as the label of the root node of the auxiliary tree) in a
given tree. Thus, for example (see Kroch 1987), the auxiliary
tree (2) when adjoined to an initial tree (1) at the node interior
node S (designated by *, for convenience), results in the derived
tree (3). One of the key properties of tog is that it factors
recursion from dependencies (such as subcategorization, agree-
ment, and filler-gap), thus making all unbounded dependencies
local in a sense. It is this property that plays a key role in our
further discussion.
Subfacency as a constraint on simple unembedded structures.
As shown above, wh-movement can be accomplished in a tag by
the introduction of auxiliary trees. The unbounded character of
wh-movement constructions will then follow from the nature of
the adjunction operation whereby matrix predicates can be
adjoined "between" the wh- in COMP and the embedded
sentence. One interesting consequence of expressing long-
distance wh-dependencies in this way is that some of the island
constraints on extraction, especially Subjacency, are statable as
constraints on elementary trees (see Kroch 1987). Consider, for
example, a wh-island violation like the following:
(4) *Who(i) did you wonder why she wrote to e(i)?
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Who did John tell Sam that Bill invited
Figures 1, 2, and 3 (Joshi). A derivation in a tag.
This sentence cannot be produced by a tag. Since long-distance
wh-movement is always the result of adjunction of a matrix
predicate above an embedded clause, (4) could only be pro-
duced by the adjunction of the auxiliary tree (5) to the initial tree
(6) at the starred node S. Such a derivation would be illicit since
the initial tree here has two preposed wh-phrases, which En-
glish sentences never allow. Since the constraints on the well-
formedness of the initial trees will have to rule out such configu-
rations to correctly generate simple sentence questions, the
ungrammaticality of wh-island violations follows directly.
The significance of this observation of Kroch in the context of
the target article is as follows. The learner does not need
evidence from complex sentences to induce the Subjacency
constraint. Since the learner will have evidence from unembed-
ded structures with only one wh-phrase and will not see struc-
tures with two wh-phrases (for English), information about the
Subjacency constraint has been implicitly presented to the
learner via trigger experiences confined only to unembedded
structures (elementary trees oftag). Kroch (1987) has shown that
several other constraints - for example, ECP (empty category
principle) and CED (condition on extraction domain) - can be
reduced to constraints on initial structures.
In the example above, tree (5) is adjoinable at the starred node
S- in the tree (6) and not to the root node of tree (6). Thus in the
specification of tree (6) we must have this information specified
in some form, either explicitly as described above, or implicitly
by a specification of features at the starred node such that their
compatability or noncompatability with the features specified at
the root nodes of auxiliary trees will have the effect of stating this
constraint. In this sense, in the language of the target article
"degree-0" or "degree-0 plus something else," specification of
the unembedded structures is needed.
The tag system described above is a very highly (mathe-
matically) constrained system. It is more powerful than context-
free grammars but only slightly so, and belongs to the class of
formalisms known as mildly context-sensitive grammar for-
malisms. The properties described above follow from the way
togs factor recursion and dependencies and the domain of
locality the elementary-tag trees provide. This domain of locality
is larger than that provided by context-free grammars. This
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Figures 5 and 6 (Joshi). Subjacency in tag.
extended domain of locality and the factoring of recursion and
dependencies is what makes it possible to state constraints such
as Subjacency on the elementary trees (unembedded struc-
tures). This is exactly what Lightfoot s model requires.
In addition to the mathematical properties described above,
it has also been shown recently that tags belong to the class of
grammars known as polynomially learnable. Polynomial learn-
ability is a complexity theoretic notion of feasible learnability
(see Valiant 1984, for example). Abe (1988), in applying this
notion to the evaluation of grammatical formalisms for linguistic
description, has shown that a novel nontrivial constraint on the
degree of "locality" of grammars allows tags and some related,
mildly context-sensitive grammar formalisms to be poly-
nomially learnable.
In summary, I have presented a formal system which can be
regarded as a (mathematical) specification of the model present-
ed in the target article. Since the model of "degree-0 or degree-
0 plus a little" is not mathematically precise (and it may be very
difficult to give such a formalization), it is not possible to show an
exact correspondence between the tog formal system and the
model of the target article. However, I would not be surprised if
it turns out that to the extent the "degree-0" or "degree-0 plus a
little" model can be made mathematically precise, it will corre-
spond to grammars that factor recursion and dependencies and
require a domain of locality which is larger than that correspond-
ing to context-free grammars.
Does Universal Grammar exist?
Jan Koster
Department of General Linguistics, University of Groningen, 9712 TG
Gromngen, The Netherlands
Electronic mail: iuliet19@hyrrug5.bitnet
Degree-0 learnability of natural languages is an important no-
tion because it means that languages could be learnable on the
basis of very simple data, particularly data without embedded
clause structures. Lightfoot convincingly shows that the hypoth-
esis of O-learnability can be maintained if we define it in terms of
minimal binding domains rather than in terms of single clauses.
I am not aware of convincing counterexamples against the
hypothesis of O-learnability. So far, then, I fully agree with the
author.
Unfortunately, the examples used to illustrate the hypothesis
are not all that convincing. There is, for instance, no reason to
assume that Italian and English differ with respect to an S/S'-
parameter for bounding purposes (Lightfoot's section 5.1). The
present consensus is that Rizzi'-s (1982a) original article overstat-
ed the differences between Italian and English. The original
idea was that Italian allows violations of the wh-island conditions
(such as Lightfoot's example 21.a), whereas English does not.
This conclusion appeared to be far too simple. Thus, English
allows many relatively acceptable violations of the wh-island
constraint as well (as was already pointed out by Reinhart 1975):
(1) a. What don't you know when to file?
b. What don't you know how long to boil?
c. What don't you know where to put?
Reinhart further pointed out that such violations are even
possible with tensed embedded questions:
(2) What books don't you remember who borrowed from you?
Many examples of this kind could be added, and it is clear that
Italian and English cannot be distinguished in terms of a simple
S/S'-parameter.
Similarly, French examples such as Lightfoot's (24) do not
necessarily show that French has less strict bounding behavior
than English. One problem is that similar examples can be
constructed for Dutch or German, which are even stricter than
English with respect to bounding. Consider, for instance, the
following Dutch examples:
(3) a. [NP Wat voor een boek, [s heeft hij t, gelezen]
what for a book has he read
"What kind of book did he read?"
b. [Wat]j [s heeft hij [NP tj voor een boek] gelezen]
As in French, it is possible in such Dutch constructions to
extract only part of an NP (as in 3.b). As in French, one might
then conclude that S is not a bounding node in Dutch. In reality,
however, the island behavior of Dutch is stricter than what we
find in either English or French. So it is not clear what the
examples at issue establish. But again, the whole idea of S/S'-
parametrization seems to be a nonissue according to our current
knowledge.
Another point of disagreement with Lightfoot is the per-
sistent use of the term Universal Grammar (UG) as a charac-
terization of the initial state of the language learner. Although
such usage is common practice, it is far from clear whether it
makes sense. The term Universal Grammar is problematic
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because of the highly modular nature of language. It is generally
assumed nowadays that language is what the structuralists used
to call a "system of systems." What we call language is the result
of the combination of highly diverse and autonomous sub-
systems. It would be highly exaggerated to claim that generative
grammar is in actual practice equally concerned with all sub-
systems that together constitute natural language.
In actual practice, generative grammar is mainly concerned
with the subsystem often referred to as the computational
system. To a large extent, this system abstracts away from the
conceptual systems provided by the human mind (for instance,
those systems that define knowledge of the world). The com-
putational system studied by generative grammarians only de-
scribes recursively defined hierarchical patterns of discrete
units (such as phonemes and morphemes) and certain relations
among these hierarchical patterns. What we call natural lan-
guage only comes about by combining this computational sys-
tem with the conceptual systems. It is highly questionable
whether one should refer to any of the systems in isolation as
language or grammar.
In speaking about Universal Grammar (or even the language
faculty) if one actually only speaks about the computational
faculty, one seems to take it for granted that the computational
faculty has an inherent purpose, namely, its combination with
the conceptual systems into what we call natural language in
everyday life. In our present state of knowledge it is sheer
dogma to assume that the various subsystems of natural lan-
guage are connected by principles of biological necessity.
Alternatively, it is entirely possible that the subsystems were
only combined as an accidental historical step, by human inge-
nuity. Since, according to this alternative, the basis for the
subsystems is still innate, poverty-of-the-stimulus arguments
cannot decide the issue. Similarly, the fact that the computa-
tional faculty has a very specific application in language does not
show that it cannot have other applications. As a matter of fact,
the human capacity to count (also based on recursiveness) seems
to indicate that certain aspects of the computational faculty can
be applied in other domains.
But if the computational faculty is not demonstrably specific
to language (as a matter of biological necessity) it does not make
much sense to refer to its initial state as Universal Grammar (as
Lightfoot and most generative grammarians do). Even if all
structural components of language have an innate basis, it does
not follow that the act of combining the components into lan-
guage has an innate basis. Strictly speaking, therefore, it has not
yet been established that there is an innate language faculty.
Language learning and language change
Anthony Kroch
Department of Linguistics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
19104-6305
Electronic mail: kroch@cis.upenn.edu
Lightfoot s target article points out that there is an inverse
relationship between the richness of the child's genetic lin-
guistic endowment, so-called Universal Grammar (UG), and the
complexity of the linguistic experience needed by the child to
trigger successful language acquisition. Given the generative
argument that children must bring to the task of first language
acquisition an extremely rich genetic endowment, Lightfoot's
observation leads him to propose that the only language specific
information needed - or used - in acquisition is present in a
severely restricted subset of the forms that language learners are
exposed to, namely, in unembedded domains. This hypothesis
is certainly plausible. Indeed, it is even expected in light of
recent work on the mathematicization of linguistic theory (see
commentary by Joshi). On the other hand, Lightfoot's attempt
to provide specific empirical support for his hypothesis suffers,
perhaps necessarily so, from a reliance on specific details of the
form of UG about which generative grammarians disagree, even
within his own school of government-binding theory. There-
fore, rather than pick apart the target article's specific analyses,
which could be modified in countless ways either to preserve or
to refute the central hypothesis, I will respond in this commen-
tary to a particularly interesting remark that Lightfoot makes
concerning the interaction of language acquisition with histor-
ical change, an area to whose investigation he has made a major
contribution. I will indicate how certain recent research on
syntactic and morphological change supports his general charac-
terization of the language acquisition problem and also his
contention that problems of language change are intimately
related to problems of acquisition. At the same time we will see
that the work suggests a view of the relationship between the
two that is somewhat different from the one Lightfoot himself
adopts.
In motivating the notion that the data active in triggering
acquisition are only a subset of those to which the child is
exposed, Lightfoot asserts that the very existence of linguistic
change requires that children ignore some of the data in their
linguistic environment in the course of language learning.
When the language of one generation of speakers differs from
that of the preceding generation, at least in simple and com-
monly occurring contexts, it must be, Lightfoot asserts, that
learners have ignored some of the input to which they were
exposed. But although there may be some cases that proceed in
this way, my own reading and research in historical change leads
me to think that change is more often gradual than abrupt and
that one generation is more likely to differ from its predecessor
in the frequency with which its speakers use certain forms than
in whether those forms are possible at all. Only when the
frequency of a form drops below a minimum threshold do
learners reanalyze their grammatical systems so as to exclude it
(Fontaine 1985; Kroch et al. 1982; Kroch 1989; Noble 1985;
Oliveira e Silva 1982). Even in cases where a grammar is
reanalyzed in the course of linguistic change, it is more than
common for features of the old grammatical system to persist as
remnants. For example, English, in the course of its history, lost
the so-called verb-second constraint that characterizes the Ger-
manic language family; but in a few cases the subject-verb
inversion triggered by the constraint still occurs, as in verb
phrase deletion examples like (1):
(1) Abigail likes ice cream and so do 1.
Examples like this suggest that, far from ignoring data that may
be incompatible with a new grammatical system, learners are
likely to complicate their grammars with rules of marginal
coverage simply to preserve details of a disappearing linguistic
system to which they have only minimal exposure.
However, neither the gradualness of linguistic change nor the
ability of learners to preserve remnants of an archaic grammar
threatens the generative picture of language acquisition. In-
deed, recent empirical work on the time course of syntactic and
morphological changes supports the hypothesis of a highly
structured UG. We and others have found that when a language
changes gradually, the locus of the change is not the specific
linguistic context where the change is manifest but rather the
whole grammatical subsystem responsible for the linguistic
form in question. To illustrate this result with a single example,
we found, in a recent reanalysis of Eleegard's (1953) pioneering
quantitative study of the rise of periphrastic "do" in Early
Modern English negatives and questions, that the use of "do" as
a tense carrier (as measured by the logistic transform of the
frequency) increased at the same rate in all contexts. Further-
more, we found that a superficially unrelated change, a shift in
the placement of the light adverb "never," proceeded at the
same rate as the rise of periphrastic "do" (see Kroch 1989 for
details). Under current grammatical analyses (for example,
348 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1989) 12 2
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00049086
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:51:46, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary/Lightfoot: Language learnability
Roberts 1985) these two changes are reflexes of a single modifi-
cation in the way that English verbs are inflected for tense and
agreement. While Middle English exhibited the process of
"verb raising to INFL' (also found in such languages as French),
Modern English has lost it and relies on a rule of affix hopping.
The loss of verb raising forces both the use of a periphrastic
auxiliary as a support for tense inflection in negatives and
questions and a change in the position of light adverbs, though
limitations of space prevent us from demonstrating the point
here. Fontaine (1985) presents a similar case of superficially
disparate reflexes of a single grammatical subsystem changing
together in her quantitative investigation of the simultaneous
loss of subject pronoun deletion and subject postposing between
Old and Modern French.
If we ask ourselves why the various contexts of a linguistic
alternation should, as a general rule, be constrained to change in
lock step, the only apparent answer consistent with the facts of
the matter is that speakers learning a language in the course of a
gradual change learn two sets of well-formedness principles for
certain grammatical subsystems and that over historic time
pressures associated with usage (presumably processing or dis-
course function based) drive out one of the alternatives. We
must then ask, however, what would cause learners of a super-
ficially homogeneous dialect to postulate two mutually exclusive
grammars for it rather than one grammar which allowed for
variation, especially as stable inherent variation is widespread in
grammar (Labov 1972a; 1980). This same question, of course,
arises with respect to bilingual and diglossic environments,
since children in such environments learn the dialects they hear
without mixing the rules. In these cases, the phonological
distinctness of the varieties may seem enough of a cue to prevent
confusion, but it should be evident upon reflection that the
appeal to phonology just poses the same learning question at a
different level of language structure. In any case, where com-
peting syntactic and morphological subsystems coexist without
overt cues, the only answer to the learning question that is
currently available is that the learners' innate dispositions, as
specified by UG, force them to analyze the competing variants
in the linguistic environment as evidence for two linguistic
systems.
Thus, although the fact that linguistic change is often gradual
docs imply that speakers exposed to two grammatical options
learn both rather than abruptly abandoning one for the other -
which challenges Lightfoot's proposal as to how language
change and language acquisition interact- an empirical analysis
of how gradual change over time is constrained reveals that the
central tenet of modern generative linguistics, the need for a
highly specified Universal Grammar, is as crucial to the explana-
tion of language change as it is to synchronic explanation.
The nature of triggering data
Howard Lasnik
Department of Linguistics, University of Connecticut, Starrs, CT 06268
Electronic mail: lasnik(duconnvm.bitnet
Lightfoot presents important discussion bearing on the paired
questions: What does a child learning a language actually have to
learn, and what evidence available to the child drives this
learning? With respect to the second question, Lightfoot sug-
gests that no negative data, in any form, are available; he further
argues that learning can proceed entirely on the basis of "de-
gree-0" evidence, that is, positive instances with no embedding.
In making his case, there is one particularly intriguing phe-
nomenon that Lightfoot calls upon without actually analyzing.
The phenomenon involves contraction, as in Lightfoot's exam-
ple (8a), presented here as (1):
(1) "Jay's taller than Kay's (cf. . . . than Kay is)
Lightfoot claims, plausibly, that children are not provided
explicit correction that would serve to inform them of the
ungrammaticality of contracting the second underlying is in (1).
He then argues that this information would not be available to
children "indirectly" either, where "indirect negative data'
arise by virtue of the recognition that an expected form is not
exemplified in the input data. Lightfoot indicates that "it is
hardly plausible to say that [children] have indirect access to
[1]. " Based on a discussion in Lasnik (in press), which draws
from Epstein (1982), I would like to explore the question that
Lightfoot has left us with: How do children come to possess the
knowledge instantiated in such examples as (1)?
Before examining how this knowledge is attained, it is neces-
sary to specify just what the knowledge is. The crucial property
of (1) is that it seems to indicate that contraction of is onto a
preceding word is inhibited if material following is has been
removed or displaced. There are several accounts of this proper-
ty in the literature, but among the most attractive is that of
Bresnan (1971). Bresnan observes that the contraction of is
contrasts with the contraction of want and to produce wanna, as
in (2).
(2) You want to see it —» You wanna see it
In particular, whereas the former is inhibited by the removal or
displacement of material following is, as seen above, the latter is
inhibited by the removal or displacement of material preceding
to:
(3) a. You want who to see it
b. Who do you want to see it
c. *Who do you wanna see it
Conversely, removal of material following to does not prevent
contraction:
(4) a. John thinks I should see it, but I don't want to (see it)
b. John thinks I should see it, but I don't wanna (see it)
Suppose that wanna contraction is just what it appears to be:
amalgamation of want and to when they are contiguous. Also
assume, with Lightfoot and much of the literature on the topic,
that movement leaves a trace. Then (3c) is correctly prevented,
since the trace of who intervenes between want and to. (4b) is
allowed since there is no such intervening trace. But what of (1)
or (5), where there is no intervening trace?
(5) a. I wonder where John is (
b. *I wonder where John's t
Bresnan argues that with is contraction, things are not as they
appear to be orthographically. Rather, contraction of is is not to
the preceding word but to the following one. Now, if, as seems
morphologically plausible, contraction onto an empty category
is proscribed, all of the ill-formed instances of is contraction are
accounted for, as is the otherwise surprising minimal pair (4b)
vs. (5b). Finally, there is a straightforward explanation for the
possibility of is contraction in a configuration abstractly like the
one in (3):
(6) a. You think who is here
b. Who do you think ( is here
c. Who do you think's here
Under Bresnan s analysis, the trace does not inhibit contraction
because it does not, in fact, intervene between the involved
items.
Thus, as Epstein notes, English uses two options made
available by Universal Grammar: encliticization (to attaching to
the end of want); and procliticization (is attaching to the begin-
ning of the following item). But what ensures that the child
learning English will associate the correct type of cliticization
with each phenomenon? For example, suppose the learner
mistakenly takes is contraction to be an instance of encliticiza-
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tion. Then the ill-formed (1) and (5b) will mistakenly be assumed
to be well-formed, a problematic state of affairs, given that
children would receive no direct evidence that the hypothesis is
in error. I would like to suggest that one possibility is indirect
negative data. Of course, for the suggestion to carry any weight,
there must be some characterization of the circumstances under
which a construction would be expected by the child, as Light-
foot points out. As noted earlier, Lightfoot suggests that what-
ever the characterization, it couldn't possibly extend to the
phenomenon under consideration here. But suppose that the
child expects contraction wherever it is possible. Surely, normal
colloquial adult speech is consistent with such an expectation. I
suspect that there will be dozens, or even hundreds, of occur-
rences of (7a) for every one of (7b) in conversation.
(7) a. He's tall
b. He is tall
When presented with (5a), then, the child might conclude that
(5b) is not possible, since, if it were possible, it would have been
used. All else being equal, this would exclude the encliticization
analysis and would thereby motivate the procliticization analy-
sis. Why contraction is preferred where possible might reflect a
preference for "reduced" forms more generally. Chomsky's
(1981a) "Avoid Pronoun Principle," which favors null pro-
nominals over overt ones, could be seen as a reflection of the
same tendency, as could the use of clitic pronouns rather than
full forms, except where emphasis or contrast is intended, in
languages that have both pronominal types.
An alternative learning procedure is also potentially available
to the child. Consider again (6c), which contrasted with the ill-
formed (3c). Assuming that the mechanism blocking the latter
example is known in advance by the child (i.e., reflects a
principle of Universal Grammar), then upon presentation of (6c)
the child will have to conclude that the cliticization process at
work here is not encliticization, hence must be procliticization.
The well-formedness of (6c) thus provides the child with evi-
dence for an analysis entailing the ill-formedness of (1) and (5b).
Under this alternative account, no negative data, either direct
or indirect, are invoked. (6c), a positive instance, is the trigger-
ing experience. From the point of view of Lightfoot's proposals,
however, (6c) raises another issue. It does not seem to be a
"degree-0" datum. A Domain can potentially include a clause
and a portion of another clause embedded in the first. That
portion may extend to Comp, and, under certain circumstances,
to the embedded subject, but may extend no further. In (6c),
however, the crucial informative part of the structure extends at
least to the INFL/AGR element of the embedded clause. This
suggests that either the degree-0 requirement is too restrictive
or that the structure relevant to determining degree is too
narrowly defined. There is some reason to think that the latter
might be correct. Lightfoot observes that there are languages
(such as English) where the antecedent of an anaphor is limited
to the minimal finite clause including the anaphor. In other
languages, binding can reach as far as the subject of the next
finite clause, as in Lightfoot's Chinese example (35). Lightfoot's
theory, however, does not seem to allow for a third possibility
that is instantiated in a number of languages, where even the
object of a clause can be bound by an antecedent outside that
clause. In fact, in such languages, the antecedent can be indefi-
nitely higher than the anaphor. For example, in certain Chinese
dialects, (8) is fully acceptable.
(8) Zhangsan, shuo
 s[Mali xihuan zijij
Zhangsan say Mary like self
"Zhangsan said that Mary likes himself
Thus, binding domains can, parametrically, extend far into an
embedded clause. (Alternatively, the parametric difference
involves not the domain but the type of anaphor. The learn-
ability question would be essentially unchanged.) In addition,
the selection between the second and third type of binding
domain clearly demands data at least as complex as (8). Perhaps
"Domain" could be redefined so as to allow such an extension.
Then (8) would still count as a degree-0 datum by Lightfoot s
criteria. But this moves us quite a distance from the Wexler-
Culicover concept of degree of embedding based on the plausi-
ble primitive notion "clause. " For Wexler and Culicover (1980),
(8) would, obviously, constitute a paradigmatic degree-i
configuration. Now imagine we were to find some phenomenon
that crucially involved still further embedding. Once again, we
could imagine redefining "Domain" so as to encompass the
necessary structure. Or we might introduce a new structural
notion, "Realm," that extends two clauses down, and then we
could define degree-0 learnability in terms of Realms. This
suggests the possibility that Lightfoot's degree-0 proposal might
reduce to a question of terminology.
The true nature of the linguistic trigger
Marjorie Perlman Lorch
Applied Linguistics, Birkbeck College, University of London, London WC1H
OPD, England; Speech Therapy, National Hospital for Nervous Diseases,
London WCIN 3BG, England
Electronic mail: ublvo30Cmcu.bbk.ac.uk
Although his abstract, introduction, and conclusion are tan-
talizingly biological in their presentation of the learnability
problem, the details of Lightfoot's argument are worked out in
strictly linguistic terms. The target article fulfils the prophesy
made by Smith and Miller more than twenty years ago:
It is somewhat paradoxical to speak of language universals as con-
stituting subject matter for psychology rather than for descriptive
linguistics because it is perfectly obvious that language universals will
be discovered and substantiated only as the result of the most careful
and painstaking linguistic research. (Smith & Miller 1966, p. 6)
Lightfoot has done an admirable job of keeping up the
linguists' side of the bargain. But, in attempting a linguistic
characterization (i.e. grammar) which has learnability as its
goal, the problem becomes one of linguistic realization. He has
convincingly argued for the possibility of degree-0 learnability.
The crucial question he asks is "why should children need to
hear more than a single clause (plus the front end of a lower
clause) in order to hear the effects of all possible grammatical
processes in their language? " The question in my mind revolves
around the use of the terms "hear" and "clause." Can we
transform this theoretical linguistic question into a psychologi-
cal and neurological question regarding stimulus sensitivity and
stimulus strength which may "tell us more about the true nature
of the trigger?"
The hope of finding answers to these questions lies in the
transformation of the learnability issue from one of linguistic
theory based on a nineteenth-century genetic metaphor, to a
detailed model of the epigenetic process of maturation in the
brain's language acquisition system which is consistent with
current notions of biological growth. [See also Johston: "Devel-
opmental Explanation" BBS 11(4) 1988.]
INFL', Spec, and other fabulous beasts
James D. McCawley
Department of Linguistics, University of Chicago, 1010 £ 59th St.,
Chicago, IL 60637
Lightfoot takes up several special cases of the problem: What
experience does it take for a child to acquire the syntax of such-
and-such class of sentences? In each case, Lightfoot's solution
posits genetically determined aspects of linguistic structure that
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would allow a child to fill in the remaining details of structure on
the basis of simple and readily accessible types of linguistic
experience. For example, Lightfoot deals with the problem of
the constitutent structure of English NPs by taking the skeletal
phrase structure rules (example 6) to be genetically determined,
leaving the child with the fairly trivial task of observing the word
order that fluent speakers use in the various instantiations of
those rules. Or at least the task is trivial once the child has
accomplished the much less trivial one of identifying relevant
fragments of what he hears as instantiations of those rules. To
identify the expression drink milk as an instance of (6b) with
drink as its head, the child would have to identify milk as not
merely a word but at the same time a "maximal projection" of
that word, and not identify drink as a maximal projection, lest he
incorrectly identify milk as the head of the expression.
If the child at this point in his development correctly under-
stands the words milk and drink, he can identify drink as the
head of the phrase on semantic grounds, namely, that it is a
predicate of which milk here functions as argument. I wish to
suggest that it is because children possess a system of conceptual
structure that functions in terms of logical categories such as
proposition, predicate, argument, and quantifier that they are
able to impose on expressions like drink milk the sort of struc-
ture that makes the step Lightfoot discusses trivial. It is not
because an expression such as the milk is "maximal" in a system
of "projections" such as (6) that it is available to combine into a
V such as drink the milk and unavailable to combine into a NP
such as *your the milk, but because its denotation is seman-
tically possible as an argument of the predicate denoted by drink
and semantically incoherent as the expression defining a domain
from which your is to pick out a part. Indeed, what makes
Determiner + N' "maximal" is not its internal structure but the
fact that its denotation can serve as an argument of a predicate.l
Lightfoot says little about how, if at all, logical categories
relate to his syntactic category notions. He does not make clear
how the traditional category S, the syntactic counterpart of
"proposition," is to be interpreted in his allegedly universal
system of categories. I conjecture that Lightfoot would reconcile
(6) with the one structure (20) in which S appears by allowing
INFL as a value of the variable X and interpreting S as INFL',
though some revision of either (6) or (20) would be needed: The
Ss of (20) do not consist of what (6b) says an INFL' could consist
of. Does this mean that for Lightfoot a child cannot identify
expressions as Ss until he has identified them as projections of
something that he has already identified as INFLs? Yes, if
category identifications can only be on the basis of phrase
structure configurations such as those given in (6), and no, if
something else (such as its denoting a proposition) suffices to
identify something as a S.
I find the latter a considerably more plausible hypothesis
about language, in large part because I take biology more
seriously than I think Lightfoot does. Biological structures
normally do not arise de novo but evolve out of structures that
had different functions.2 An account of the biology of language
increases in plausibility to the extent that the biological struc-
tures it posits can be interpreted as having homologs in closely
related species and having present or past functions that are not
limited to human-style language. I thus rate Lightfoot's purely
linguistic conception of linguistic structure as a less plausible
hypothesis about the human genotype than the alternative
hypothesis that there is a genetically determined scheme of
conceptual structure organized in terms of propositions, predi-
cates, arguments, and perhaps some other categories, and that
such a scheme of conceptual structure plays a major role in
linguistic structure.3 In McCawley (1982; 1983; 1988), I treat
such a system of conceptual/logical categories as determining
some of the factors to which syntactic phenomena can be
sensitive. (Not all of them: The word-class of the head of an
expression - the "X" of (6) - is another such factor, as is a 2-way
distinction corresponding roughly to Lightfoot's X/X' distinc-
tion.) My approach allows the syntactically relevant factors to be
learned independently of one another (e.g., a child can identify
love as a 2-place predicate before he identifies it as a V), the
approach allows a child to learn rules of syntactic structure in
terms of whatever category components he can so far identify
(hence prior to the acquisition of the full repertoire of category
notions) and it allows him to impose specific syntactic structures
on sentence types whose syntax and semantics he has not yet
learned (even a child who did not yet understand passive
sentences would assimilate was given money to the already
learned [Y.YY'] surface configuration as soon as he had identified
was as a Y).
The putative category "Specifier" is absent by design from my
account of categories. The term "Specifier" was introduced
(Chomsky 1970, p. 52) as a cover term for "Determiner "(article,
demonstrative, and perhaps some other things), "Aux" (a sup-
posed unit that consisted of the tense marker and whatever
auxiliary verbs there were),4 and degree adjuncts to adjectives;
the term has subsequently taken in other things that vary greatly
from one work to another. The sole common feature of "Spec-
ifiers" mentioned in Chomsky (1970) is that in English they
precede phrasal units with which they combine into larger
phrasal units. This parallelism in word order is a spurious
generalization, since cross-linguistically there is a weak negative
correlation between (i) whether articles and demonstratives
precede the N and (ii) whether auxiliary verbs precede the main
verb (McCawley 1982).5 The arguments offered when propo-
nents of "Specifier" have attempted to justify the category (e.g.
Chomsky 1972a, pp. 160-61) have been few in number and
scandalously insubstantial; to my knowledge, no serious seman-
tic characterization of "Specifier" has ever been attempted.
"Specifier" survives as a device for giving recalcitrant structures
a semblance of conformity to the X-bar scheme. It is ludicrous to
claim that a category whose very existence is so questionable is
genetically determined.
Adherents of the "government and binding" approach to
linguistics have no monopoly on the human genotype: All or part
of any other conception of linguistic categories and structures
can with equal propriety be hypothesized to have a genetic
basis. I hope that Lightfoot's target article will stimulate ad-
herents of all approaches to linguistics to worry at least some of
the time about how biological structures might be reflected in
language acquisition and about how biological evolution might
have yielded organisms that are effective acquirers and users of
language, but not to form the mistaken impression that CB
linguistics has a privileged status in that enterprise.
NOTES
1. This statement refers to the unmarked case, in which predicates
take entities and not properties as arguments; there also are predicates
with N' arguments (Smith has been named chairman of the committee).
2. Jespersen (1922, pp. 412-42), in one of the few accounts of the
origin of language that a person knowledgeable in both linguistics and
biology can take seriously, develops a fascinating hypothesis about how
"preadaptation" not of biological structures but of linguistic material
might have figured in the origin of human language.
3. I accept Griffin's (1984) conclusion that logical inference is not
restricted to the human species. See, however, Anderson and Belnap
(1975, pp. 296-300) for a critical discussion of a popular argument that
imputes the disjunctive syllogism to the logical repertoire of dogs.
4. "Aux' is often confused with "auxiliary verb," even though must
have been (an "Aux") is no more an auxiliary verb than lonesome little old
is an adjective. It is widely agreed that no such unit exists, but not so
widely agreed that such a consensus exists, since linguists have fre-
quently rejected the concept of "Aux" while retaining the term with a
different meaning, namely, "tense or tensed auxiliary verb"; see Mc-
Cawley (1985) for a discussion of this terminological morass.
5. Lightfoot presumably rejects the claimed negative correlation,
since he expresses doubts that any languages have N'Spec word order
and criticizes Greenberg and Hawkins for "not distinguish[ing] between
demonstratives which have the syntax of adjectives (as in Latin) and
those which manifest Spec (as in English)." In view of his statement that
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Note: Tabulation based on 30 hours of speech transcripts, including two per child per
stage. Catenative verbs, such as wanna or gotta, were not counted as adding a level of
embedding.
"Projected totals were calculated by extrapolating the hourly rate of speech over eight
hours per day, seven days a week, five years.
"in other languages demonstratives and possessives are often adjectives
instead of specifiers' [emphasis added]), I surmise that is is because
Latin demonstratives are inflected somewhat like adjectives that he
denies that they "manifest Spec." I see no reason why that should affect
the status of hie, ille, and so on, as "Spec"; in McCawley (1988, p. 194, I
argue that part of speech distinctions are orthogonal to the category
notions that figure in such terms as "determiner, that is, some "deter-
miners" are adjectives, some are nouns, and some do not belong to any
"part of speech." Lightfoot has provided no motivated criteria for the
identification of "Spec" that would justify applying it to the prenominal
demonstratives of English and Japanese while withholding it from the
postnominal demonstratives of Malay and Swahili.
Learnability considerations and the nature of
trigger experiences in language acquisition
James L. Morgan
Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN
55455
Learnability results utilizing Gold's (1967) framework incorpo-
rate assumptions about three components: the amount of infor-
mation available in language input, the extent of constraints on
grammatical hypotheses that the learner may entertain (i.e., the
richness of Universal Grammar), and the nature of the psycho-
logical mechanisms by which a specific grammar is acquired
upon exposure to input. Lightfoot stresses tradeoffs between
the first two of these components, but in fact all three are in
dynamic balance. Ascertaining the power of one component
establishes the combined power of the remaining two.
Of these three components, input is particularly susceptible
to direct empirical investigation. The amount of information
available is in part a function of syntactic complexity; one metric
describing the complexity of input involves tabulating levels of
sentence embedding. Applying this metric to speech addressed
to Roger Brown's Adam, Eve, and Sarah (Brown 1973; tran-
scripts provided by MacWhinney & Snow 1985), it may be seen
that input consists predominantly of simple sentences, as Table
1 shows.
These data suggest an upper limit on the amount of informa-
tion in input and hence a lower limit on the power of the
remaining two components. In particular, any acquisition theo-
ry that depends upon the appearance of particular syntactic
forms in input - such as those propounded here by Lightfoot, or
by Wexler and Culicover (1980) - cannot require input data any
more complex than degree-1. This is because in order to ensure
sufficient representation of the range of syntactic forms of a
given degree of complexity, the number of sentence tokens
must be considerably larger than the number of sentence types.
However, the number of sentence types expands geometrically
as levels of embedding accumulate, so that there are easily
thousands, and perhaps hundreds of thousands, of possible
degree-2 forms. Even given the patently liberal estimate in
Table 1 of the number of degree-2 tokens appearing in input
across acquisition (which may well be an order of magnitude too
generous), there will be too few such sentences to ensure
sufficient representation of degree-2 types.
Power in a theory of acquisition must therefore be sought
somewhere other than in the syntactic complexity of input. One
may seek additional dimensions by which information may be
conveyed in input (Morgan 1986), or alternative learning strat-
egies (Osherson et al. 1986), or more powerful constraints on
Universal Grammar (Lightfoot). In specifying a rich theory of
grammar as the basis for claims of learnability from very simple
input, however, Lightfoot fails to articulate clearly the third
component of his model. With respect to the specification of the
pyschological mechanisms of acquisition, two questions are of
particular importance. The first concerns how children come to
represent input in an appropriate fashion; the second concerns
the nature of the relationship between triggering experiences
and the parameters whose settings are triggered.
Several of the arguments adduced by Lightfoot in support of
his degree-0 hypothesis depend crucially on particular repre-
sentations of input. Consider, for example, his account of dif-
ferences in government between English and Dutch (see sec-
tion 5.2). English does not allow the subject of an embedded
sentence to be ttih-questioned if an overt complementizer is
present; Dutch does. The explanation advanced for this is that
the presence of the complementizer blocks government in
English but not in Dutch. Lightfoot suggests that sentences like
(1) (= his (30)) provide degree-0 evidence that, in Dutch,
government by a wh pronoun is not blocked by the presence of
additional lexical material in Comp. This argument thus de-
pends upon the auxiliary heeft being moved into Comp. How-
ever, Lightfoot acknowledges the possibility that the auxiliary
may not move to this position (see note 12); (2) is a possible
alternative sentence structure. If children represent wie heeft
het boek gelezen as (2) rather than as (1), Lightfoot's degree-0
argument fails to go through in this case.
Comptwiei heeft,],
 s[e( het boek gelezen
who has the book read
"Who has read the book?"
e
,
 h e t
 •»«* gelezen
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Triggers, as portrayed by Lightfoot, are bracketed and la-
beled sentence structures. Children, however, hear strings of
sounds; these structures must somehow be mentally con-
structed by the child. Presumably, Universal Grammar will
constrain the possibilities for the representation of any input
datum. Even so, alternative representations will often be possi-
ble, as illustrated. Theoretical justifications for particular repre-
sentations, independent of degree-0 learnability considera-
tions, should be provided, as should explanations of how
children must arrive at these representations.
The sort of trigger-parameter relationship that Lightfoot
intends is not clear. In every example, the triggering data
provide evidence contradicting the current setting of a param-
eter. These examples are thus consistent with an error-
detection learning model of the sort offered by Wexler and
Culicover. Such a model enforces associations between the
content of input and the nature of modifications to the learner's
internal grammar. But Lightfoot apparently has something else
in mind: "The error detection procedure reflects a more funda-
mental difference in orientation. . . . I have adopted the recent
parameter-setting model, . . . [which] specifies certain option
points which are set on exposure to particular data-sets" (note 8).
To illustrate the sort of problem that may arise upon forsaking
an error-detection model, consider a recent proposal by Hyams
(1987). Hyams's concern is the Null Subject parameter, which
determines whether sentence subjects are obligatory (as in
English) or optional (as in Italian or Chinese). Languages allow-
ing optional subjects have uniform inflectional marking of verbs
- Italian has inflections for all combinations of person, number,
and tense; Chinese has no inflections whatsoever. In contrast,
languages with obligatory subjects have nonuniform inflectional
marking. Hyams proposes that optionality is the unmarked
setting of the parameter, with the marked setting triggered by
morphological nonuniformity. Thus the receipt of any present
tense paradigm (e.g., / run, you run, he runs) is sufficient to
indicate that English has obligatory subjects, despite the fact
that these data are consistent with the unmarked setting of the
parameter. Hyams may have tapped some deep systemic rela-
tionship in language, but on the face of things the connection
between the Null Subject parameter and its putative trigger is
quite arbitrary.
If arbitrary trigger-parameter relationships are admitted, it
will always be possible to find simple triggers (these need not be
consistent across languages, or even across learners), and claims
that triggers must comprise input of a given degree of simplicity
will be unfalsifiable. Unfortunately, alternative sources of con-
straints on these relationships appear to be unavailable. The-
oretically, one could draw analogies in learning across cognitive
domains, except that the properties of Universal Grammar are
commonly taken to be specific to the "language faculty" (cf.
Chomsky 1986; 1988). Empirically, one could observe relations
between input and acquisition in development, except that
failures to find expected trigger-parameter relations may always
be attributed to maturational factors.
In sum, Lightfoot is right in insisting that acquisition must
proceed on the basis of robust data; clearly this comprises simple
sentences. Lightfoot is also right in arguing that acquisition
theories should account for language variation. Comprehensive
evaluation of his acquisition model, however, must await more
explicit specification of the psychological processes involved.
On one as an anaphor
Stephen Neale
Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544
Electronic mail: neale@confidence.princeton.edu
Lightfoot takes it as uncontroversial that "any noun phrase [NP]
that occurs in English, and thus any noun phrase that an
English-speaking child will hear" can be generated by either of
two incompatible sets of phrase structure rules. For example,
the NP an old man from the city might be analyzed as either (i) a
Specifier (Determiner) an concatenated with old man from the
city (an N', a phrasal category intermediate between a common
noun and a full NP), or(ii)an NP an oldtnan concatenated with a
prepositional phrase (PP) from the city. Two pieces of evidence
in favor of (i) emerge from investigation of the behavior of one
when used as some sort of anaphor. First, there is the contrast
between Lightfoot's examples (4. a) and (5. a):
(4) a. *The student of physics is older than the one of
chemistry
b. The student from New York is older than the one from
Los Angeles
where one is supposed to be anaphoric on a student. Second,
there is the fact that (5. a) is ambiguous according as one is
understood as anaphoric on suit or on old suit.
(5) a. He wants an old suit but he already has the only one I
own
At first sight the contrast in (4) is puzzling, but Lightfoot
provides a plausible account of it. In (4.a) the common noun
student has as its sister node the PP of physics, and both are
immediately dominated by an N'. In (4.b), by contrast, the
common noun student is immediately dominated by the N'
student which is the sister of the PP. Lightfoot's hypothesis is
that one can "refer back to an N'" but not to a common noun.
This licenses (4.b) but not (4. a), and permits one in (5. a) to "refer
back to" either suit or old suit, both of which are N's.
The important conclusion we are to draw from this is that
children must attain a grammar that analyzes NPs in the manner
of (i) rather than (ii) on a "nonexperiential basis." The child's
primary linguistic data are simply too impoverished to deter-
mine the particular grammar the child obtains; they fail to
provide the information necessary to induce certain principles
and generalizations characteristic of that grammar. The positive
proposal is that Universal Grammar - the linguistic genotype -
contains the information that (a) an NP consists of a Specifier and
an N', and (b) an N' consists of a head (N' or N) and a
complement. (The linear order of occurrence is presumed to be
determined on the basis of experience.) The reason given for
this claim is that although language learners might encounter
any NP that could occur in English, they are not "systematically
informed" that strings like (4. a) are not normally used and that
(5. a) is ambiguous.
I do not wish to challenge the substance of this interesting
claim. However, it seems to me that a certain amount of
semantical clarification is called for in Lightfoot's discussion of
the anaphor one before the syntactic claim underlying the
psychological claim can be interpreted. In the above examples it
would be perfectly fine to say that one is anaphoric on an N'. But
what Lightfoot says is that one "refers to" or has as its "referent"
a "preceding N'" (note 1), and this is highly problematic. First,
since reference is a word/world relation, if one referred it would
refer to some nonlinguistic object and not the expression upon
which it is anaphoric. What Lightfoot should say is simply that
one is anaphoric on an N'. Indeed, talk of reference is quite out
of place here. It is certainly not true that one has to be coreferen-
tial with its antecedent or anything of that sort. (Bill bought a car
yesterday and Mary bought one today can be true even if Mary
does not buy the car Bill bought.) Rather, one is best viewed as
what Peter Geach (1962) has called a "pronoun of laziness," that
is, a pronoun which, from a semantical perspective at least,
stands in lieu of a repeated occurrence of its antecedent. (Notice
also that one can precede its "antecedent" as in seeing Doris buy
one yesterday encouraged Mary to buy a wig today.)
Having made this move a second problem emerges. If one is a
pronoun of laziness, then on Lightfoot's account it should stand
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in for an N'. But, as we just saw, one may stand in for a full NP
like a car. (See also Lightfoot s example 15.) Lightfoot could now
suggest that although one may, on occasion, stand in for a full
NP, it is actually an N' within that NP upon which it is
anaphoric: but the resulting mismatch between the syntax and
semantics of the type of anaphora under consideration would
appear to be quite unmotivated. At the very least, then, we
should accept that one may be anaphoric on N's and NPS.
(Notice that this does not have to drag reference back into the
picture since the most plausible account of indefinite descrip-
tions treats them as quantified noun phrases rather than as
referring expressions; see Russell 1919, ch. 16; Ludlow & Neale
1988.)
Finally, it should be pointed out that Lightfoot is overstating
the case when he claims that "any [my emphasis] noun phrase
that occurs in English" can be generated in the manner of either
(i) or (ii) above. Proper names and pronouns (including the
demonstrative pronouns this and that) are most certainly noun
phrases, but since they have no internal structure they cannot
be generated in either manner. To claim that names and pro-
nouns may be N's dominated by NPs would of course under-
mine the view that one may be anaphoric on an N' since one can
never be anaphoric on a name or pronoun.
Two perspectives on learnability
William O'Grady
Department of Linguistics, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada T2N 1N4
David Lightfoot's target article takes as its starting point the
assumption that linguistic development depends on the interac-
tion of inbom cognitive structures with selected types of experi-
ence, a view that constitutes the consensus in cognitive science
today. Indeed, as Osherson and Wasow (1976, p. 208) note, the
only real question facing linguists is "whether innate structure
has significant components that subserve the development of no
other faculty than language." For the sake of convenience, let us
refer to the view that there are such components as "special
nativism," reserving the term "general nativism" for the view
that the inborn cognitive structures relevant to linguistic devel-
opment are not specific to the language faculty.
Lightfoot, of course, is a strong proponent of special nativism.
Not only does he believe that there are inborn cognitive struc-
tures, he believes that they include faculty-specific components
such as (1) and (2).
(1) XP - • Spec, X' (example 6)
.v - { * • ) , <vP)
(2) One refers to an N'. (Sect. 4, para. 8 & note 1; Lightfoot 1982, p.
56)
My purpose in this brief commentary is to challenge this type of
nativism. Because of space limitations I will restrict my remarks
to just one of the phenomena discussed in the target article - the
contrast between the one from Los Angeles as in Lightfoot's (4b)
and *the one of chemistry as in his (4a). My goal will be to show
that this contrast does not demonstrate the need for an N'
category or for the inborn mechanisms in (1) and (2) above.
Like Lightfoot, I assume that an inborn acquisition mecha-
nism (AM) is needed to construct the grammar of a human
language. Unlike Lightfoot, however, I envision an AM that
does not contain inborn principles specific to the language
faculty. To illustrate this approach, I will outline one component
of this alternative AM and show how it can help explain the
distribution of one.
In what follows I will assume that the AM contains a "proposi-
tional module" that provides a means to represent propositions
in an innate "language of thought."1 Among other things, this
module provides a representation of word meanings and of any
ontological or "thematic" roles that they entail. The lexical
semantics of destroy, for example, entails an entity that commits
an act of destruction (an agent) and an entity that is destroyed (a
theme), from entails a source, and student an optional theme (a
thing studied).
(3) destroy: (agent, theme)
from: (source)
student: ((theme))
I also assume that the propositional module includes informa-
tion about the association of these semantically determined
roles with particular arguments. Hence:
(4) a. Harry destroyed the book
[agent] [theme]
b. student from NY
Finally, I will assume that an inborn semantic coherence re-
quirement demands that each referring expression bear a the- •
matic role (e.g., Kaplan & Bresnan 1982, p. 212). This require-
ment is met in sentences such as Harry destroyed the book, in
which each NP is associated with a role (agent and theme,
respectively), but not in *Harry arrived the book, in which
there is no role for the second NP.
Returning now to the problem of one, there is no violation of
the coherence requirement in phrases of the type student of
physics or student from NY. In the former case, physics is
associated with the theme role determined by the lexical seman-
tics of student (see 3)), whereas NY is associated with the source
role entailed by from.
(5) a. student of physics
[theme]
b. student from NY
[source]
Why, then, is one substitution permitted only in the second
case?
(6) a. *the one of physics
b. the one from NY
This contrast follows from a simple and easily observable fact
about one, namely:
(7) One has no lexical content.
Since one has no lexical content, it cannot determine a thematic
role. In order to satisfy the coherence requirement, the NPs in
(6) must therefore receive a thematic role from something other
than one. This happens in the one from NY, where the preposi-
tion has enough lexical content to assign a source role. In the
ungrammatical *the one of physics, in contrast, the preposition
is semantically empty and therefore incapable of assigning a
thematic role.2 Given that one also does not specify a thematic
role, physics runs afoul of the coherence requirement and the
phrase is therefore ill-formed.
From the point of view of learnability, this analysis offers
some interesting contrasts with Lightfoot's proposal. Whereas
Lightfoot must stipulate that there is an N' category and that one
refers back to this category type, I have only to stipulate that one
lacks lexical content. Moreover, whereas Lightfoot's stipula-
tions are not leamable, children should be able to determine
that one, unlike student, lacks lexical content. In fact, even the
strongest proponents of special nativism recognize that children
must be able to learn the idiosyncratic properties of the lexical
items in their language.
I have been compelled to focus here on a small issue, ignoring
many of the other points raised by Lightfoot (including some
that I agree with, such as the desirability of making the AM
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sensitive to very simple forms of experience). Furthermore,
although I have tried to provide an analysis consistent with
general nativism. space has not permitted discussion of many
details, including the (N '-free) syntactic structure that should be
assigned to "one phrases. ' 1 have likewise been unable to
consider any of the other mechanisms Lightfoot proposes (e.g.
constraints on multiple wh structures). Of course, for many
phenomena, there are simply no proposals to make at this time.
The principles proposed within contemporary special nativist
theories (e.g. Lightfoot's (27)) were not discovered at an early
point in the development of that research program, and there is
no reason to expect their counterparts within general nativism
to be uncovered quickly either.
Given the long established pattern within linguistics of look-
ing first to abstract syntactic notions for the description of both
new and traditional problems, it is clear that analyses challeng-
ing special nativism will not simply spring forth. If they are to be
discovered, they will have to be very deliberately pursued.
Moreover, if the early work on special nativism (as exemplified
by transformational grammar) is in any way typical of how
theories emerge in the cognitive sciences, we can expect pre-
liminary proposals to be often incomplete and to lead to many
disappointing dead ends. Counterbalancing these inevitable
difficulties, however, is the possibility of a significant advance in
our understanding of the human language faculty - a possibility
that may well make this line of. inquiry worth pursuing.
NOTES
1. I omit discussion of the computational module, which is concerned
with the formation of structural representations, and of the hypothesis
formation module, which uses cross-faculty "learning" mechanisms
such as generalization (constrained by a conservatism law) and modus
ponens to acquire particular principles. For discussion of these issues,
see O'Grady (1987 and forthcoming).
2. Where of retains a modicum of literal meaning and designates a
"content" relation as in pitcher of milk, it can assign a thematic role
(hence the acceptability of . . . and one of water).
On the format for parameters
Luigi Rizzi
Facutt6 des Learns, University de Geneve, CH-1211 Geneva 4,
Switzerland
Electronic mall: rizzitatcgeugesi.bitnet
The target article has the merit of making explicit an assumption
that is rarely spelled out but absolutely crucial for the param-
etric approach if the latter is to be construed as part of an abstract
model of language acquisition: Values of parameters must be
easy to select on the basis of simple evidence readily available to
the language learner. If this obvious feasibility constraint is not
met, a parametric analysis will not adequately address the
acquisition problem, no matter how structured our assumptions
about the predetermined linguistic mechanisms may be.
If there is no doubt that checking the feasibility of parameter
setting is of fundamental importance, it is less obvious that this
goal requires a principled approach. The need for a special
principle limiting the search domain for parameter fixing is not
self-evident and its conceptual status raises questions. What
could be the theoretical nature of the constraint that the search
space is limited to "a clause plus a little bit"? Surely such a
principle could not be part of Universal Grammar (UG) in the
same sense in which familiar principles (Subjacency, ECP, etc.)
are. Moreover, it is not obvious that a "degree-0" constraint
could be construed as a principle of learning theory, entering
into the acquisition process in interaction with UG, but not
belonging to UG proper. Compare this constraint with a reason-
able candidate for a principle of learning theory: the Subset
principle (Berwick 1985). Whereas the latter is abstract enough
to be plausibly construed as a component of a general learning
theory, applying across cognitive systems (i.e., whenever a
learning system is confronted with an option that would increase
the class of objects that the system to be attained can deal with,
the option is taken only if experience requires it), the degree-0
constraint, as stated, looks too concrete and modality specific to
be ascribed to a general learning theory. In sum, the conceptual
status of the constraint is not transparent.
I would like to explore briefly a possible way to deal with the
conceptual problem and, at the same time, to put an even more
severe restriction on the search space for parameter fixing, fully
in the spirit of Lightfoot's proposal. The idea that a very limited
amount of structure suffices for parameter setting can be essen-
tially right but need not be stated as a separate principle: It can
simply fall out as a consequence of the format that UG offers for
parameters. Most well-established cases of parameters have to
do with properties of heads: Either they are associated with
specific lexical items (as Hagit Borer pointed out), or with heads
of certain kinds, or with heads in general (i.e., the ordering
between heads and complements, the licensing of null pro-
nominals by Infl or other heads [Rizzi 1986], various param-
etrized properties of selection and case assignment, etc.). If the
space available for parametrization is indeed restricted to prop-
erties of heads, it is natural to expect that the evidence needed
for the fixation of each parameter will not exceed the normal
sphere of influence of a head: its government domain. The
fixation of parameter P will (at most) require inspecting the
amount of structure governed by the head that the parameter is
related to.
It should be noted that this way of looking at the problem puts
a further restriction on the search space for parameter fixing
with respect to Lightfoot's formulation: neither sentential sub-
ordination, nor also phrasal subordination (hence, subordina-
tion in general) need be accessed. This higher restrictiveness
seems to be justified: For instance, there is no plausible case of a
parameter requiring more than one level of nominal embedding
to be fixed. And the "little bit" of subordination that is required
for parameter fixing can now be characterized in a nonarbitrary
way: It involves cases in which a head extends its government
domain to material belonging to the subordinate structure, as in
the believe case and in the cases involving a subordinate Comp
position mentioned by Lightfoot.
One might object that our proposal is too restrictive. In
particular, the S/S' case falls out of the picture, while it can be
integrated within an approach expressed in terms of sentential
subordination, as Lightfoot shows. Perhaps it is not undesirable
to set this case aside, however. The S/S' case is of some
historical significance, as it was the first concrete instance of
language variation treated in terms of the parametric approach;
as such, it gave impulse to subsequent research in this area. But,
seen in retrospect, this case looks quite atypical - certainly not
representative of what is now known about parameters. First,
no other major property seems to be clearly related to the
extractability from wh-islands (the facts of extraction from NP in
Romance are quite complex, and in any event could not be
related to the wh-island facts in a principled approach to subja-
cency such as Chomsky 1986, so one does not find the clustering
of properties occurring together that makes the parametric
approach interesting. Second, judgments vary considerably
among speakers (e.g., Grimshaw 1986, describes an English
dialect which essentially corresponds to the description of Ital-
ian in Rizzi 1982, ch. 2) and there seems to be no neat distinction
between grammatical systems, as with other parameters. Third,
unlike the major familiar cases of parameters, this one does not
seem to be reducible to a property of a head. (In Chomsky 1986,
there is a recent assessment of the issue.)
I would like to conclude this commentary by pointing out that
Lightfoot's approach, whatever the theoretical status of the
proposed constraint will ultimately turn out to be, has an
important heuristic value. First of all, it has the effect of
excluding a large class of unattested, bizarre parameters. Even
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more important, it enforces a reanalysis of conceivable param-
eters along directions that tighten the deductive structure of the
system. A case in point is provided by the existence of long
distance anaphors (Manzini & Wexler 1986). Whereas anaphors
such as himself in English are clause-bound, some languages
allow anaphors to have their antecedents in a higher clause (e.g.
Icelandic, Anderson 1986):
(1) Jon segir ad Maria elski sig
John says that Mary loves+SUBJ himself
One could think that, in order to determine whether his lan-
guage has long distance anaphors, the language learner should
hear such sentences as (1), in which the anaphor lacks an
antecedent in its simple clause. But this would be in violation of
degree-0 learnability (and of the refinement we have sug-
gested). So, if we hold the latter constant, we must look further
to explain the acquisition of longdistance anaphors: The fact that
s«g is long distance in Icelandic and himself is not in English
must be related to some independently observable property of
the two elements or of the two grammatical systems. In fact,
there is a plausible candidate for the case at issue. Pica (1987) has
noticed that (nonclitic) morphologically simple reflexives like sig
tend to be long distance, whereas morphologically complex
anaphors like himself in general are clause bound, a generaliza-
tion that he attempts to explain in terms of a theory of anaphor
movement in Logical Form. If this approach is on the right track
no conflict with degree-0 learnability arises. A simple inspection
of the form of the anaphor provides sufficient evidence to
determine its local or long distance status.
Even if many details remain to be settled (for instance, the
fact that in different languages long distance anaphors seem to
be sensitive to different kinds of tense/mood distinctions in the
clauses intervening between the antecedent and the anaphor),
the positive heuristic value of degree-0 learnability is clearly
illustrated by this example. In enforcing the reanalysis of cases
of this kind, Lightfoot's approach makes it harder to stop too
early in the analysis of cross-linguistic variation and favors
seeking out new correlations and deepening the deductive
connections in the theory of grammar.
Language acquisition: Dubious assumptions
and a specious explanatory principle
I. M. Schlesinger
Department of Psychology, Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905, Israel
Lightfoot s interesting target article is based on theoretical
premises which he shares with writers on language acquisition
working in the generative grammar tradition. My comments are
directed at the weaknesses of these theoretical presuppositions,
not at Lightfoot s ingenious analyses based on them.
The case for what Lightfoot calls the "selective" model of
human language capacity rests on the claim that the child
eventually acquires knowledge that is "not part of the input,"
that is, could not have been derived from linguistic experience.
However, in arguing for this claim generativists make two
implicit assumptions, both unwarranted.
One assumption is that the child is informed only about the
correctness or (according to one view, not accepted by Light-
foot) incorrectness of sentences. No account is taken of the
possibility that the child acquires information about the fre-
quency of a certain type of construction. (On the human propen-
sity to register such information see, e.g., Hasher & Zacks
1984.) Frequency information goes a long way toward account-
ing for language acquisition. Braine (1988) describes a learning
model that is sensitive to such frequency information and
disposes of the problems of "degenerate input" and of the
unavailability of negative feedback. Although the basic idea of
this model was outlined long ago (Braine 1971), writers on
generative grammar have never, to my knowledge, discussed
this alternative.
Generativists claim that unless one posits innate knowledge
there is no answer to the question of how the child arrives at
abstract grammatical constructs (such as N' in Lightfoot's exam-
ple). This argument is based on another implicit assumption,
namely, that the analysis made by the child is at the abstract
level found appropriate for linguistic analysis (e.g., Lightfoot's
(2. a)); that is, that the child, like the linguist, attains the rule that
explains the maximum data. This has gone unquestioned ever
since Chomsky (1965, p. 30 8) postulated an evaluation measure
by which the child selects the simplest, most economical de-
scription of the data.
But why should the child not entertain hypotheses at a less
general level, at least in the early stages of learning? There is no
reason for the child to aim immediately at abstractions at the
highest level when the data are amenable to a simpler, more
"local," treatment; see Schlesinger (1982, pp. 31-34) for an
example. Eventually the child may then subsume the lower-
level rules under more comprehensive ones. Or he may not; for
the organization of the data most efficient in acquisition and for
the processing mechanism may differ from the most economical
linguistic description. The second implicit assumption, then, is
also entirely unwarranted.
Let us now, for the sake of the argument, take these assump-
tions for granted and turn to the generativist solution to the
"poverty-of-the-stimulus" problem: the postulation of "gen-
otypic" (i.e., innate) information. This move might have some
merit if it gave a general solution to the problem of knowledge
that cannot be derived from the input - according to the above
assumptions. Actually, generativists discuss only examples sug-
gested by the government/binding model, and these represent
only a very small subset of the knowledge we eventually ac-
quire. Innate constructs are of no avail in many other cases,
which are explained easily and quite naturally in terms of
general cognitive factors. This makes the generativist solution
extremely unparsimonious.
For instance, that the asterisked sentences in (l)-(6) are
unacceptable cannot be derived from the linguistic input any
more than the cases discussed by Lightfoot. But no proposal has
been forthcoming as to how the relevant knowledge might be
attained with the help of "genotypic" information (although
examples like these have been in the published literature for
much over a decade).
(1) a. The car scraped the tree with the front wheel rim.
b. *The wind broke the window pane with the twisted
branch.
(2) a. The crane picked up the box.
b. *The fork picked up the potato.
(3) a. The janitor's key opened the door for him.
b. *The janitor's key opened the door for him without
delay.
(4) a. The tent puts up in less than five minutes,
b. *The tent puts up in the backyard.
(5) a. This shirt washes easily, because it is made of synthetic
fabric,
b. This shirt washes easily, because I have a lot of time.
(6) a. As a single woman, Jill used to bolt her front door, and
it was lucky for her that she did so/that.
b. *As a baby, Jill resembled her older sister, and it was
lucky for her that she did so/that.
c. *As a bachelor, John used to admire the Swingle Singers,
and it is strange that he did so/that.
An explanation of (l)-(3) is proposed in Schlesinger (1985;
1988) in terms of semantic factors (subjects are conceived of as
agents, which makes the above (b)-sentences unacceptable).
Examples (4)-(5) are adapted from Van Oosten (1977), who
offers a similar explanation (the subject position implies respon-
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sibility). The semantics of the verb category (dynamic vs.
stative) is involved in (6) (for details see Quirk et al. 1972). The b-
sentences in (l)-(6) can be generated from the same rules as the
corresponding a-sentences. Children cannot leam from the
input that the former are unacceptable, and they do not need to:
They avoid applying the general rule because of the unintended
connotations of the (b)-sentences. In other cases, relative pro-
cessing load (which has been shown to determine partly the
relative acceptability of Dative Movement; see Schlesinger
1977) may account for unacceptability.
The generativist approach, then, merely provides us with a
special-purpose solution for certain specific problems; it is
inapplicable on a wider scale. Since pragmatic and semantic
factors and considerations of processing load do not involve
postulating additional entities, it would be good strategy to
explore these factors and see how far they can take us before
deciding to populate the human "genotype" densely with
putatively universal constructs. Unless such a course is adopted,
our language acquisition theory will be too homuncular.
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Lightfoot's stated goal is to focus attention on the role of primary
linguistic data (PLD) in the child's acquisition of language. He
argues that the total neglect of this problem in the learnability
literature constitutes an "incomprehensible omission." He then
provides an analysis of the role of PLD that neglects virtually all
of the empirical research on PLD - an even more incomprehen-
sible omission from our point of view. As researchers who have
contributed to this research, we thus find ourselves endorsing
Lightfoot's goal, but puzzled about the limited means he uses in
its pursuit. In this commentary, we will make some suggestions
about additional sources of information that might be used in
addressing the very important issues Lightfoot raises. We will
argue that one reason these sources are neglected in this and
other works in the learnability paradigm is the reliance on the
metaphors of "triggering" and "parameter setting."
The basic question Lightfoot formulates is: What differenti-
ates the parts of the PLD that constitute a basis for children's
language learning from those that do not? He very correctly
points out that not all the experiences the child has, nor all the
sentences a child hears, are used as a basis for generalizations
about language. This is a point that has been made again and
again in the more psychologically based approaches to language
acquisition (e.g., Nelson 1982; Snow 1972; 1977). The cor-
rectness of this point is assumed by virtually everyone doing
empirical research on PLD (as well as by most other develop-
mental psychologists) and is in fact one reason researchers in this
area avoid the term "input" in favor of terms such as "intake'
and "uptake." Thus, for example, Lightfoot's imputation that
Wells (1981) was so naive as to think that everything uttered in a
child's hearing constituted usable PLD is quite wrong. The
problem remains, though, to offer a principled basis for dis-
tinguishing between usable and nonusable PLD.
Lightfoot provides one promising approach to the problem.
In a very interesting analysis, he demonstrates how specific
cases of historical language change provide a basis for hypoth-
eses about the selective reanalysis of certain types of utterances,
and thus strong evidence that those utterances and novel analy-
ses of them constituted usable PLD for children at some particu-
lar time period. While recognizing the value of such historical
evidence, we must also point out that many additional sources of
evidence about the nature of usable PLD are available here and
now.
Although Lightfoot does not say so explicitly, it is clear that
before an adult sentence can act as PLD for the parameter-
setting mechanism, the child must first provide that sentence
with an appropriate syntactic analysis. A parameter cannot be
set by a string of English or Japanese words; it must be set by
some language-independent structural description of such a
string. Thus, for a sentence such as "His belief that Susan left
guided his actions" to act as appropriate PLD the child must,
among other things, classify "belief" as a noun which is part of
the subject NP (and not, for example, as a verb) and must
designate "guided" (and not "left") as the main verb of the
sentence. Though again Lightfoot is not explicit on this point,
many learnability theorists (e.g., Pinker 1984) argue that in
many instances the child's syntactic analyses can only be made
with the assistance of semantic information. It would seem then,
for example, that the only way for children to provide appropri-
ate structural descriptions of passive sentences is either to
restrict their attempts to pragmatically irreversible sentences or
to hear reversible passives such as "The cow was kicked by the
horse" in contexts which make the intended meaning clear.
The first step in distinguishing usable from nonusable PLD is
to determine which aspects of adult speech children are able to
process, both semantically and syntactically, at various develop-
mental periods. There is a large psychological literature on
precisely this point. A variety of studies have established the
specific cognitive and linguistic skills prerequisite to children's
comprehension of particular linguistic structures, from English
word-order conventions at two years of age (Huttenlocher 1974;
Sachs & Truswell 1978) to passive sentences and embedded
clauses at ages five to seven (Horgan 1978; Maratsos 1974,
Slobin 1968). If the question is usability, many of the answers
are in this literature.
Another extremely rich source of data on which aspects of
PLD children are processing may be found in the commu-
nicative-interactive analyses normally eschewed by learnability
theorists. In such analyses, children on many occasions confirm
directly that they have processed a piece of adult language and
also provide evidence that some discourse conditions make such
processing easier. First, children sometimes respond to a novel
structure in adult speech in a way that could only indicate
comprehension (with other sources of sentence comprehension,
e.g. nonlinguistic cues, unavailable). This seems to be made
easier by adult language that is on the topic of the child's
immediately preceding utterance (Snow et al. 1987; Snow, in
press). Second, children often imitate novel and progressive
adult forms (and this is true despite the single, worn-out
putative counterexample from McNeill [1966], which only
makes the point that children can't imitate everything; for
examples of children using imitations to expand their own
systems, see Clark 1977; 1978; Snow 1981; 1983). Most impor-
tant, children are especially likely to imitate when the adult has
just recast their immature linguistic form into a mature adult
form (Bohannon & Stanowicz 1988). Third, children often spon-
taneously produce at some later time a novel structure ad-
dressed to them by an adult on an earlier occasion. Experimen-
tal studies controlling PLD and measuring the resultant
learning have established, for example, that the introduction of
new forms in certain discourse contexts, especially recasts,
facilitates the child's acquisition of these forms (Nelson 1982).
The important point from our perspective is that the usability
of a particular piece of PLD - and thus its availability to act as a
trigger - relies on the child's comprehension and analysis of it.
This in turn depends on (i) the developmental level of the child,
both cognitively and linguistically, and (ii) the communicative-
interactive conditions surrounding adult use of that structure.
The child language literature is replete with empirical research
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in both of these areas. We find the omission of references to this
highly relevant literature in the target article incomprehensible;
worse, it undermines serious attempts to consider how children
actually use the PLD as a source of information about the
linguistic system.
A primary reason for Lightfoot's neglect of empirical research
on child language acquisition may be his reliance on the "trig-
gering" and "parameter-setting" metaphors (deriving ultimate-
ly from an incorrect view of the biological bases of language, we
would argue, but that is another story). The term "trigger"
suggests that a single event causes the relevant change in the
child's linguistic system irreversibly and instantaneously. This is
not universally wrong, and in fact a similar notion is implied by
Keith Nelson's (1987) "rare-event model," which likewise pro-
poses that a single interactive event at the right moment can
induce significant change in the child's language system. The
difference between "triggering" and "a rare event" is that
Nelson's model includes considerable attention to the develop-
mental achievements that are prerequisite to the rare-event
effects, some of which may result from a long, slow, laborious
process of incremental change that is a precondition to the
crucial utterance's targeting the right parameter.
We must also emphasize that insofar as the triggering meta-
phor implies error-free performance after the parameter is set,
it is just plain wrong for many if not most of the structures of
early child language (nor is the invocation of a compe-
tence/performance distinction an adequate response to the
ubiquitously meandering character of developmental pro-
cesses). In many domains of language acquisition, development
is more correctly characterized as gradual movement toward
adult-like performance, often followed by a period of increased
errors that signal reanalysis and/or reorganization, succeeded
again by more adult-like performance (e.g., Bowerman 1982).
The data from children learning language simply do not support
the view that learning a linguistic structure is as simple and
irreverstblcTas hitting a switch.
" Another implication of the triggering metaphor that seems
particularly questionable to those of us who have studied tran-
scripts of children talking is the assumption that restructurings
in the child's system are solely the result of comprehension
events. Transcripts reveal the enormous amounts of effort chil-
dren put into producing some utterances, particularly those at
the edge of their own linguistic systems. It seems clear that in
many cases children are "learning by doing," that is, the struc-
tural analysis that provides the basis for the so-called triggering
experience may come as children struggle to express themselves
in adult-like ways. Testing this possibility requires supplement-
ing the research strategy of making assumptions about sen-
tences children must have heard by studying transcripts of what
they actually say.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the triggering and
parameter-setting metaphors for the developmental psychol-
ogist who has taken the trouble to document the process of
language acquisition is the degree to which they imply that the
child is a passive organism - a target or set of targets to be hit by
the utterances produced by adults. These metaphors fail en-
tirely to capture the most salient feature of the language-
learning child: active industriousness. Children work very hard
in the process of comprehending and producing utterances. A
close look at individual children acquiring particular structures
(e.g., the use of prepositions or the past tense of regular verbs)
often reveals days, weeks, or even months during which they
hear and struggle to comprehend dozens or even hundreds of
relevant adult examples, and during which they struggle on
numerous occasions, interspersing both successes and failures,
to produce the correct form themselves (see Tomasello 1987;
forthcoming). All of these variations and vacillations are merely
noise to the parameter switchboard; that may be why learn-
ability theorists neglect them.
Ever since Chomsky severed competence from performance
and restricted the definition of language to syntax alone, there
has been a profound lack of communication between lin-
guistically and psychologically oriented developmental psycho-
linguists; for the most part we are not even talking about the
same thing. By focusing on PLD from the learnability perspec-
tive Lightfoot has potentially narrowed the rift. He demon-
strates quite clearly that information about PLD is crucial for
researchers of both persuasions because our characterizations of
PLD and the language acquisition mechanism are interdepen-
dent: Every hypothesis about a facilitative aspect of the child's
social interaction is also a hypothesis about the child's mind. We
believe that the concept of PLD used by Lightfoot and other
learnability theorists is too narrow, that it neglects the informa-
tion children gain from comparing their own utterances to those
of adults in the same discourse context, and that it ignores
important information about how developmental level interacts
with the use and acquisition of language. But at least we are
beginning to talk about the same thing.
What's a trigger?
Edward P. Stabler, Jr.
Department of Computer Science, University of Western Ontario, London,
Canada N6A 5B7
Electronic mail: stabler@uwovax.bitnet
The development of the principles and parameters approach in
GB (government binding) theory makes the learning problem
look more tractable than it did in the framework of the Standard
Theory. Rather than learning a set of transformations with
restrictions on the order of their application, the language
learner need only set a finite number of parameters. Of course, a
solution to the language acquisition problem must account for
the fact that a child can learn any human language, so some
parameter setting must define (core properties of) each human
language. And the process should be "feasible" in the sense that
the determination of the appropriate setting must be achievable
"within the given constraints of time and access, and with the
range of observed uniformity of output" (Chomsky 1965, p. 54).
Within this framework, Lightfoot proposes that relatively sim-
ple data suffice to determine parameter settings. Specifically, no
data containing "embedded Domains" is required: "Given cer-
tain formulations of UG, the relevant parameters can be fixed on
the basis of data in nonembedded Domains." The confirmation
of such a proposal is a step toward confirming the feasibility of
the principles and parameters approach, since it shows that no
implausible assumptions need be made about the complexity of
the structures 'a child needs.
Lightfoot's claims are appealing, but the arguments for them
rely on an oversimplified account of parameter setting. I think
that Lightfoot will agree that at least a few promissory notes are
involved. His account is subject to the following familiar
problems:
1. The analyses used to support the account are controversial
and unstable.
2. If parameter settings interact, the account of parameter
setting must be elaborated to ensure that the account does not
run afoul of the subset principle.
I would like, however, to focus on two other interrelated
problems that are, I think, more serious. These do not under-
mine the familiar idea that it could be valuable to use learn-
ability considerations to guide the development of linguistic
theory, but they do raise doubts about the claimed sufficiency of
nonembedded or "degree-0" Domains:
3. Lightfoot is not clear about the kind of data the learner is
presumed to have access to. The examples of triggers suggest an
implausible view; nor is it clear that more plausible assumptions
will still allow a defense of the degree-0 hypothesis.
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4. The assumptions about parameter setting that are sug-
gested by Lightfoot are empirically untenable. Triggers must
have some properties which distinguish them from other sorts of
linguistic data, but these properties are neither specified nor
shown to be possessed by the degree-0 examples.
I consider the latter two points in turn.
1. What Is In the primary linguistic data? Each parameter of UG
is presumed to have a finite number of settings, ordered by
markedness. Let the symbol p( represent an assignment t of
values to all of the parameters. Then UG(pf) represents a
grammar. The simplest idea is perhaps that the language learner
uses his current parameter settings UG(p,.) until prompted to
adopt more marked settings UG(j5j) by part of the primary
linguistic data (PLD). Given the PLD and a current grammar
UC(pf), a change of parameter settings might be prompted in
something like the following situation:
(i) the primary linguistic data (PLD) contain some structure
S that is not well-formed according to UG(p,.),
(ii) S is well-formed when some of the current parameters are
set to more marked values, yielding a different grammar UG(p,).
I will call this the "standard account of parameter setting." In
the situation just described, PLD, and especially S, is the
"trigger" for the development of the grammar from UG(pf) to
UC(p,).
Notice that the standard account of parameter setting re-
quires that the learner be able to identify triggers. That is, the
learner must be able to tell when a structure in the PLD is well-
formed according to the current grammar. For any UG(p() that
occurs, the non-well-formedness of at least some triggers with
respect to UG(p,) must be decidable, and feasibly so. It is
interesting to note that this assumes a connection between
feasible computability and the learnability of the associated
language. The computability of the set of well-formed structures
in the whole language is not assumed (cf. Chomsky 1980, p. 121;
1981a, pp. 11-13); only the feasible computability of the gram-
maticality of appropriate triggers in the PLD of any actually
occurring language is required.
The "actually occurring" condition in this last remark is
essential. Notice for example that there is no a priori reason to
reject a theory that proposes parameters that can only be set by
degree-1,000 data, any more than there is a reason to reject a
theory that treats some degree-1,000 structures as well-formed.
Structures of such high degree do not occur, and languages that
could be learned only on the basis of evidence of such high
degree would not occur. The explanation of their nonoccurrence
is unproblematic. In any case, if this approach to the learning
problem is correct, the feasible computability property must
hold with regard to data and languages of the kind actually
found. Lightfoot does not undertake to quell any doubts about
whether this property does hold for the cases that he discusses,
but it is plausible that it does given the small size of the
structures involved.1
Another thing to notice about Lightfoot's account of param-
eter setting is how it contrasts with the situation in which
linguistic structures are "filtered" out of the set of PLD. Light-
foot uses a reconstruction of the change from Middle English to
Modern English to illustrate how some data that the learner
might hear will simply be filtered out as ungrammatical if they
cannot be squared with the UG given its previously s.et param-
eters. Thus the triggers will often be less than the total linguistic
experience of the child. The idea implicit in this story is appar-
ently the following: A structure is considered deviant and not
part of the trigger if it cannot be reconciled with UC given
previously set parameters. In Lightfoot's example, the learner is
forced to regard some structures with their usual meanings as
deviant, prompting the adoption of new lexical meanings for
some verbs. The point I want to make here is that the filtering
situation is like the parameter adjustment situation in an impor-
tant respect. In both cases, the learner encounters a structure
that is not well-formed given the learner's current grammar.
However, a trigger for a new parameter setting must differ from
a structure that is filtered out in at least the following respect:
The trigger can be recognized to be well formed by an adjust-
ment of the parameters to more marked settings.
Now let's look more carefully at the question of what counts as
a trigger. Lightfoot says "the trigger consists of a haphazard set
of utterances . . . utterances of a type that any child hears
frequently . . . the trigger consists only of simple, unembed-
ded material. " The suggestion is, apparently, that the learner
learns from structures. The exact nature of the structures is not
explicitly specified, in spite of their importance to the argu-
ment. We can get a better idea of what Lightfoot is assuming,
however, by considering the examples of parameter setting
discussed in the target article. In each case, a simple structure is
presented as an example that can motivate the adjustment of a
parameter to a marked setting. The examples include the setting
of the bounding node parameter to a marked value in French
and Italian; the setting of a "Dutch government" parameter to a
marked value in English; the setting of an AGR parameter to a
marked value in Chinese. In each of these cases the simple
structure that Lightfoot presents is an S-structure with traces (or
something very similar). Lightfoot's examples suggest that trig-
gers are completely specified S-structures containing traces of
movement, S-structures that are not allowed by the current
grammar of the learner. In the setting of the bounding node
parameter in French, for example, Lightfoot presents the fol-
lowing example as evidence that a simple structure suffices to
force the learner to a marked setting:2
as-tu vu [NP e; [j\r de personnes]]?
This structure would violate Subjacency if e, is a trace of
combienj and if S were a bounding node (in addition to NP), and
so a learner who could detect this situation would be forced to
the more marked assumption that S is not a bounding node.
This picture of parameter setting is a little peculiar, since it
appears that the learner who has not yet learned the grammar of
French must already be able to determine the S-structures
defined by the correct grammar. We face a "bootstrapping"
problem here. There may be a way out, but the problem is
serious and important, and bears directly on the plausibility of
Lightfoot's main argument. Suppose, for example, that the PLD
contains structures but not those that mark movement relations
with traces, as in Morgan (1986). Then the mere presentation of
a degree-0 S-structure that cannot be accommodated by an
unmarked parameter setting will not suffice to show that simple
PLD can force the adjustment of the parameter, since the S-
structure itself is not available to the learner. Obviously, Light-
foot wants to show that simple structures available to the learner
suffice to determine the appropriate parameter settings. As
Morgan says, "for learnability theories that do include a source
of structural information in input, one must ask whether this
source is plausible' (Morgan 1986, p. 47). Lacking any account
of what is really available to the learner, Lightfoot's argument is
incomplete. Obviously, if degree-0 S-structures would suffice -
but we agree that the child does not have access to such data -
then the relevant degree-0 learnability hypothesis is not sup-
ported. The problem of figuring out what data a learner uses at
early stages is serious and is of the center of some current
research, but Lightfoot neglects the issue.
2. Triggers, ungrammatical and marked constructions. A little
reflection suffices to show that a learner given PLD containing
S-structures who conforms to what I called the "standard"
account of parameter setting would still be unable to learn
English. There are at least two independent considerations that
show that the question of what counts as a trigger must be much
more complex. In the first place, learners of English are exposed
to data that can be accommodated by setting parameters to
values that are more marked than they are for English. Even if
some children hear primarily grammatical sentences (cf., e.g.,
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Newport 1977), many learners hear ungrammatical sentences
without thereby being prompted to overgeneralize by setting a
parameter to a more marked setting. Consider again the setting
of the bounding node parameter. It is widely recognized that
some violations of Subjacency are not as severe as others; they
could well occur in the environment of a language learner. The
following structures, for example, violate Subjacency but are
perfectly comprehensible and could occur in a learner's
environment.3
He is the person who [s they left before [NP speaking to t]].
He is the person of whom [SINP pictures t]] are on the table.
What [s did you wonder how [s John fixed t]]?
The appropriate analyses of these strings are also controversial,
but the point is not. It is just that some ungrammatical strings
that occur in a learner's environment could be made gram-
matical by adjusting the parameters, and yet the learner does
not make the adjustment. So the question is: What special
property must a structure have for it to be recognized as a trigger
rather than as an ungrammatical string that could be made
grammatical with a more marked setting of some parameter? To
show that degree-0 data suffice, we must show not only that they
would force an adjustment if they were in the trigger, but also
that they have whatever other property is required to dis-
tinguish them from a merely deviant, ungrammatical structure.
The point can be put in another way. Every linguist has noted
that there seem to be various marked constructions in human
languages, constructions that seem to violate predominant reg-
ularities. Indeed, these are to be expected. It is plausible that
once we have properly determined the core properties of a
language, we can learn various kinds of special constructions
that do not fall into the regular patterns dictated by UG. So
again, the question is, how can the learner distinguish such
cases from those that should prompt the adjustment of a param-
eter? The difference from the previous case is that in at least
some such cases, linguists may be prepared to countenance the
structures as grammatical even though they must be exceptional
and peripheral relative to the core.4 The standard account of
parameter setting needs to be revised in order to provide real
support for particular claims about the complexity of the pri-
mary linguistic data required for human language acquisition.
NOTES
1. See Stabler (forthcoming) for a formalization of similar problems in
the framework of Chomsky (1986a). It turns out that even the most naive
and straightforward approach to establishing the well-formedness of a
structure is typically feasible, but no general decidability result has yet
been established.
2. As noted above, the analyses and constraints on which Lightfoot's
arguments are based are controversial. The controversy about Subja-
cency is well known. For example, Koster (1986) has argued against it,
and Chomsky (1986a) has moved to treating it as a graded effect. In the
case of the particular structure displayed here, Lightfoot refers to Kayne
(1981) for support of the analysis, but a careful reading shows that Kayne
does not take the empty element inside the VP to be a trace. Yet it is
crucial to Lightfoot's account that the empty element be the trace of the
movement of the quantifier, a movement subject to Subjacency. Kayne
(1981) does not pursue the matter in any detail, but refers to his earlier
work, Kayne (1975, pp. 29ff), in which he suggests that the QP's are base
generated in preverbal position in these structures. Noting that the
point is controversial, he also refers to other earlier work on the topic. In
more recent work, Obenauer (1984, p. 157) mentions the advantages of
Kayne's (1975, pp. 29ff) analysis, but does not pursue the question that is
critical for Lightfoot, viz., whether the empty category is the trace of a
movement subject to Subjacency. Koster (1986, pp. 5-52) argues, of
course, for a nontransformational analysis of this structure. The move-
ment analysis that Lightfoot needs is not entirely rejected, though: see
Gueron (1981, p. 132, n. 44), Safir (1985, p. 317, n. 39), and Stabler
(forthcoming).
3. See, for example, Chomsky, 1986a, ch. 6-7 for a discussion of
these examples. I do not know of any careful studies of common syntactic
errors. Some interesting errors that have occurred in literature and in
the publicized remarks of celebrities are collected in Creider (1987,
Appendix 3).
4. This point was made by Grimshaw (1987).
Observing obsolescence
Nigel Vincent
Department of Linguistics, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL,
England
An interesting, important, and largely original question that is
raised by Lightfoot's target article is whether it is possible to
establish a connection between that subset of the language data
available to the child, which nonetheless does not constitute
part of the trigger experience, and the phenomenon of obsoles-
cence whereby structures are lost from the historically evolving
language. The attempt to explore such a link is surely to be
welcomed. In the present commentary I wish in a constructive
spirit to point out some difficulties, both logical and meth-
odological, with the enterprise as Lightfoot conceives it.
Let us begin by considering the logic of the question in a little
more detail. Assume a grammatical construction C, which at a
given period in a language's history is regularly and widely
attested, is in harmony with other structural properties of the
language, and therefore gives rise to data which are sufficiently
robust for the language learner to make use of. Assume further
that this structure is, in Lightfoot's sense, degree-0 learnable.1
In such circumstances there is every reason to believe that C
will form part of the trigger experience. What then could make
C obsolescent? Otherwise put, what could make C fail to be part
of a new generation's trigger experience? Obviously not a
change in UG, which is by definition constant across time and
space. The only answer, assuming that trigger experience does
not vary randomly from epoch to epoch, is that the relation of C
to other aspects of the language's structure has changed so that C
and the rest of the language - call it C (= the logical complement
of C) - are incompatible in the sense that they trigger mutually
exclusive parameter settings. Since C, ex hypothesi, has not
changed, this change must arise in C. Such is the logic of the
account Lightfoot offers of the notorious case of like.
So far so good, but notice now that a further question arises. If
an independent change leads to conflicting patterns in the data
to which the language learner is exposed, what determines
which pattern is selected? Lightfoot's general argument quite
reasonably entails that learners are able to discard or ignore
much that is irrelevant, including even quite major intrusive
factors - such as being brought up by non-native speakers of the
language they eventually acquire - and are able instead to
attend to or home in on the central triggering data which will
ensure that they develop an appropriately set core grammar of
the language in question. One is immediately prompted to ask,
therefore: Why, in the scenario we have sketched, was the
change in C allowed to happen? Would not the existence of C in
the trigger experience have served to inhibit such a change?
Why, in other words, does the learner not ignore the innovative
pattern and treat it as part of the nontrigger background
experience?
One possible answer, compatible with Lightfoot's overall
argument, is that the innovative change occurs with respect to a
part of C that is in some absolute sense more central than C.
Thus, in the case in point, what renders the older interpretation
of him likes the queen impossible is a change in basic word order.
Suppose that we were to postulate some general principle
whereby word order parameters take precedence over lexically
determined patterns such as the like construction. Things would
then fall into place rather neatly. We could say, in general
terms, that obsolescence will come about when data relevant to
an aspect of UG that would be determined later in the matura-
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tional process are rendered ineffectual by virtue of changes in
data for which the parameters are set early.2
What has still not been resolved in this scenarios is, of course,
the question of how the original innovative change is brought
about. If obsolescence is due to a structural "knock-on" effect,
effectively a kind of syntactic push-chain (Martinet 1955), there
will always have to be at least one initiating change motivated
externally in terms of changes in the community that provide
the data to which the learner is exposed. Moreover, such
original, enabling changes cannot be explained in terms of the
interaction of the genotype and the triggering experience, since
that way lies an infinite regress. Rather these changes must be
determined either by variations in adult, or at least postmatura-
tional, usage, or by population shifts and other kinds of socially
motivated factors. This may seem obvious, but it has an impor-
tant methodological consequence. Externally motivated
changes will make structures obsolescent directly, without re-
course to acquisitionally induced effects. Therefore, when we
look back over the history of languages to spot potential cases of
obsolescence to use in constructing theories about the limits of
trigger experience, we will have to be able to distinguish
between what we might call direct (i.e. socially determined)
obsolescence and indirect (i.e. psychologically determined) ob-
solescence. Only instances of the latter would be germane to
Lightfoot's case.
This is not the place to embark on a full account of how
instances of the appropriate kind of obsolescence may be de-
tected, but some preliminary remarks may be in order. One
criterion, adumbrated in Lightfoot's own earlier monograph on
syntactic change (Lightfoot 1979), would be the relatively sud-
den disappearance from attested sources of a construction.
Whereas other kinds of grammatical change, such as gram-
maticalization (cf. Hopper & Traugott, forthcoming), seem to be
gradual and cumulative over relatively long timespans, any
change involving an incompatibility between two structures
should manifest itself soon after the potentially "threatening"
structure had emerged. Lightfoot (1979) applies the same argu-
ment to the identification of cases of reanalysis. A further guide
might be to look for instances of obsolescence linked to re-
analysis. Note, however, that reanalysis is not always entailed.
Lightfoot cites the example oflikc, and to this we might add lose,
whose Old English etymon losian had the sense "be lost to" so
that the subject of the sentence expressed the thing lost and the
sufferer of the loss was in the dative case (Allen 1986, p. 384). On
the other hand, many more verbs from the class in question
simply disappear from the language (fordunchen "to displease,"
misliken "to cause/feel dislike," ofdunken "to cause/feel regret"
- cf. Allen 1986, p. 396) or survive only in minor and archaic
patterns (e.g. what ails thee?, to rue the day, it hehoves me to
say, etc.). A more complex case concerns the disappearance of d
unchen in the sense of "seem." This verb also involves a dative
experiencer, as does modern English seem (e.g. it seems to me
that. . .). In this instance the borrowed item seem has taken
over the old pattern, and the modern reflex think now has an
experiencer subject (cf. earlier methinks). (See Vincent 1987 for
more details.) Here the initial cause is manifestly external,
being due to borrowing, which is in turn a special case of
language contact. The latter is an obvious and competing source
of explanation for obsolescence and, once again, one that would
have to be eliminated in any future instances to be cited in
favour of Lightfoot's position.
NOTES
1. Incidentally, these are not unreasonable assumptions to make
about the Old English sentence pattern him likes the queen that
Lightfoot takes as his central example. Nonetheless, the example is not
without its problems. My personal preference is for a lexicalist account
of the kind given by Allen (1986) which, if accepted, would invalidate the
like case as an instance of the logical possibility which Lightfoot dis-
cusses. Since it is the logic of the argument which concerns me here, I
proceed on the assumption that Lightfoot's example is a valid one.
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The hypothesis that natural languages are degree-0 learnable, in
the usual sense of the term, is clearly untenable. Translated into
nontechnical terms, it amounts roughly to the claim that chil-
dren can learn languages without being exposed to any example
sentences that contain subordinate clauses. Lightfoot argues for
a weaker position, admitting the need for subordinate clauses in
the input data, but claiming that only the "front of an embedded
clause" is necessary for learnability. Since fronts of embedded
clauses occur only in sentences with backs of embedded clauses,
it follows that embedded clauses are needed in the input data.
Lightfoot's hypothesis, then, appears to be that children can
attain grammatical competence without attending to the backs
of the subordinate clauses in the sentences they hear. But this
buys little, if anything, in accounting for language acquisition.
Surely the child is trying to understand what is being communi-
cated, not just to learn grammar; and ignoring the backs of
embedded clauses will obviously make it very hard to under-
stand what the speaker intends. Thus, once it is conceded that
embedded clauses are needed in the input data, it is exceedingly
odd to assume that children ignore all but the beginnings of
those clauses.
Lightfoot argues for degree-0 learnability in his sense by
showing how a few apparent counterexamples might be handled
within one contemporary theory of grammar. But the examples
he gives are by no means indicative of the number and variety of
prima facie counterexamples available in the languages of the
world. It is as though someone were to argue that a photograph,
together with general principles of perspective, would always
suffice to permit computation of the distances between the
objects depicted. Although instances do exist where such com-
putations are possible, they do not establish the general claim -
which is, of course, false. In the space allotted to me, I will give a
very superficial listing of a few simple counterexamples to the
degree-0 learnability hypothesis, concentrating on ones that are
inconsistent even with Lightfoot's expanded definition. While it
may perhaps be possible to construct accounts for some of them,
my list should at least establish where the burden of argumenta-
tion falls.
(i). Lightfoot himself (note 14) alludes to a well-known phe-
nomenon that only occurs in embedded clauses: In standard
German, the finite verb must be the last word in a subordinate
clause, a position in which it never appears in main clauses. This
is exemplified in (1).
(1) a. Ich weiss nicht, ob ich gewonnen habe.
I know not whether I won have
b. *Ich weiss nicht, ob ich habe gewonnen.
c. *Ich gewonnen habe.
d. Ich habe gewonnen.
It is hard to see how this contrast in word order could be
mastered without exposure to the backs of subordinate clauses,
since that is where the verbs in question occur. Moreover, there
is variation across the Germanic languages with respect to this
phenomenon, suggesting that it is unlikely to be predictable on
the basis of universal principles.
(ii). One component of learning a language is learning the
words in it. Many languages have words that appear only in
embedded sentences, for example, English "if and "lest."
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Although these words appear at the beginnings of their clauses,
there are forms of words that only appear in other positions in
embedded clauses. An example from English is the subjunctive
"were," exemplified in (2).
2. a. If I were the boss, I would fire the whole bunch,
b. *I were the boss.
The following passage from Sells (1987, p. 445) describes an-
other kind of word that occurs only in subordinate clauses:
A . . . "logophoric pronoun has a distribution distinct from that of
other pronouns. . . . Roughly, the antecedent of the logophoric
pronoun must be the one "whose speech, thoughts, feelings, or
general state of consciousness are reported" (Clements (1975, p.
141)); hence logophoric pronouns appear predominantly within sen-
tential arguments of predicates of communcation and experience.
Hyman and Comrie (1981) report that in the African language
Gokana, logophoricity is marked on verbs, not on pronouns, and
the verb in Gokana follows the subject; hence, logophoricity is
not indicated at the front of the subordinate clauses. So, the
logophoric forms of Gokana verbs and the English subjunctive
"were" are words that never occur in degree-0 data. But then
degree-0 learnability would entail that such words would not be
learned.
(iii) Andersson and Dahl (1974, p. 453) describe a phe-
nomenon in Swedish that only occurs in subordinate clauses:
Forms of the cognate to the auxiliary "have" can be omitted in
embedded clauses, where it would be required in the corre-
sponding main clause. Thus, in (3a), if "hade" is omitted, the
sentence becomes ungrammatical. It can, however, be embed-
ded with or without "hade," as (3b) illustrates.
(3) a. a book which, I don't know whOj to ask e where to publish e,
b. *a man who, I don't know whatj to ask e, where to publish e,
c. *a book which I don't know who I could ask where I should publish
A similar phenomenon exists in some dialects of English. A
reduced form of the auxiliary "have" (represented here as "of)
can appear in some embedded environments, where it would be
impossible in the corresponding main clause. This is illustrated
in (4).
(4) a. If I hadn t of waited, I would've won.
b. *I hadn't of waited.
(I am indebted to Charles Fillmore for pointing this contrast out
to me.) Evidently, the distribution of the Swedish "hade" and
the reduced auxiliary illustrated in (4) could not be learned
without access to degree-1 data.
(iv) Keenan and Comrie (1977) noted that languages differ
according to what functions the relative pronoun can serve
within the relative clause. For example, in Malagasy a relative
pronoun must be the subject of the relative clause, in Welsh it
can be either the subject or the direct object, and in English it
can have any of a number of functions in its clause. None of the
substantial literature dealing with this variation claims that it
can be predicted from facts about sentences without any relative
clauses; nor do the fronts of the relative clauses provide the
necessary information. But this is precisely what would be
required to maintain degree-0 learnability.
Such examples could be multiplied many times over. The
traditional distinction between main clauses and subordinate
clauses is based on the observation of generations of gram-
marians that there are systematic differences between them.
Many of those differences are manifest at the front of subordi-
nate clauses, but many others are not. The distinction is so
deeply ingrained that at least one linguist (Williams 1973)
published an article whose point was to argue that there was one
language that did not differentiate main and subordinate clauses
structurally! Given the pervasiveness of differences between
main and subordinate clauses, together with the fact that those
differences are not uniform across languages, the obvious hy-
pothesis to adopt regarding learnability is that degree-1 data are
necessary. It also seems plausible that degree-1 data are suffi-
cient, since there are very few cases of putative differences
between singly and doubly embedded clauses. Moreover, given
Lightfoot's peculiar redefinition of degree-0 learnability, de-
gree-1 learnability doesn't demand that the data available to the
child be any richer than is required for Lightfoot's hypothesis.
All that is required is that children learn from the data available.
There is ample evidence that they do this, so why would one
event want to pursue the degree-0 learnability hypothesis?
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In our work on leamability, Culicover and I (Culicover &
Wilkins 1984) were motivated to restrict the learning model to
degree-0 because our theory of grammar was based on specifi-
cally degree-0 phenomena: the assignment of thematic and
grammatical relations. We were interested in showing how any
error in the assignment of a grammatical relation would be
detectable within the degree-0 domain in which grammatical
relations are assigned. Nothing in Lightfoot's theory of gram-
mar, however, specifically motivates degree-0 learning (as op-
posed to, say, degree-1). Although much can be learned from
degree-0 input, Culicover and I were forced to move to
"degree-0+," what Lightfoot subsequently calls "main clauses
( . . . ) plus a little bit." In point of fact, however, it seems more
likely that the appropriate characterization of the child's PLD is
degree-1.
Before presenting the sort of evidence from which I would
argue for degree-1 learning, let me say that as far as I can tell,
Lightfoot's overall theory would be neither weakened nor
strengthened by a move to degree-1. His expanded charac-
terization of degree-0 coincides with his theoretical notion of
binding Domain, but this does not necessarily constitute an
argument for either the theory of grammar or the theory of
learning. The local domain of movement as determined by the
Subjacency condition coincides with degree-1, but this, again,
would not necessarily argue for the particular learning model.
Before a beginning discussion of degree-1 versus degree-0, it
must be reiterated that what is at issue is not what sort of data are
in the child's linguistic environment (children surely have ac-
cess to sentences with embedded clauses) but, rather, what sort
of data are contained in the PLD from which learning takes
place.
Consider first Lightfoot's discussion of example (24). The
grammaticality of this example "dictates that S cannot be a
bounding node in addition to NP." But nothing in Lightfoot's
proposed model assures that the learner will conclude that it is S
that is not a bounding node. The learner might wrongly con-
clude that NP is not a bounding node. Recovery from this
incorrect hypothesis, given only degree-0 input, could not be
achieved. To avoid this problem, Lightfoot would have to claim
that NP is universally a bounding node, not subject to param-
etric variation. Only further theoretically informed analyses of
more languages will tell whether this is an empirically justifiable
result.
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But consider a related issue with respect to bounding nodes.
In French, the crucial datum for choosing S or S' involves the
extraction from NP of a pre-N' constituent (example 24b). In
Italian, it involves the extraction of the clitic ne from the subject
of an embedded small clause (example 45). In Spanish, there is
no movement similar to either the French or the Italian. And
yet, as Torrego (1984) demonstrates, Spanish has S' as the
bounding node. Unless some appropriate extraction from NP in
Spanish can be found (none has been proposed to date), this is a
serious problem for the degree-0 learning of the bounding nodes
for Subjacency.
Consider next a language-particular issue that is not directly
related to the matter of parameter setting. It is generally
assumed, as Lightfoot points out via the reference to Ross, and
especially since Emonds's (1976) elaboration of the Structure
Preserving Hypothesis, that there are no rules that apply only in
embedded domains. It is interesting to recall, in this light, a
certain problematic construction in Navajo. Kaufman, in her
1975 MIT dissertation (published later as Schauber 1979), dis-
cusses a certain rightward clitic movement which she argues is
unbounded. Chomsky (1975) recognizes this to be problematic
both for Ross (1967) and for his own Subjacency condition. It is of
interest here not specifically because of the purportedly un-
bounded nature of the movement, but because the clitic can
"attach only to an embedded verb" (Schauber 1979, p. 52). In
other words, the movement rule functions (unboundedly) only
within embedded domains. Compare (1) and (2).
(1) Jaanadeesb^as nizinigdd Mary bit beehdzin
J. l.F.drive 3.want.C0MPto M. 3.with 3.be known
"Mary knows where John wants to drive to."
(2) *Jaan naaghaliigii shit b£6h6zindJJ
J. 3.come,COMP l.with 3.be known./rom
"I know where John comes from."
(Many thanks to Geraldine Keams for corroborating the Navajo
grammaticality judgments.)
For (1), Schauber argues that the clitic originates on the most
embedded verb ("drive") and then attaches to the verb glossed
as "want" (although in more complex sentences it need not
move to the highest embedded verb). The ungrammaticality of
(2) (Schauber's [36]) is due to the movement of the clitic from the
embedded verb to the matrix. Although it might be necessary to
question whether Navajo has quite the clause structure that
Schauber assumes (Jelinek, personal communication), her data
would seem to require close scrutiny by anyone who wishes to
limit the PLD to degree-0. How could the distribution of some
element be learned if it can move onto various embedded verbs
but never into the matrix clause?
Finally, consider cases where the characteristics of an embed-
ded structure are determined by aspects of a higher clause. In
Spanish, any verb embedded under es necesario must be in the
subjunctive:
(3) Es necesario que venga / *viene.
is necessary that 3.come.Subj. / *3.come.Ind.
"It is necessary for him/her to come.
It is easy to find examples in many languages where some
aspect of an embedded verbal complex depends on some charac-
teristic of the matrix. For Spanish, the general use of the
subjunctive could be learned from main clauses. However, the
phenomenon illustrated in (3) is essentially degree-1. What
must be learned is the relationship between the matrix and the
embedded clause. For such cases, Lightfoot might redefine the
binding Domain so as to include AGR with "dependent tense,"
or perhaps he could represent tense or AGR in some way in the
embedded Comp. I would suggest that a more adequate alter-
native would be to simply recognize degree-1 data as part of the
PLD.
Lightfoot has developed a learning model specifically to
address the setting of the parameters made available in UG.
Learners, in addition to setting all the necessary parameters,
must ultimately learn all the language-particular details as well
(such as the distribution of clitics in Navajo or the subjunctive in
Spanish). These details actually present the biggest challenge
for the theory of learnability because principles of UG or
markedness are unlikely to be directly relevant. For the idiosyn-
cratic details of particular grammars, a heavier burden of learn-
ing is placed on the learner. If it turns out that data of greater-
than-degree-0 must be used for the learnability of peripheral
details, there is little reason for artificially limiting the PLD to
degree-0 for parameter setting.
Linguistic variation and learnability
Edwin Williams
Department of Linguistics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA
01002
Electronic mall: ewilliam@umass.bitnet
It is worth emphasizing the difference between what Lightfoot
has accomplished and what Wexler and Culicover (1980) accom-
plished: Wexler and Culicover proved a theorem about a gener-
al rule writing system, whereas Lightfoot has defended an
empirical speculation about a system whose general properties
are not known. So Lightfoot's result should not be seen as an
"improvement" on Wexler and Culicover's theorem, but rather
a different kind of contribution. At the time of Wexler &
Culicover's work it was generally assumed that degree-1 should
be attainable, but this eluded proof; degree-0 was clearly impos-
sible, but Lightfoot's interpolation of a complexity between 0
and 1 (which he calls "0 plus a little') is an interesting compro-
mise, grounded as it is in the linguistic notion of "domain."
What is known at this point is a good deal about particular
parameters; however, the general questions, such as "what is
the inventory of parameters," "what is the general character of
the dimensions of syntactic variation," and "what is the relation
between triggering data and the setting of parameters" are not
sufficiently answered to permit theorem proving analogous to
Wexler & Culicover's results for the general transformational
model of earlier generative work.
The second of these questions may have no answer - that is,
there may be no general properties of dimensions of variation.
On the third question, Lightfoot (under example 24) correctly
but mysteriously points out that there is no necessary connec-
tion between locality and complexity, but he is surely assuming
some sort of "tame" and general answer to this question,
otherwise the locality conditions would be of no use in guaran-
teeing simple crucial data in the way that he illustrates in his
examples. For example, it is commonly assumed that the trigger
for a parameter is "relevant" to the parameter in some way, and
not arbitrarily related to it, though of course it could be
otherwise.
An empirical speculation is defended by searching out coun-
terexamples and defusing them, and this Lightfoot does for a
number of clear and relevant cases. The problem can be put in
the following extensional way: Can two languages differ, and
their degree-0-plus structures not differ? To Lightfoot's cases I
would add the following for his consideration:
1. The German verb placement rules: How is the child to
learn that verb second does not apply in both root and embed-
ded sentences, if the verbs of embedded sentences are not
included in the domain of the matrix clause?
2. Special properties of relative clauses: Presumably relative
clauses will not be a part of the matrix domain, so any properties
they have had better be deducible from some properties of the
0-plus structures. But what property of the 0-plus structures will
tell you, for example, whether or not relative pronouns can
delete?
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3. Long anaphors: Anderson (1982) reports that reflexive
pronouns in Icelandic must have antecedents within the small-
est indicative clause that includes the reflexive, which is a more
liberal requirement than is found in English, where the ante-
cedent must be in the smallest clause of any type. In order for
the Icelandic child to know that his anaphor is of the liberal type,
he would seem to need an example of an anaphor in nonsubject
position of an embedded nonindicative clause unambiguously
taking an antecedent outside that clause; but this would not be a
0-plus structure.
The notion of domain relevant for degree-O-plus learnability
cannot be tied directly to the notion of domain of reflexive
binding, for in some languages (e.g., Dutch, as shown in Koster
1984) there are several distinct reflexives, each with its own
binding domain, and so the binding of reflexives does not
determine a single notion of domain for the language.
Finally, I think Lightfoot gives the impression that syntacti-
cians generally ignore the question of learnability. My impres-
sion of the recent literature in neo-comparative syntax is that
there is a widely felt obligation to outline the learning path
whenever a parameter is posited, indicating whether negative
data are required and how complex the crucial data are. There is
in fact at least one volume of papers on the topic (Roeper &
Williams 1987).
Author's Response
Matching parameters to simple triggers
David Lightfoot
Department of Linguistics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742
1. Adjusting the rigging. Writing a target article for BBS
peer commentary is a bit like sailing a 12-foot laser during
a tornado alert. There are sure to be high winds, perhaps
strong enough, if a tornado does come, to make one
abandon the boat and one s dignity. In advance, one can
expect that some gusts will turn in on themselves and
amount to nothing, some will send the boat in a new
direction, some will catch it and speed it forward, and
others may require some redesigning. It's nerve-racking
but irresistible.
Like a laser, the idea I was sailing was simple and
limited, although it depended on some complex en-
gineering. Any selective theory of language acquisition
supposes that a child endowed with certain properties
acquires certain kinds of linguistic capacities when ex-
posed to certain kinds of linguistic experiences. On this
much everybody agrees. I claimed that certain current
assumptions about the endowed properties and the
eventual capacities seem to suggest that children acquir-
ing their syntactic systems need access only to very
simple experiences, in fact only to unembedded material
if one defines "unembedded" in terms of binding Do-
mains at the level of logical form (and that is where some
engineering is relevant).
Why should anybody care? It has long been known that
not everything that a child hears has a noticeable or long-
term effect on the emergent mature capacity; some sifting
is involved. Some of the sifting must surely be statistical,
some is effected through the nature of the endowed
properties, some results from the cumulative effect of
acquisition and the fact that children may not make any
sense of certain expressions at some stage of develop-
ment. And now I am suggesting that there may be
structural limitations. If a plausible case can be made (and
clearly that will take more than one article in BBS), then
there will be one more tool for evaluating analyses and
linguists will question proposals which entail more com-
plex triggering experiences. The same is true, of course, if
we resort to a weaker claim, that the triggering experi-
ence may include structures with one level of embed-
ding, as several of the commentators think is plausible.
For there is a more general point of logic, better intoned
from the minaret than shouted from a laser: Selective
theorists should, in principle, be able to point to plausible
triggering experiences for whatever grammatical analyses
they put forward. Except in some enlightened corners, I
do not see with Williams "a widely felt obligation to
outline the learning path whenever a parameter is
posited." That's why I rigged the laser and wrote the
article.
The complexity of the trigger experience is an impor-
tant but limited concern. Many aspects of language ac-
quisition are immune to it. For familiar reasons, genet-
ically determined factors clearly permit the acquisition of
even the first systematic sounds (contrary to what Harris
seems to believe), but I doubt that anybody would imag-
ine that exotic or complex data are needed to establish the
inventory and distribution of sound segments and mor-
phemes, or the meanings of most words. Nevertheless,
these topics have been of great interest to people study-
ing the emergence of language in children, and quite
rightly. Issues of complexity do arise with the acquisition
of stress and intonation patterns, where different analyses
sometimes make different claims about how much a child
would need to hear (see Chomsky 1972); recently there
has been some fascinating work on this by Dresner and
Kaye (forthcoming), who provide a model of how a child
sets the parameters of a certain stress system. But my
concerns have been even more limited, dealing with
some complexity issues in the syntactic domain. This
disappointed commentators who would have preferred a
different topic.
Consequently, I had nothing to say about how children
acquire the sounds of their language or come to use wawa
as a word and a noun with the meaning roughly of
"water." This is a nontrivial process, as McCawley notes,
but it happens, and several people have examined how it
happens. Having established that water is a noun, chil-
dren later acquire the constituent structure of water from
the bath, if I am right, by setting the parameters in (6) (see
target article) and projecting to NP accordingly via N',
yielding
 NP[Spec N'[N.[ N[water]] PP[from the bath]]]; for
an excellent recent discussion of this aspect of language
acquisition, see Lebeaux (1988). In setting these particu-
lar parameters, children are operating with partially
formed representations which include
 N[water], P[from],
s_ec[the] and N[bath]. They are not operating with "raw
data" or mere words, as McCawley, Morgan, Snow &
Tomasello, and Stabler correctly point out. And they are
364 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1989) 12:2
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00049086
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:51:46, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Response/Lightfoot: Language learnability
certainly not "judging" water from the bath to be
grammatical.
Water from the bath and similar expressions occur in
the child's environment with an appropriate frequency
(more on this later), and, given a partially formed gram-
mar whereby water and bath are classified as nouns, a
projection can be assigned conforming to the schema of
(6) (discussed nicely by Stabler). Contrast this with some
ill-formed expressions that a child might encounter for
various reasons: from the bath water, uttered by a guest
who speaks a head-final language, is not a sufficiently
frequent type to have any effect, and water uit het bad,
uttered by a Dutch house-guest, could not be analyzed by
a partially formed grammar in which uit is not classified.
Of course, if the Dutch guest stayed long enough and
spoke often enough about bath water, then uit, het, and
bad might come to be classified as P, Spec and N respec-
tively with the relevant meanings, and the child might
interpret the string correctly as a phrasal complement of
water and even perhaps use such phrases - in which case,
one would witness an instance of code-switching, a fre-
quent phenomenon among children exposed to more
than one language. If there is a great deal of this kind of
mixture in the trigger experience, the child will attain
some form of Creole. This is an extreme case which
reflects the quite general capacity (invoked here by
Kroch) to operate with a heterogeneous grammar. There
is much more to be said about this, but there is nothing
mysterious about it and children at this parameter-setting
stage are neither judging sentences to be grammatical
(pace Buckingham) nor judging words to be English (pace
Harris). No particular issues of grammatically are raised
by this process, as far as I can see, and, despite the claims
of Bickerton (BBS 7, 1984) and others, the phenomenon
of mixed trigger experiences has not yet revealed any-
thing special about the nature of UG.
In the target article I emphasized that children are not
"little linguists." If they are genetically endowed in the
way I suggest, then they undertake little analysis in the
usual sense of the term; exposure to a sufficiently robust
structure sets a parameter automatically and without any
conscious analysis or effort. I surely have no reason to
believe Snow & Tomasello when they assert (without
evidence) that language acquisition involves a "long,
slow, laborious process" - slow compared to what other
labors? If children are endowed with the results of our
linguistic arguments, such as a properly constructed
phrase structure template, then they do not conduct any
analysis "which parallels suspiciously closely the overt
arguments" of linguists (Harris). Our poverty-of-stimulus
arguments are the scaffolding that analysts may kick away
when hypotheses about UG seem firm enough to pursue
at other levels of abstraction, but children no more
recapitulate these arguments than they rehearse the
poverty-of-stimulus reasoning of Gregor Mendel or
Thomas Hunt Morgan about the genetic basis of their
physiological development.
A number of commentators discussed the "metaphor"
or "analogy" to the biological sciences, but there is no
analogy; this is biology and we use reasoning parallel to
that of other biologists working at comparable levels of
abstraction. Arguments from the poverty of the stimulus
are not a "codicil to the theory" (A. Grimshaw) but as
essential to the enterprise as they were for Mendel:
Mendel noted properties and generalizations applying to
pea plants which went beyond what could have been
determined by environmental factors, given certain as-
sumptions. He therefore hypothesized that pea plants
developed according to an internally prescribed program
which was subject to certain computational principles
(the laws of segregation and independent assortment): he
had very little idea of how these principles were instanti-
ated. Later work explored these and other generaliza-
tions at biochemical levels, yielding fruitful ideas about
the behavior and chemical structure of genes, and much
more. If the kind of work I have described continues to be
successful, there will be another synthesis, fulfilling the
rational hopes of Lorch: We shall understand how notions
like NP and the binding theory translate into other levels
of abstraction such as neurological terms, and how they
are realized biochemically, in the same way that Mendel's
"factors" or "gens" (sic) of pea color, position on the
branch, and so forth, were eventually seen to correlate
with certain biochemical notions - despite the in-
credulity of his contemporaries (see Lightfoot 1982 and
Jenkins 1979).
It is conceivable, presumably, that biology might have
evolved differently, in such a way that Mendel's line of
thinking would not have been a precursor to biochemical
investigations. It is likewise possible that biochemists will
next week announce a breakthrough in our understand-
ing of the biological basis of language; but there is surely
nothing irrational in pursuing work at a level of abstrac-
tion parallel to that of Mendel, in the hope that we can
refine crucial ideas in such a way that they can later be
linked to neurological or biochemical notions. We have
been learning a great deal about the content of UG by
working at this level of abstraction, and this is likely to
continue. The fact that there is no synthesis with neu-
rology or biochemistry at this time does not warrant a
principled objection to such a synthesis. It hardly seems
rational to reject the biological notions of triggering and
parameter-setting on the grounds that languages are not
species-specific like birdsong (Harris), that parameters
are not set irreversibly and instantaneously by single
events (Snow & Tomasello), or even that parametric
variation fails to account for "the idiosyncratic details of
particular grammars" which go beyond parameter-setting
(Wilkins), which is a distinction without a difference. It is
clear that the computational system supporting the
human language capacity has some unique properties; we
aim to discover what they are and to enrich our under-
standing of human biology accordingly. For example, one
of the distinctive properties of UG is its plasticity, the fact
that it is compatible with many different mature states,
depending on the environmental factors a child is ex-
posed to. This is not unique; Brandon and Hornstein
(1986) point to the plant arrowhead (Saggitaria sag-
gitifolia), which puts out different leaves above and below
water. However, this kind of "phenotypic plasticity"
(Brandon and Hornstein's phrase) has not been studied
extensively by biologists; the variation found in human
languages promises to extend our understanding of this
concept.
One element of understanding how phenotypic varia-
tion emerges will be to determine not only the complexity
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of the data which may act as a trigger but also the required
robustness. Robustness is presumably a function of sali-
ence and frequency. We can be sure with Snow &
Tomasello that parameters are not always set by single
events; that would make the child too "trigger happy" and
inclined to draw long-term conclusions (a metaphor) from
too little data, as Grodzinsky shows (unless there is an
independent sifting mechanism based on something
other than frequency). However, this is not a trivial
matter and different parameters may require more trig-
gering experience than others. Indeed, some parameters
may in fact be set by single events; for example, some
child might "learn" (another metaphor) the meaning of
the words add and giraffe from one exposure, particularly
if that single exposure focused much attention on the
word and provided a simple definition. Even some struc-
tural parameters might require few triggering experi-
ences; it might not require more than a few instances of
water from the bath, student of physics and such like to fix
a prepositional complement as following its nominal
head. As noted, raw data do not act as triggers, so it will
not be enough to count how many such phrases are heard
by the child under investigation. This parameter can be
set only when the child has a partial analysis whereby
water is classified as a noun and from the bath as PP; one
will want to know how much it takes from that stage
before the relevant parameter is set.
So any counting has to involve significant analysis and
has to presuppose a good account of the primitives in-
volved in the prior analyses; for example, is it enough to
know that water is a noun and from the bath a PP, or does
the child also need to know that the PP is in a modifying
relation? To answer those questions and thus to provide a
basis for the relevant quantification requires a better
understanding of parametric variation among languages
than we have at present; this quantification is hence not a
matter high on my current research agenda. Nonethe-
less, there are real questions here, as Buckingham and
Schlesingcr point out, and it certainly seems plausible to
assume with Baker that not all degree-0 data are robust
enough to act as part of the triggering experience and
have long-term effects. My sense is that more gram-
matical analysis is needed before we can develop precise
and useful ideas of what the relevant robustness consists
of. (Unlike Schlesinger, I see no reason to suppose that a
child sensitive only to robust data would ipso facto and
with no help from UG know the true extent of the partial
generalizations which permeate natural languages.)
This serves to re-emphasize my point about the trading
relation between ideas about UG, particular grammars
and triggers, nicely discussed by Cinque. Notions about
all three entities are theory-dependent and involve a
good deal of analysis, as noted by several commentators;
it is emphatically not the case that the triggering experi-
ence has some privileged accessibility to investigation,
because it consists of partial analyses and few analyses are
settled unquestionably and immutably. No useful claims
can be made about the trigger without working assump-
tions about UG and particular grammars. This of course
does not mean that one must first "settle," for example,
the role of the Subjacency condition in accounting for the
data in my (21), before raising issues about the possible
triggering experiences, as Buckingham fears. Unlike
Stabler, I do not see this as a problem, but just a normal
situation occurring as theories are enriched: we build
hypotheses on hypotheses, and most hypotheses are
subject to revision and refinement as we go along.
2. Tacking: Research strategies. A sailor is always ready
to abandon a tack when a wind makes it inappropriate,
and some commentators advocated different tacks to get
the laser to its target, different research strategies to
understand language acquisition. Perhaps Harris was
one such, but he worked up such a lather in Hong Kong
and flailed at so many straw men that I was unsure
whether he saw no laser or no lake.
A. Grimshaw, a sociologist, sees that linguistic argu-
ments from the poverty of the stimulus are based on clear,
impressive, and readily available data, and that hypoth-
eses are therefore eminently testable and refinable (if he
or others need more convincing on the uselessness of
negative data, Grimshaw & Pinker will provide it force-
fully). As a result, I am surprised that he is discomfitted
by assumptions I took to need no discussion or demon-
stration: that a lot can be learned from constructed exam-
ples like water from the bath, student of physics, and so
forth, regardless of who might have uttered such phrases
under what conditions; that children sometimes resist
correction; that certain kinds of rarely heard expressions
may not be part of the triggering experience nor have
long-term consequences. A. Grimshaw wants a research
program with more attention to the social constraints on
language, particularly when dealing with language
change, but he does not show how this will cast light on
the questions I was dealing with. Clearly, social factors
account for why certain historical changes take place.
Indeed, much of historical linguistics can be seen as a
kind of population genetics, but not all of it. I'm not sure
how Grimshaw thinks my point about obsolescence and
triggering experiences would have been altered by con-
sidering social variables. It may well be that social factors
will influence what I have called the robustness of a
structure, but even that remains undemonstrated.
McCawley and Schlesinger are pursuing a research
strategy which takes conceptual/logical categories as fun-
damental, but the differences may not be as great as they
suggest. Pursuing a strategy which emanates from the
generative semantics program, McCawley thinks that
children have a genetically determined scheme of
conceptual structure functioning in terms of logical cate-
gories (like predicate, argument, quantifier) that they can
impose on expressions. Some of these notions may be
necessary but they are by no means sufficient. My note 1
referred elliptically to the semantic distinction between
student from New York and student of physics. If that
analysis is correct, children eventually assign the struc-
ture
 N'[N-[N[water]] PP[from the bath]] to water from the
bath, and not
 N.[N[water] P P [from the bath]], although
the PS rules of (2.a) make both structures available. This
accounts for the fact that the phrase reflects two semantic
"properties" (in the terminology of Baker 1978). It is
entirely possible that this knowledge is part of the trigger
for the syntactic structure; in that case, the trigger is not
exclusively syntactic. In other words, the input to later
stages of language acquisition includes not only a partial
phonological representation of the expression but also a
partial representation of the meaning; so the child needs a
rough idea of the meaning of an expression as a syntactic
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representation is assigned. This does not entail that Spec
does not exist, that S must be subject to the PS template
of (6), and least of all that some sort of conceptual
structure suffices for the linguistic genotype.
The last is evidently what Schlesinger expects to find.
He objects to the "special-purpose solutions" of gener-
ative grammar on the grounds that they cannot account
for various selectional violations. He offers a generaliza-
tion that subjects are viewed as either agents (his 1-3) or
having responsibility (4-5). This is false: The tent in (4.a)
and this shirt in (5.a) are in no way agentive or "responsi-
ble, " and it begs the question of why the car is agentive in
(l.a) but not the wind in (l.b). Even if the generalization
were true, one would need to ask whether it was under-
determined by childhood experience. If it were generally
valid, then it could be "learned" inductively by a child
because all subjects would exhibit it and there would be
no poverty-of-stimulus problem. If it is a partial gener-
alization, -then genotypical principles are likely to be
involved. According to Chomsky (1965) children learn
that the subject of certain verbs tends to be agentive and
that this learning is guided by general principles of UG
which delimit the form of the lexicon. Burzio (1981)
provided analyses of ergative verbs (as in Schlesinger's 4
and 5), which have the effect that they may not have
agentive subjects. More generally, even if "innate con-
structs are of no avail in many other cases, which are
explained . . . in terms of general cognitive factors," this
would hardly entail that innate constructs are not needed
for the kinds of cases I discussed. If innate constructs are
relevant for certain things and not others then that would
be the fact of the matter, whether "parsimonious" or not.
Snow & Tomasello study the speech of children and
speech addressed to children. Much can be learned from
this for my purposes; however, one hopes that they
interpret children's speech more successfully than they
interpret linguists' articles. Their response deals mis-
leadingly with imputations and implications. They charge
me with neglecting "virtually all of the empirical research
on PLD," concluding that my concept of PLD is too
narrow, because it ignores much of what children hear
and do. But as Wilkins reiterates, what is at issue is not
what data are in the child's environment, but which are
the basis for "learning. " Snow & Tomasello take "PLD'
to be what children hear, whereas I used the term to refer
to the subset relevant for language acquisition; therein
lies the source of much misunderstanding.
Research on what children hear is not necessarily
concerned with PLD in the sense I used the term; this is
clear in the work of Wells (1981), who sought a compre-
hensive account of what children hear and understand at
different stages. Such accounts are extremely useful inso-
far as they elucidate what children of various ages under-
stand and how, but they are not necessarily studies of
PLD (and nowhere did I suggest that Wells thought that
PLD included everything children hear). The misunder-
standing leads Snow & Tomasello to bark up a gum tree:
They want to distinguish usable from nonusable speech,
but usability is not the issue. Children can use and
understand complex nursery rhymes, but that does not
mean that complex structures are needed to establish the
child's grammar. Nor does the fact that they sometimes
imitate a novel and complex adult form entail that this
form is part of the trigger (and nowhere did I suggest that
children do not imitate). Such phenomena are important,
but they are not what I was dealing with; nor, it seems,
are they a good place to start to investigate the trading
relation between UG and the trigger experience. A gram-
matical analysis must be provided for what the child
understands, and that analysis will depend on details of
UG. Where observational work on children has success-
fully been brought to bear on the trading relation under
discussion here, it has customarily involved more gram-
matical analysis than one finds in the work of Snow and
her associates.
These are issues of research strategy, however, and
different strategies typically have different levels of suc-
cess at different times. A strategy which has not been
notably successful recently may bring unexpected results
next week; that's one of the elements that makes scientific
work and sailing exciting. Certainly it would be wrong-
headed to believe that adherents of one approach have
some monopoly on the human genotype, as McCawley
points out.
3. Scope and shape of UG. There are many ideas on the
range and nature of the linguistic genotype. Schlesinger
and O'Grady put forward a Piagetian form of "general
nativism" with no principles specific to the language
faculty. Schlesinger admits pragmatic and semantic prim-
itives, but does not address the poverty-of-stimulus argu-
ments for more specific notions. The one argument he
offers does not lead to his conclusion, as we have seen.
O'Grady, however, takes my arguments head-on and
postulates propositional, computational, and hypothesis-
formation modules as part of the genotype, all couched in
terms which range over objects other than language,
presumably. The propositional module includes a "se-
mantic coherence requirement," whereby each referring
expression must bear a thematic role. It is not shown how
such ideas are relevant to nonlinguistic domains, but
O'Grady crafts an analysis of the interpretation of one.
The idea is that one has no lexical content, and therefore
cannot assign a thematic role; consequently, one does not
find *the one of physics, alluding to a student. (Neale is
right to object to couching any anaphora rule in terms of
reference; the problem is that anaphora has taken on a
technical sense which makes it inappropriate also.) The
reason is that physics lacks a thematic role, violating the
semantic coherence requirement. Contrast this with the
one from New York, where from assigns a thematic role to
New York. However, this generalization cannot be cor-
rect. If one has no lexical content, that would be true a
fortiori of a phonetically empty noun; nonetheless, (l.a)
seems more acceptable than *the student of physics is
older than the one of chemistry, and (l.b) certainly is
(here "e" indicates the phonetically empty noun, stand-
ing for students and pictures respectively). One wonders
where physics in (l.a) and Jim in (l.b) get their thematic
roles from. Furthermore, the well-formedness of (l.c)
suggests that O'Grady's account of one itself requires
amendment.
(1) a. ?I met two students of geology and three e of physics
b. I saw two pictures of Kim and three e of Jim
c. I saw the one of Tim
Presumably this is the kind of genotype that McCawley
has in mind, although I'm unsure whether he would call
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his logical categories not specifically linguistic. It might
also be what drives A. Grimshaw to urge linguists to
consider extralinguistic concepts like parsimony and effi-
ciency as the basis of UG. O'Grady sees clearly that the
challenge will be to state these general ideas specifically
enough to solve linguistic problems. He asks for more
time, which is fair enough, but he must acknowledge that
this program has a long and so far not very successful
history.
Haider, in his guise as advocatus diaboli, presents UG
somewhat differently. Rather than the environment se-
lecting values for the parameters of UG, UG triggers the
child to look for certain things in the PLD. I see no
substantive issue here and certainly not that the former
mode reduces the role of "cognition." Nor do I see any
incompatibility with the fact (also pointed out by Snow &
Tomasello) that children may adopt intermediate analy-
ses which do not match those of their adult models; a two-
year-old might interpret its linguistic environment in
such a way as to set a parameter one way, but later, with
greater maturity and more parameters set, interpret
things differently and set the parameter differently.
This is a possibility in principle and has sometimes
been assumed to occur, but I am unaware of strong
arguments for such a sequence of events. In fact, Cinque
offers an interesting discussion of the distortions which
can be provoked by the actual stages of language acquisi-
tion; he suggests an alternative, "instantaneous" account
of the acquisition of the much-studied null subject option
of Italian. This and Radford's (1988) analysis on which it is
based, strike me as very plausible. He argues for delayed
parameter-setting rather than resetting. Radford's argu-
ment that INFL and other nonlexical projections are not
available in the early stages of acquisition may cast light
on the acquisition of null subjects, which has been exten-
sively discussed since Hyams (1983). If so, then we shall
want to know whether elements of UG are subject to an
internal clock of the kind that regulates the emergence of
secondary sexual characteristics (Borer & Wexler 1987),
or whether data triggering the existence of INFL are
somehow less accessible than data triggering the exis-
tence of nouns and verbs. There have been attempts to
show that certain aspects of UG only become available at
relatively late stages in the acquisition process, but they
have not been entirely convincing (see Lightfoot 1982,
pp. 173-75, and Weinberg 1987). Such questions are on
the research agenda, however, and are being explored
actively.
Koster enters an objection to the use of the term
"Universal Grammar" to characterize the initial state of
the language learner because of the modular nature of
language. I actually used "linguistic genotype" to encom-
pass information which must be available to children
independently of any experience with language, in order
for the eventual mature linguistic capacities to emerge in
the way they do. If one cuts some substantial corners, one
can take the information to be genetically encoded in
some fashion; those corners relate to the possibility of
epigenetic developments and the like, which nobody will
have the faintest idea how to approach until theories
progress beyond their present rudimentary state (for
some discussion, see Lightfoot 1982, p. 4). I adapted the
usual terminology about UG, grammars, and PLD to
refer to the relevant parts of the genotype, phenotype,
and environment. We know very little now about how
this information is organized and how it interacts with
other aspects of the human genotype (see Lightfoot 1982,
pp. 42-49). It may turn out that O'Grady's general
nativism is appropriate in certain areas and there may be
principles which are crucial for language and for some
other cognitive capacity. Perhaps, for example, the recur-
sive capacity presupposed by the number system is also
exploited for language, as has sometimes been suggested.
Given the kind of parametrization that seems to be
involved and the apparent plasticity of the genotype, it
hardly seems likely that there will be nothing specific to
language. Meanwhile, I see nothing inappropriate in
using "UG" to refer to the relevant cluster of properties as
we grope our way to some of their most salient features.
4. Why degree-O? Despite the alert, I took the laser out to
focus attention on a neglected aspect of selective models
of acquisition and to formulate a plausible but strong
hypothesis: Parameters are set on exposure only to simple
structures and nothing special has to be learned in order
to use complex structures. I did not offer a proof of
degree-0 learnability along the lines of Wexler and
Culicover (1980), as Williams correctly emphasized. Nor
did I offer a principle comparable to Subjacency or the
Subset Principle, pace Rizzi. Nonetheless, if some such
form of degree-0 learnability is plausible, one will seek to
re-analyze proposed parameter settings which seem to
need richer triggers. I discussed three such examples in
the target article, and I shall consider some more in
section 6 below.
Haider wondered what a degree-2 learnable param-
eter would look like, and Morgan offered an ingenious
argument against degree-2 learnability based on statis-
tical data about speech addressed to Roger Brown's (1973)
children. Rizzi's (1982a) analysis of S and S' as bounding
nodes would suffice for Haider. Although the parameter
does not exist in the form that Rizzi originally proposed
(see Rizzi's commentary and section 5 below) there was
nothing inconceivable about it. Furthermore, within the
framework of that analysis nothing a priori required a
degree-0 trigger like my (45), and the sentences were
readily comprehensible. For a child, of course, Rizzi's
sentences (my 21) could be comprehended only when
much of the grammar was in place, not in the early stages
of acquisition. At the relevant stage it is possible that
exposure to just a few such sentences would have sufficed
to set the parameter. If Morgan is right, children can be
expected to hear 21,000 sentences of degree-2 or greater
complexity over a five-year period; from that pool Italian
children would need to hear a few like my (21) at the
appropriate stage, regardless of the ratio of tokens-to-
types. As a result, Morgan's principled case against de-
gree-2 learnability fails, unfortunately.
These matters are hypothetical if some degree-0 story
is correct. If children set parameters only on the basis of
unembedded Domains, then Rizzi's parameter could not
have been set by structures like my (21). Furthermore, a
parameter could not be set by properties of the verb or
direct object of an embedded clause (but see below).
Several commentators regard this as implausible, includ-
ing Lasnik, and I shall address some arguments to that
effect in section 6. This is nonetheless an empirical issue
for a degree-0 account and a strong hypothesis. (It does
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not mean, of course, that children only hear the front of
an embedded clause, as in Wasow's caricature.) I am
therefore puzzled by Lasnik's contention that the dif-
ference between degree-0 defined in terms of binding
Domains and degree-1 defined in terms of clauses (in the
fashion of Wexler & Culicover 1980) may be termin-
ological. It is of course possible that a binding Domain
may be defined parametrically in some language in such a
way that my notion of degree-0 would match Wexler and
Culicover's notion of degree-1 in that language, but that
would not make the ideas generally equivalent.
Not only is degree-0 learnability an empirical matter,
but it also does not follow in any strong sense from the
nature of current ideas abut UG. Locality conditions in
UG certainly facilitate degree-0 learnability and probably
constitute a necessary condition, but they do not suffice.
Perhaps this is what Williams means by a "tame" relation.
Again, Rizzi's analysis of bounding nodes, while not
correct, cannot be ruled out a priori and illustrates how a
grammar with only local processes may nonetheless re-
quire complex data to set some parameter. The commen-
taries of Joshi and Wilkins are important in this regard.
Wilkins is right to say that nothing in my theory of UG
specifically motivates degree-0 learning, and that this
theory of UG would be neither weakened nor strength-
ened if degree-1 embeddings proved to be needed for
learnability . . . except that this would free linguists to
postulate parameter settings sensitive to embedded
verbs and direct objects. I do not view this as a short-
coming; indeed Culicover and Wilkins (1984) used a
theory of UG with very strict locality conditions; this may
have motivated them to investigate degree-0 learnability,
as she says, but it did not guarantee degree-0 learnability.
Wilkins now takes degree-1 embeddings to be available.
Joshi, on the other hand, offers a mathematical specifica-
tion of degree-0 learnability by using a form of UG which
allows a set of elementary structures and a single adjunc-
tion operation to yield recursive structures. The locality
of the grammar is taken to guarantee the simplicity of the
PLD, but something more is needed to show how the
German child, for example, sets the verb as VP-final and
allows it to occur to the left only in root clauses. It will be
an interesting result if degree-0 learnability can be guar-
anteed by some form of UG, but I know of no such
argument yet and consequently see no principled reason
for it.
5. Beating upwind: Empirical issues. The commentaries
have raised some intriguing empirical issues, but here I
can only briefly mention some general ones which re-
quire elaboration or amendment in my account.
Buckingham, Clark, Crodzinsky, Lasnik, Morgan,
Wilkins, and Williams all raise an important and general
issue: how to match triggers to parameters. As indicated
in section 1 above, this involves questions of robustness;
the child must not be, in Grodzinsky's phrase, "trigger
happy," reacting too readily to everything that is heard.
An appropriate notion of robustness would solve
Grodzinsky's problem with give and donate: Structures
like his (l.b) would be robust in the appropriate sense,
whereas (3.a) might occur in isolation but would not be
sufficiently robust (that much would be plausible; unlike
Grodzinsky and Randall (1985), I do not hear a great
difference between (3.a) and (3.b)).
Under current analyses, however, the issue also in-
volves an apparent multiplicity of triggers for a given
parameter; so Wilkins points out that French, Italian, and
Spanish would each use different triggers to set S' as a
bounding node. Buckingham asks whether the existence
of null subjects would be set in a given language by the
presence of postverbal subjects, empty subjects or, we
add, "uniform" inflectional marking on verbs (see
Morgan) (but surely not by the existence of object-verb
structures, which do not occur in Italian and are presum-
ably not relevant). The issue is a general one even if these
examples do not survive further analysis: There is proba-
bly no S/S' option for bounding nodes (below) and null
subjects are probably set by hearing null subjects (which
in turn are licensed but not triggered by a suitable INFL).
Clark shows that structures which seem to trigger
"Exceptional Case Marking" in English (whereby a verb
governs and assigns case to the subject of an infinitival
complement) may not trigger an equivalent process in
Irish and Latin. The Irish child, on exposure to Clark's
(2), must somehow determine that the subject receives its
case from within its own clause (from an INFL adjoined to
S, if Chung & McCloskey 1987 are right), whereas the
English child, on hearing he expected her to win,
determines that her receives case from the higher verb.
Lasnik raises an intriguing problem involving the
matching of trigger to parameter. He points to a grammar
with encliticization and procliticization processes and
asks what would prevent a child from subsuming some
particular phenomenon under the wrong process. His
answer is either indirect access to negative data (and he
provides a very plausible scenario) or degree-1 embed-
dings. The problem may prove to be a general one and
other examples will be interesting, but there are at least
two plausible tacks for Lasnik's case. One would make
cliticization processes generally subject to a government
condition (as suggested in Aoun & Lightfoot (1984)).
Since want but not win governs the INFL to in a structure
(2) (assuming INFL to be the head of S), to must en-
cliticize on to want.
(2)
 v.[want s[to VP[win]]]
Meanwhile simple cases like s'Kim here? or s'cold in
here, with the clitic form of is in sentence-initial position,
would show that is may be adjoined to the left of the
following item (thereby governed by Kim). There's much
more to be said about this, but the approach looks
promising. The second tack would be to say that Lasnik's
primary datum (6.c) who do you think's here? is a degree-
0 datum: If is manifests INFL, which, in turn, is the head
of the embedded clause, then it has the upstairs clause as
its binding Domain.
Rizzi's rich commentary offers an alternative means of
defining "unembedded": in terms of government do-
mains. He takes parameters to relate to the properties of
heads and proposes that all such parameters should be
settable by inspecting the immediate environment of the
head, that is, the government domain. To determine the
properties of, say, verbs, it should be necessary to inspect
only a maximally accessible verb, that is, the verb of a
matrix clause. This is an attractive formulation which
avoids a so far unmentioned problem with using binding
Domains as the key notion: If Domains are defined in
terms of accessible SUBJECTS, then the direct object of
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an embedded clause has no accessible SUBJECT, hence
no Domain, and therefore has the matrix clause as its
Domain by default (see Aoun 1986). By this reasoning
children should have access to embedded direct objects
in order to set parameters, which is an unwelcome relaxa-
tion of our central hypothesis. Rizzi's formulation does
not have this defect and is therefore empirically distinct.
Then the question arises of whether this view of param-
eters is exhaustive; is there variation in ways which do not
relate directly to the properties of heads, for example, in
terms of how binding Domains are defined? If the head-
related view is not exhaustive, then Rizzi's definition of
degree-0 will need to be amended. Also, the deletability
of complementizers is manifested only in embedded
structures; an embedded Comp would not be accessible
to Rizzi's child. This may also distinguish the two ap-
proaches, unless it can be shown that the deletability of an
item in Comp is a reflex of properties of the governing
verb.
Kroch and Vincent offer interesting discussion of the
implication of degree-0 learnability for work on language
change. Vincent takes up the matter of obsolescent struc-
tures and gives an account which conforms in general to
my understanding. He correctly distinguishes externally
and internally motivated changes, pointing to the neces-
sity of external changes due to adult innovations, popula-
tion shifts and the like. He then wonders how one could
distinguish obsolescence due to "a structural 'knock-on'
effect' from that which is socially determined. This ques-
tion is quite general in diachronic work and there are
criteria for drawing such distinctions, as he notes. How-
ever, what is intriguing about obsolescence is that it must
generally be due to structural factors, since only under
quite exceptional circumstances is it plausible to argue
that people stopped saying certain things for stylistic
reasons or because of external influences; usually a struc-
ture becomes obsolete as a consequence of some other
change and is, in some sense, pushed out. It is for this
reason that I have argued that obsolescent structures are
particularly illuminating (Lightfoot, in press).
Changes involving obsolescence seem relatively
abrupt, like other structural changes, whereas externally
induced changes seem to be more gradual; I do not see
gradualness as a general property of historical change.
There has been a continuing debate on this point, and
Kroch's views may be somewhat different. The quan-
titative research of Kroch and his associates is among the
most important recent work in historical linguistics. He
shows that people may operate with heterogeneous gram-
mars; his statistics show that changes spread gradually but
in a nonetheless systematic fashion reflecting the cluster-
ing of phenomena that grammars require. However,
although all changes spread through a speech community
gradually, it is less clear whether they affect individuals
with equal gradualness. This is an important topic, re-
quiring more extensive discussion (Lightfoot, forthcom-
ing).
I discussed the available bounding nodes for the Subja-
cency condition within the framework of Rizzi's 1982a
analysis to illustrate the markedness conventions in-
volved and to make some points about the nature of the
trigger. Grimshaw (1986) has shown, however, that
Rizzi's analysis is probably incorrect, as noted in the
target article and by Buckingham, Koster, and Rizzi.
Furthermore, if Rizzi is right in his speculation here that
parametric variation is limited to the properties of heads,
then his 1982 proposals would be excluded in principle
and they cannot be taken as typical of anything. His
speculation, if correct, would also undermine the
usefulness of the distinction drawn by Freidin & Quicoli
between rule- and principle-related parameters.
6. Running downwind: Empirical challenges to degree-0.
Several commentators devised challenges for degree-0
learnability. Some can be analyzed away in such a fashion
as to strengthen my notion and to provide a following
wind to speed the laser along. However, the most dan-
gerous time on the lake is when running before the wind.
Other challenges are more mysterious and may
eventually cause a gibe and a capsize. Let's first get up
some speed.
Two issues were raised by several commentators: verb-
second phenomena in Dutch and German and long-
distance anaphors in the Scandinavian languages. The
apparent problem for the Dutch child concerns how to
attain from unembedded information the knowledge that
verbs occur at the end of the sentence in embedded
clause. A Dutch child endowed with a phrase structure
schema like my (6) knows that heads occur adjacent to
complements in D-structure, perhaps preceding or per-
haps following them. Partially analyzed structures like (3)
might lure the child to the view that Dutch has subject
[verb object] at D-structure; but (4), where the verb is not
adjacent to its direct object, forces the child to conclude
that something has moved.
(3)
 NP[vele mensen] v[Iezen] NP[geen krant]
"many people read no newspaper"
(4) in Utrecht lezen velc mensen geen krant
"in Utrecht read many people no newspaper"
Various factors would eventually show that it was the verb
which has moved upward rather than the subject vele
mensen downward into the VP, or any of the other
possibilities. And the presence of specifiers and separable
prefixes in final position (5) would show that to be the
source position for the verb.
(5) a. vele mensen lezen de krant niet/nooit
b. vele mensen bellen de docent op
"many people call the teacher up"
Space limitations preclude further discussion here, but
see Lightfoot (forthcoming). The phrase structure schema
is the crucial factor indicating movement; a more ag-
gressive sailor might take out another boat and hone this
into an argument for the "special nativism" that some
commentators seek to avoid.1
Rizzi pointed to one approach to long-distance ana-
phors in Icelandic, following Pica (1987) and keying their
syntactic properties to their morphological form. Sigur-
jonsdottir and Hyams (1988) offer another approach,
which treats Icelandic sig as a bound variable analogous to
his in everybody loves his mother, and not as an anaphor.
If it were an anaphor, then the Subset Principle would
predict that early grammars would allow only local bind-
ing (because that defines a smaller language than a gram-
mar also allowing long-distance binding). However, they
show that children control the complex constraints on
long-distance binding at a relatively early age and that
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both children and adults show a strong preference for
long-distance readings where the anaphors are ambigu-
ous. Bound variables, on the other hand, typically have
long-distance dependencies (everybody hopes that his
mother is happy). Chien and Wexler (1987) and Lee and
Wexler (1987) report different developmental data for
Chinese and Korean, so the solution does not carry over
straightforwardly for those languages. However, Baker's
account of Wilcoxon (1988) suggests that apparent em-
bedded reflexives in Chinese may be instances of an
"intensive adverb," which will change the problem
significantly.2
Relative clauses posed problems for some commen-
tators. Williams wondered how the deletability of rela-
tive pronouns would follow from degree-0 properties.
The binding Domain for a Comp is the upstairs clause and
therefore the properties of an embedded Comp are avail-
able to a degree-0 learner; these properties include the
deletability of items in that position and the features of
words like if and whether, which Wasow did not see how
to treat.3 The availability of an embedded Comp might
also suffice for Wasow's problem with Keenan and Com-
rie s (1977) accessibility hierarchy; insofar as relative
pronouns bear the necessary case markers, a child will
observe whether a relative pronoun in Comp may be a
subject (Malagasy) or subject/object (Welsh) or whatever.
Relative pronouns do not always carry the necessary
markers, however, and in those cases one must hope that
Cinque's (1981) approach is fruitful and that the gener-
alizations correctly predicted by Keenan and Comrie's
accessibility hierarchy emerge from principles of UG
interacting with degree-0 features of particular gram-
mars. Clearly, degree-0 learnability, like any other hy-
pothesis, will be refined or refuted by counterana/i/ses,
not by raw phenomena. Baker, on the other hand, raises a
problem for which I now have nothing to suggest: the
occurrence of resumptive pronouns in relative clauses in
some languages, or, comparably, the occurrence of object
traces in English infinitival complements.
The other challenges to degree-0 about which I have
only questions and nothing useful to say are Wilkins's
material on Navaho clitics, which appear to attach only to
embedded verbs, and Haider's discussion of extraction
from within embedded questions and relative clauses
(where it is unclear what parameter is involved, let alone
how it is set). Wilkins mentions the subjunctive mood of
verbs under predicates like necessario in Spanish; this is
presumably a form of complementation, marked in the
Comp or the head of the clause or both. However,
questions of degree-0 learnability do arise from the "ob-
viation " properties of Romance subjunctives: The subject
of a subjunctive complement must be disjoint in refer-
ence from the higher subject (6).
(6) a. je veux que Pierre/*j'aille a Paris
I want that Peter/I should go to Paris
Maybe the subjunctive has the effect of making the
binding Domain for the embedded subject the next
clause up, like an infinitive; or maybe a pragmatic solu-
tion is in order.
7. Conclusion. There are therefore several substantial
puzzles for this kind of degree-0 hypothesis. All such
puzzles will involve matters of detailed analysis at the
Response/ Lightfoot: Language learnability
level both UG and the particular grammar under investi-
gation. As Cinque points out, this is both a strong and a
desirable hypothesis. I have argued here that it is also
plausible; nothing in the commentaries leads me to aban-
don the boat. It is for others to judge whether dignity has
been abandoned. However, the commentaries have
raised several valuable questions about the nature of the
parameter-setting model. This is important. Many con-
ceptual advantages are claimed for the parameter-setting
model over the earlier grammar selection model, whose
child formulated and tested hypotheses according to an
evaluation metric. The notion of parameters has provided
a vehicle and an incentive for more productive com-
parative work, with important consequences. However,
alongside the real conceptual advantages, there are many
ambiguities, unclarities, and difficulties for such a model.
These commentaries have been particularly interesting
for the questions raised about it. I have tried to provide
partial answers where possible, but fundamental ques-
tions are still open. I am deeply grateful to all the
commentators for their energetic attention, for helping to
tidy up the design of the boat and for suggesting how it
could be sailed better.
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NOTES
1. If some such account were not available, one might main-
tain a version of degree-0 learnability by taking the embedded
verb to manifest INFL (fairly uncontroversial) and taking INFL
to be the head of the embedded clause, whose Domain is
therefore unembedded.
2. Perhaps this would also change Lasnik's problem with
object reflexives in Chinese. However, notice in this case that
the binding Domain for the object ziji in Lasnik's (8) is, by
default, the matrix (because it has no accessible SUBJECT). In
my discussion of Rizzi's alternative formulation (section 5 above)
I noted the availability of embedded objects as a difference
between our accounts. If no better solution is found for Lasnik's
problem, there will be a reason to reject Rizzi's more restrictive
formulation.
3. Wasow also points to were in if I were the boss, I
would . . . , which occurs only in conditional clauses. Such
forms are probably archaisms, more taught than acquired
through the usual parameter-setting process, and thus by no
means uniform in the speech of English speakers. Again, how-
ever, were occupies INFL and may be the head of the clause; in
that case it might be available to language learners. Wasow also
points to "logophoric" pronouns, citing Sells (1987) to the effect
that they occur "predominantly" in complement clauses. By a
useful rhetorical move, predominantly occurring in comple-
ment clauses translates a few lines later into "never occur in
degree-0 data." Latin certainly allows logophoric pronouns in
main clauses which are understood to reflect what somebody
said. Perhaps this is also possible in Gokana; in fact, Wasow's
source, Hyman and Comrie (1981), provides such an example in
the final footnote. I have not been able to check his material on
the deletability of Swedish hade, but he relates it to a similar
phenomenon in some dialects of English which allow a reduced
form of have (written of) "in some embedded environments."
However, those dialects allow the same reduced forms in matrix
clauses: / could of done it.
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